The Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist
#1
Holy Eucharist
(Greek eucharistia, thanksgiving).


The name given to the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar in its twofold aspect of sacrament and Sacrifice of Mass, and in which Jesus Christ is truly present under the appearances of bread and wine.

Other titles are used, such as "Lord's Supper" (Coena Domini), "Table of the Lord" (Mensa Domini), the "Lord's Body" (Corpus Domini), and the "Holy of Holies" (Sanctissimum), to which may be added the following expressions, and somewhat altered from their primitive meaning: "Agape" (Love-Feast), "Eulogia" (Blessing), "Breaking of Bread", "Synaxis" (Assembly), etc.; but the ancient title "Eucharistia" appearing in writers as early as Ignatius, Justin, and Irenæus, has taken precedence in the technical terminology of the Church and her theologians. The expression "Blessed Sacrament of the Altar", introduced by Augustine, is at the present day almost entirely restricted to catechetical and popular treatises.

This extensive nomenclature, describing the great mystery from such different points of view, is in itself sufficient proof of the central position the Eucharist has occupied from the earliest ages, both in the Divine worship and services of the Church and in the life of faith and devotion which animates her members.

The Church honors the Eucharist as one of her most exalted mysteries, since for sublimity and incomprehensibility it yields in nothing to the allied mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation. These three mysteries constitute a wonderful triad, which causes the essential characteristic of Christianity, as a religion of mysteries far transcending the capabilities of reason, to shine forth in all its brilliance and splendor, and elevates Catholicism, the most faithful guardian and keeper of our Christian heritage, far above all pagan and non-Christian religions.

The organic connection of this mysterious triad is clearly discerned, if we consider Divine grace under the aspect of a personal communication of God. Thus in the bosom of the Blessed Trinity, God the Father, by virtue of the eternal generation, communicates His Divine Nature to God the Son, "the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" (John 1:18), while the Son of God, by virtue of the hypostatic union, communicates in turn the Divine Nature received from His Father to His human nature formed in the womb of the Virgin Mary (John 1:14), in order that thus as God-man, hidden under the Eucharistic Species, He might deliver Himself to His Church, who, as a tender mother, mystically cares for and nurtures in her own bosom this, her greatest treasure, and daily places it before her children as the spiritual food of their souls. Thus the Trinity, Incarnation, and Eucharist are really welded together like a precious chain, which in a wonderful manner links heaven with earth, God with man, uniting them most intimately and keeping them thus united. By the very fact that the Eucharistic mystery does transcend reason, no rationalistic explanation of it, based on a merely natural hypothesis and seeking to comprehend one of the sublimest truths of the Christian religion as the spontaneous conclusion of logical processes, may be attempted by a Catholic theologian.

The modern science of comparative religion is striving, wherever it can, to discover in pagan religions "religio-historical parallels", corresponding to the theoretical and practical elements of Christianity, and thus by means of the former to give a natural explanation of the latter. Even were an analogy discernible between the Eucharistic repast and the ambrosia and nectar of the ancient Greek gods, or the haoma of the Iranians, or the soma of the ancient Hindus, we should nevertheless be very cautious not to stretch a mere analogy to a parallelism strictly so called, since the Christian Eucharist has nothing at all in common with these pagan foods, whose origin is to be found in the crassest idol- and nature-worship. What we do particularly discover is a new proof of the reasonableness of the Catholic religion, from the circumstance that Jesus Christ in a wonderfully condescending manner responds to the natural craving of the human heart after a food which nourishes unto immortality, a craving expressed in many pagan religions, by dispensing to mankind His own Flesh and Blood. All that is beautiful, all that is true in the religions of nature, Christianity has appropriated to itself, and like a concave mirror has collected the dispersed and not infrequently distorted rays of truth into their common focus and again sent them forth resplendently in perfect beams of light.

It is the Church alone, "the pillar and ground of truth", imbued with and directed by the Holy Spirit, that guarantees to her children through her infallible teaching the full and unadulterated revelation of God. Consequently, it is the first duty of Catholics to adhere to what the Church proposes as the "proximate norm of faith" (regula fidei proxima), which, in reference to the Eucharist, is set forth in a particularly clear and detailed manner in Sessions XIII, XXI, and XXII of the Council of Trent.

The quintessence of these doctrinal decisions consists in this, that in the Eucharist the Body and Blood of the God-man are truly, really, and substantially present for the nourishment of our souls, by reason of the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, and that in this change of substances the unbloody Sacrifice of the New Testament is also contained.

These three principle truths — Sacrifice, Sacrament, and Real Presence — are given a more detailed consideration in the following articles:
"So let us be confident, let us not be unprepared, let us not be outflanked, let us be wise, vigilant, fighting against those who are trying to tear the faith out of our souls and morality out of our hearts, so that we may remain Catholics, remain united to the Blessed Virgin Mary, remain united to the Roman Catholic Church, remain faithful children of the Church."- Abp. Lefebvre
Reply
#2
Sacrifice of the Mass

The word Mass (missa) first established itself as the general designation for the Eucharistic Sacrifice in the West after the time of Pope Gregory the Great (d. 604), the early Church having used the expression the "breaking of bread" (fractio panis) or "liturgy" (Acts 13:2, leitourgountes); the Greek Church has employed the latter name for almost sixteen centuries.

There were current in the early days of Christianity other terms;
  • "The Lord's Supper" (coena dominica),
  • the "Sacrifice" (prosphora, oblatio),
  • "the gathering together" (synaxis, congregatio),
  • "the Mysteries", and
  • (since Augustine), "the Sacrament of the Altar".

With the name "Love Feast" (agape) the idea of the sacrifice of the Mass was not necessarily connected. Etymologically, the word missa is neither (as Baronius states) from a Hebrew, nor from the Greek mysis, but is simply derived from missio, just as oblata is derived from oblatio, collecta from collectio, and ulta from ultio. The reference was however not to a Divine "mission", but simply to a "dismissal" (dimissio) as was also customary in the Greek rite (cf. "Canon. Apost.", VIII, xv: apolyesthe en eirene), and as is still echoed in the phrase Ite missa est. This solemn form of leave-taking was not introduced by the Church as something new, but was adopted from the ordinary language of the day, as is shown by Bishop Avitus of Vienne as late as A.D. 500 (Ep. 1 in P.L., LIX, 199):

In churches and in the emperor's or the prefect's courts, Missa est is said when the people are released from attendance.

In the sense of "dismissal", or rather "close of prayer", missa is used in the celebrated "Peregrinatio Silvae" at least seventy times (Corpus scriptor. eccles. latinor., XXXVIII, 366 sq.) and Rule of St. Benedict places after Hours, Vespers, Compline, the regular formula: Et missae fiant (prayers are ended). Popular speech gradually applied the ritual of dismissal, as it was expressed in both the Mass of the Catechumens and the Mass of the Faithful, by synecdoche to the entire Eucharistic Sacrifice, the whole being named after the part. The first certain trace of such an application is found in Ambrose (Ep. xx, 4, in P.L. XVI, 995). We will use the word in this sense in our consideration of the Mass in its existence, essence, and causality.


The existence of the Mass

Before dealing with the proofs of revelation afforded by the Bible and tradition, certain preliminary points must first be decided. Of these the most important is that the Church intends the Mass to be regarded as a "true and proper sacrifice", and will not tolerate the idea that the sacrifice is identical with Holy Communion. That is the sense of a clause from the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, can. 1): "If any one saith that in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God; or, that to be offered is nothing else but that Christ is given us to eat; let him be anathema" (Denzinger, "Enchir.", 10th ed. 1908, n. 948). When Leo XIII in the dogmatic Bull "Apostolicae Curae" of 13 Sept., 1896, based the invalidity of the Anglican form of consecration on the fact among others, that in the consecrating formula of Edward VI (that is, since 1549) there is nowhere an unambiguous declaration regarding the Sacrifice of the Mass, the Anglican archbishops answered with some irritation: "First, we offer the Sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving; next, we plead and represent before the Father the Sacrifice of the Cross . . . and, lastly, we offer the Sacrifice of ourselves to the Creator of all things, which we have already signified by the oblation of His creatures. This whole action, in which the people has necessarily to take part with the priest, we are accustomed to call the communion, the Eucharistic Sacrifice". In regard to this last contention, Bishop Hedley of Newport declared his belief that not one Anglican in a thousand is accustomed to call the communion the "Eucharistic Sacrifice." But even if they were all so accustomed, they would have to interpret the terms in the sense of the thirty-nine Articles, which deny both the Real Presence and the sacrifical power of the priest, and thus admit a sacrifice in an unreal or figurative sense only. Leo XIII, on the other hand, in union with the whole Christian past, had in mind in the above-mentioned Bull nothing else than the Eucharistic "Sacrifice of the true Body and Blood of Christ" on the altar. This Sacrifice is certainly not identical with the Anglican form of celebration.

The simple fact that numerous heretics, such as Wyclif and Luther, repudiated the Mass as "idolatry", while retaining the Sacrament of the true Body and Blood of Christ, proves that the Sacrament of the Eucharist is something essentially different from the Sacrifice of the Mass. In truth, the Eucharist performs at once two functions: that of a sacrament and that of a sacrifice. Though the inseparableness of the two is most clearly seen in the fact that the consecrating sacrificial powers of the priest coincide, and consequently that the sacrament is produced only in and through the Mass, the real difference between them is shown in that the sacrament is intended privately for the sanctification of the soul, whereas the sacrifice serves primarily to glorify God by adoration, thanksgiving, prayer, and expiation. The recipient of the one is God, who receives the sacrifice of His only-begotten Son; of the other, man, who receives the sacrament for his own good. Furthermore, the unbloody Sacrifice of the Eucharistic Christ is in its nature a transient action, while the Sacrament of the Altar continues as something permanent after the sacrifice, and can even be preserved in monstrance and ciborium. Finally, this difference also deserves mention: communion under one form only is the reception of the whole sacrament, whereas, without the use of the two forms of bread and wine (the symbolic separation of the Body and Blood), the mystical slaying of the victim, and therefore the Sacrifice of the Mass, does not take place.

The definition of the Council of Trent supposes as self-evident the proposition that, along with the "true and real Sacrifice of the Mass", there can be and are in Christendom figurative and unreal sacrifices of various kinds, such as prayers of praise and thanksgiving, alms, mortification, obedience, and works of penance. Such offerings are often referred to in Holy Scripture, e.g. in Ecclesiasticus 35:4: "All he that doth mercy offereth sacrifice"; and in Psalm 140:2: "Let my prayer be directed as incense in thy sight, the lifting up of my hands as evening sacrifice." These figurative offerings, however, necessarily presuppose the real and true offering, just as a picture presupposes its subject and a portrait its original. The Biblical metaphors — a "sacrifice of jubilation" (Ps. xxvi, 6), the "calves of our lips (Hosea 14:3), the "sacrifice of praise" (Hebrews 13:15) — expressions which apply sacrificial terms to sacrifice (hostia, thysia). That there was such a sacrifice, the whole sacrificial system of the Old Law bears witness. It is true that we may and must recognize with St. Thomas (II-II:85:3), as the principale sacrificium the sacrificial intent which, embodied in the spirit of prayer, inspires and animates the external offerings as the body animates the soul, and without which even the most perfect offering has neither worth nor effect before God. Hence, the holy psalmist says: "For if thou hadst desired sacrifice, I would indeed have given it: with burnt-offerings thou wilt not be delighted. A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit" (Psalm 51:18 sq.). This indispensable requirement of an internal sacrifice, however, by no means makes the external sacrifice superfluous in Christianity; indeed, without a perpetual oblation deriving its value from the sacrifice once offered on the Cross, Christianity, the perfect religion, would be inferior not only to the Old Testament, but even to the poorest form of natural religion. Since sacrifice is thus essential to religion, it is all the more necessary for Christianity, which cannot otherwise fulfil its duty of showing outward honour to God in the most perfect way. Thus, the Church, as the mystical Christ, desires and must have her own permanent sacrifice, which surely cannot be either an independent addition to that of Golgotha or its intrinsic complement; it can only be the one self-same sacrifice of the Cross, whose fruits, by an unbloody offering, are daily made available for believers and unbelievers and sacrificially applied to them.

If the Mass is to be a true sacrifice in the literal sense, it must realize the philosophical conception of sacrifice. Thus the last preliminary question arises: What is a sacrifice in the proper sense of the term? Without attempting to state and establish a comprehensive theory of sacrifice, it will suffice to show that, according to the comparative history of religions, four things are necessary to a sacrifice:
  • a sacrificial gift (res oblata),
  • a sacrificing minister (minister legitimus),
  • a sacrificial action (actio sacrificica), and
  • a sacrificial end or object (finis sacrificii).
In contrast with sacrifices in the figurative or less proper sense, the sacrificial gift must exist in physical substance, and must be really or virtually destroyed (animals slain, libations poured out, other things rendered unfit for ordinary uses), or at least really transformed, at a fixed place of sacrifice (ara, altare), and offered up to God. As regards the person offering, it is not permitted that any and every individual should offer sacrifice on his own account. In the revealed religion, as in nearly all heathen religions, only a qualified person (usually called priest, sacerdos, lereus), who has been given the power by commission or vocation, may offer up sacrifice in the name of the community. After Moses, the priests authorized by law in the Old Testament belonged to the tribe of Levi, and more especially to the house of Aaron (Hebrews 5:4). But, since Christ Himself received and exercised His high priesthood, not by the arrogation of authority but in virtue of a Divine call, there is still greater need that priests who represent Him should receive power and authority through the Sacrament of Holy Orders to offer up the sublime Sacrifice of the New Law. Sacrifice reaches its outward culmination in the sacrificial act, in which we have to distinguish between the proximate matter and the real form. The form lies, not in the real transformation or complete destruction of the sacrificial gift, but rather in its sacrificial oblation, in whatever way it may be transformed. Even where a real destruction took place, as in the sacrificial slayings of the Old Testament, the act of destroying was performed by the servants of the Temple, whereas the proper oblation, consisting in the "spilling of blood" (aspersio sanguinis), was the exclusive function of the priests. Thus the real form of the Sacrifice of the Cross consisted neither in the killing of Christ by the Roman soldiers nor in an imaginary self-destruction on the part of Jesus, but in His voluntary surrender of His blood shed by another's hand, and in His offering of His life for the sins of the world. Consequently, the destruction or transformation constitutes at most the proximate matter; the sacrificial oblation, on the other hand, is the physical form of the sacrifice. Finally, the object of the sacrifice, as significant of its meaning, lifts the external offering beyond any mere mechanical action into the sphere of the spiritual and Divine. The object is the soul of the sacrifice, and, in a certain sense, its "metaphysicial form". In all religions we find, as the essential idea of sacrifice, a complete surrender to God for the purpose of union with Him; and to this idea there is added, on the part of those who are in sin, the desire for pardon and reconciliation. Hence at once arises the distinction between sacrifices of praise and expiation (sacrificium latreuticum et propitiatorium), and sacrifices of thanksgiving and petition (sacrificium eucharisticum et impetratorium); hence also the obvious inference that under pain of idolatry, sacrifice is to be offered to God alone as the beginning and end of all things. Rightly does St. Augustine remark (City of God X.4): "Who ever thought of offering sacrifice except to one whom he either knew, or thought, or imagined to be God?".

If then we combine the four constituent ideas in a definition, we may say: "Sacrifice is the external oblation to God by an authorized minister of a sense-perceptible object, either through its destruction or at least through its real transformation, in acknowledgement of God's supreme dominion and of the appeasing of His wrath." We shall demonstrate the applicability of this definition to the Mass in the section devoted to the nature of the sacrifice, after settling the question of its existence.

Scriptural proof
It is a notable fact that the Divine institution of the Mass can be established, one might almost say, with greater certainty by means of the Old Testament than by means of the New.

1. Old Testament

The Old Testament prophecies are recorded partly in types, partly in words. Following the precedent of many Fathers of the Church (see Bellarmine, "De Euchar.", v, 6), the Council of Trent especially (Sess. XXII, cap. i) laid stress on the prophetical relation that undoubtedly exists between the offering of bread and wine by Melchisedech and the Last Supper of Jesus. The occurrence was briefly as follows: After Abraham (then still called "Abram") with his armed men had rescued his nephew Lot from the four hostile kings who had fallen on him and robbed him, Melchisedech, King of Salem (Jerusalem), "bringing forth [proferens] bread and wine for he was a priest of the Most High God, blessed him [Abraham] and said: Blessed be Abram by the Most High God . . . And he [Abraham] gave him the tithes of all" (Genesis 14:18-20). Catholic theologians (with very few exceptions) have from the beginning rightly emphasized the circumstance that Melchisedech brought out bread and wine, not merely to provide refreshment for Abram's followers wearied after the battle, for they were well supplied with provisions out of the booty they had taken (Genesis 14:11, 16), but to present bread and wine as food-offerings to Almighty God. Not as a host, but as "priest of the Most High God", he brought forth bread and wine, blessed Abraham, and received the tithes from him. In fact, the very reason for his "bringing forth bread and wine" is expressly stated to have been his priesthood: "for he was a priest". Hence, proferre must necessarily become offerre, even if it were true that the Hiphil word is not an hieratic sacrificial term; but even this is not quite certain (cf. Judges 6:18 sq.). Accordingly, Melchisedech made a real food-offering of bread and wine.

Now it is the express teaching of Scripture that Christ is "a priest for ever according to the order [kata ten taxin] of Melchisedech" (Psalm 109:4; Hebrews 5:5 sq.; 7:1 sqq.). Christ, however, in no way resembled his priestly prototype in His bloody sacrifice on the Cross, but only and solely at His Last Supper. On that occasion He likewise made an unbloody food-offering, only that, as Antitype, He accomplished something more than a mere oblation of bread and wine, namely the sacrifice of His Body and Blood under the mere forms of bread and wine. Otherwise, the shadows cast before by the "good things to come" would have been more perfect than the things themselves, and the antitype at any rate no richer in reality than the type. Since the Mass is nothing else than a continual repetition, commanded by Christ Himself, of the Sacrifice accomplished at the Last Supper, it follows that the Sacrifice of the Mass partakes of the New testament fulfilment of the prophecy of Melchisedech. (Concerning the Paschal Lamb as the second type of the Mass, see Bellarmine, "De Euchar.", V, vii; cf. also von Cichowski, "Das altestamentl. Pascha in seinem Verhaltnis zum Opfer Christi", Munich, 1849.)

Passing over the more or less distinct references to the Mass in other prophets (Psalm 21:27 sqq., Isaiah 66:18 sqq.), the best and clearest prediction concerning the Mass is undoubtedly that of Malachias, who makes a threatening announcement to the Levite priests in the name of God: "I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of hosts: and I will not receive a gift of your hand. For from the rising of the sun even to the down, my name is great among the Gentiles [heathens, non-Jews], and in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to my name a clean oblation: for my name is great among Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts" (Malachi 1:10-11). According to the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers of the Church (see Petavius, "De incarn.", xii, 12), the prophet here foretells the everlasting Sacrifice of the New Dispensation. For he declares that these two things will certainly come to pass:
  • The abolition of all Levitical sacrifices, and 
  • the institution of an entirely new sacrifice.
As God's determination to do away with the sacrifices of the Levites is adhered to consistently throughout the denunciation, the essential thing is to specify correctly the sort of sacrifice that is promised in their stead. In regard to this, the following propositions have to be established:
  • that the new sacrifice is to come about in the days of the Messiah;
  • that it is to be a true and real sacrifice, and
  • that it does not coincide formally with the Sacrifice of the Cross.
It is easy to show that the sacrifice referred to by Malachias did not signify a sacrifice of his time, but was rather to be a future sacrifice belonging to the age of the Messiah. For though the Hebrew participles of the original can be translated by the present tense (there is sacrifice; it is offered), the mere universality of the new sacrifice — "from the rising to the setting", "in every place", even "among the Gentiles", i.e. heathen (non-Jewish) peoples — is irrefragable proof that the prophet beheld as present an event of the future. Wherever Jahwe speaks, as in this case, of His glorification by the "heathen", He can, according to Old Testament teaching (Psalm 21:28; 71:10 sqq.; Isaiah 11:9; 49:6; 60:9, 66:18 sqq.; Amos 9:12; Micah 4:2, etc.) have in mind only the kingdom of the Messiah or the future Church of Christ; every other explanation is shattered by the text. Least of all could a new sacrifice in the time of the prophet himself be thought of. Nor could there be any idea of is a sacrifice among the genuine heathens, as Hitzig has suggested, for the sacrifices of the heathen, associated with idolatry and impurity, are unclean and displeasing to God (1 Corinthians 10:20). Again, it could not be a sacrifice of the dispersed Jews (Diaspora), for apart from the fact that the existence of such sacrifices in the Diaspora is rather problematic, they were certainly not offered the world over, nor did they possess the unusual significance attaching to special modes of honouring God. Consequently, the reference is undoubtedly to some entirely distinctive sacrifice of the future. But of what future? Was it to be a future sacrifice among genuine heathens, such as the Aztecs or the native Africans? This is as impossible as in the case of other heathen forms of idolatry. Perhaps then it was to be a new and more perfect sacrifice among the Jews? This also is out of the question, for since the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus (A.D. 70), the whole system of Jewish sacrifice is irrevocably a thing of the past; and the new sacrifice moreover, is to be performed by a priesthood of an origin other than Jewish (Isaiah 66:21). Everything, therefore, points to Christianity, in which, as a matter of fact, the Messiah rules over non-Jewish peoples.

The second question now presents itself: Is the universal sacrifice thus promised "in every place" to be only a purely spiritual offering of prayer, in other words a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, such as Protestanism is content with; or is it to be a true sacrifice in the strict sense, as the Catholic Church maintains? It is forthwith clear that abolition and substitution must correspond, and accordingly that the old real sacrifice cannot be displaced by a new unreal sacrifice. Moreover, prayer, adoration, thanksgiving, etc., are far from being a new offering, for they are permanent realities common to every age, and constitute the indispensable foundation of every religion whether before or after the Messiah.

The last doubt is dispelled by the Hebrew text, which has no fewer than three classic sacerdotal declarations referring to the promised sacrifice, thus designedly doing away with the possibility of interpreting it metaphorically. Especially important is a substantive Hebrew for "sacrifice". Although in its origin the generic term for every sacrifice, the bloody included (cf. Genesis 4:4 sq.; 1 Samuel 2:17), it was not only never used to indicate an unreal sacrifice (such as a prayer offering), but even became the technical term for an unbloody sacrifice (mostly food offerings), in contradistinction to the bloody sacrifice which is given the name of Sebach.

As to the third and last proposition, no lengthy demonstration is needed to show that the sacrifice of Malachias cannot be formally identified with the Sacrifice of the Cross. This interpretation is at once contradicted by the Minchah, i.e. unbloody (food) offering. Then, there are other cogent considerations based on fact. Though a real sacrifice, belonging to the time of the Messiah and the most powerful means conceivable for glorifying the Divine name, the Sacrifice of the Cross, so far from being offered "in every place" and among non-Jewish peoples, was confined to Golgotha and the midst of the Jewish people. Nor can the Sacrifice of the Cross, which was accomplished by the Saviour in person without the help of a human representative priesthood, be identified with that sacrifice for the offering of which the Messiah makes use of priests after the manner of the Levites, in every place and at all times. Furthermore, he wilfully shuts his eyes against the light, who denies that the prophecy of Malachias is fulfilled to the letter in the Sacrifice of the Mass. In it are united all the characteristics of the promised sacrifice: its unbloody sacrificial rite as genuine Minchah, its universality in regard to place and time its extension to non-Jewish peoples, its delegated priesthood differing from that of the Jews, its essential unity by reason of the identity of the Chief Priest and the Victim (Christ), and its intrinsic and essential purity which no Levitical or moral uncleanliness can defile. Little wonder that the Council of Trent should say (Sess XXII, cap.i): "This is that pure oblation, which cannot be defiled by unworthiness and impiety on the part of those who offer it, and concerning which God has predicted through Malachias, that there would be offered up a clean oblation in every place to His Name, which would be great among the Gentiles (see Denzinger, n. 339).


2. New Testament

Passing now to the proofs contained in the New Testament, we may begin by remarking that many dogmatic writers see in the dialogue of Jesus with the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well a prophetic reference to the Mass (John 4:21 sqq.): Woman believe me, that the hour cometh, when you shall neither on this mountain [Garizim] nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father.... But the hour cometh and now is, when the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth." Since the point at issue between the Samaritans and the Jews related, not to the ordinary, private offering of prayer practised everywhere, but to the solemn, public worship embodied in a real Sacrifice, Jesus really seems to refer to a future real sacrifice of praise, which would not be confined in its liturgy to the city Jerusalem but would captivate the whole world (see Bellarmine, "De Euchar., v, 11). Not without good reason do most commentators appeal to Hebrews 13:10: We have an altar [Thysiastesion, altare], whereof they have no power to eat [Phagein, edere], who serve the tabernacle." Since St. Paul has just contrasted the Jewish food offering (Bromasin, escis) and Christian altar food, the partaking of which was denied to the Jews, the inference is obvious: where is an altar, there is a sacrifice. But the Eucharist is the food which the Christians alone are permitted to eat: therefore there is a Eucharistic sacrifice. The objection that, in Apostolic times, the term altar was not yet used in the sense of the "Lord's table" (cf. 1 Corinthians 10:21) is clearly a begging of the question, since Paul might well have been the first to introduce the name, it being adopted from him by later writers (e.g. Ignatius of Antioch died A.D. 107).

It can scarcely be denied that the entirely mystical explanation of the "spiritual food from the altar of the cross", favoured by St. Thomas Aquinas, Estius, and Stentrup, is far-fetched. It might on the other hand appear still more strange that in the passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews, where Christ and Melchisedech are compared, the two food offerings should be only not placed in prophetical relation with each other but not even mentioned. The reason, however, is not far to seek: parallel lay entirely outside the scope of the argument. All that St. Paul desired to show was that the high priesthood of Christ was superior to the Levitical priesthood of the Old Testament (cf. Hebrews 7:4 sqq.), and this is fully demonstrated by proving that Aaron and his priesthood stood far below the unattainable height of Melchisedech. So much the more, therefore, must Christ as "priest according to the order of Melchisedech" excel the Levitical priesthood. The peculiar dignity of Melchisedech, however, was manifested not through the fact that he made a food offering of bread and wine, a thing which the Levites also were able to do, but chiefly through the fact that he blessed the great "Father Abraham and received the tithes from him".

The main testimony of the New Testament lies in the account of the institution of the Eucharist, and most clearly in the words of consecration spoken over the chalice. For this reason we shall consider these words first, since thereby, owing to the analogy between the two formulas clearer light will be thrown on the meaning of the words of consecration spoken over the chalice. For this reason we shall consider these words first, since thereby, owing to the analogy between the two formulae, clearer light will be thrown on the meaning of the words of consecration pronounced over the bread. For the sake of clearness and easy comparison we subjoin the four passages in Greek and English:
  • Matthew 26:28: Touto gar estin to aima mou to tes [kaines] diathekes to peri pollon ekchynnomenon eis aphesin amartion. For this is my blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins.
  • Mark 14:24: Touto estin to aima mou tes kaines diathekes to yper pollon ekchynnomenon. This is my blood of the new testament which shall be shed for many.
  • Luke 22:20: Touto to poterion he kaine diatheke en to aimati mou, to yper ymon ekchynnomenon. This is the chalice, the new testament in my blood, which shall be shed for you.
  • 1 Corinthians 11:25: Touto to poterion he kaine diatheke estin en to emo aimati. This chalice is the new testament in my blood.

The Divine institution of the sacrifice of the altar is proved by showing
  • that the "shedding of blood" spoken of in the text took place there and then and not for the first time on the cross;
  • that it was a true and real sacrifice;
  • that it was considered a permanent institution in the Church.
The present form of the participle ekchynnomenon in conjunction with the present estin establishes the first point. For it is a grammatical rule of New Testament Greek, that, when the double present is used (that is, in both the participle and the finite verb, as is the case here), the time denoted is not the distant or near future, but strictly the present (see Fr. Blass, "Grammatik des N.T. Griechisch", p. 193, Gottingen, 1896). This rule does not apply to other constructions of the present tense, as when Christ says earlier (John 14:12): I go (poreuomai) to the father". Alleged exceptions to the rule are not such in reality, as, for instance, Matthew 6:30: "And if the grass of the field, which is today and tomorrow is cast into the oven (ballomenon) God doth so clothe (amphiennysin): how much more you, O ye of little faith?" For in this passage it is a question not of something in the future but of something occurring every day. When the Vulgate translates the Greek participles by the future (effundetur, fundetur), it is not at variance with facts, considering that the mystical shedding of blood in the chalice, if it were not brought into intimate relation with the physical shedding of blood on the cross, would be impossible and meaningless; for the one is the essential presupposition and foundation of the other. Still, from the standpoint of philology, effunditur (funditur) ought to be translated into the strictly present, as is really done in many ancient codices. The accuracy of this exegesis is finally attested in a striking way by the Greek wording in St. Luke: to poterion . . . ekchynnomenon. Here the shedding of blood appears as taking place directly in the chalice, and therefore in the present. Overzealous critics, it is true, have assumed that there is here a grammatical mistake, in that St. Luke erroneously connects the "shedding" with the chalice (poterion), instead of with "blood" (to aimati) which is in the dative. Rather than correct this highly cultivated Greek, as though he were a school boy, we prefer to assume that he intended to use synecdoche, a figure of speech known to everybody, and therefore put the vessel to indicate its contents.

As to the establishment of our second proposition, believing Protestants and Anglicans readily admit that the phrase: "to shed one's blood for others unto the remission of sins" is not only genuinely Biblical language relating to sacrifice, but also designates in particular the sacrifice of expiation (cf. Leviticus 7:14; 14:17; 17:11; Romans 3:25, 5:9; Hebrews 9:10, etc.). They, however, refer this sacrifice of expiation not to what took place at the Last Supper, but to the Crucifixion the day after. From the demonstration given above that Christ, by the double consecration of bread and wine mystically separated His Blood from His Body and thus in a chalice itself poured out this Blood in a sacramental way, it is at once clear that he wished to solemnize the Last Supper not as a sacrament merely but also as a Eucharistic Sacrifice. If the "pouring out of the chalice" is to mean nothing more than the sacramental drinking of the Blood, the result is an intolerable tautology: "Drink ye all of this, for this is my blood, which is being drunk". As, however, it really reads "Drink ye all of this, for this is my blood, which is shed for many (you) unto remission of sins," the double character of the rite as sacrament and sacrifice is evident. The sacrament is shown forth in the "drinking", the sacrifice in the "shedding of blood". "The blood of the new testament", moreover, of which all the four passages speak, has its exact parallel in the analogous institution of the Old Testament through Moses. For by Divine command he sprinkled the people with the true blood of an animal and added, as Christ did, the words of institution (Exodus 24:8): "This is the blood of the covenant (Sept.: idou to aima tes diathekes) which the Lord hath made with you". St. Paul, however, (Hebrews 9:18 sq.) after repeating this passage, solemnly demonstrates (ibid., ix, 11 sq) the institution of the New Law through the blood shed by Christ at the crucifixion; and the Savior Himself, with equal solemnity, says of the chalice: This is My Blood of the new testament". It follows therefore that Christ had intended His true Blood in the chalice not only to be imparted as a sacrament, but to be also a sacrifice for the remission of sins. With the last remark our third statement, viz. as to the permanency of the institution in the Church, is also established. For the duration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice is indissolubly bound up with the duration of the sacrament. Christ's Last Supper thus takes on the significance of a Divine institution whereby the Mass is established in His Church. St. Paul (1 Corinthians 11:25), in fact, puts into the mouth of the Savior the words: "This do ye, as often as you shall drink, for the commemoration of me".

We are now in a position to appreciate in their deeper sense Christ's words of consecration over the bread. Since only St. Luke and St. Paul have made additions to the sentence, "This is My Body", it is only on them that we can base our demonstration.
  • Luke 22:19: Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis datur; touto esti to soma mou to uper umon didomenon; This is my body which is given for you.
  • 1 Corinthians 11:24: Hoc est corpus meum, quod pro vobis tradetur; touto mou esti to soma to uper umon [klomenon]; This is my body which shall be broken for you.
Once more, we maintain that the sacrifical "giving of the body" (in organic unity of course with the "pouring of blood" in the chalice) is here to be interpreted as a present sacrifice and as a permanent institution in the Church. Regarding the decisive point, i.e. indication of what is actually taking place, it is again St. Luke who speaks with greatest clearness, for to soma he adds the present participle, didomenon by which he describes the "giving of the body" as something happening in the present, here and now, not as something to be done in the near future.

The reading klomenon in St. Paul is disputed. According to the best critical reading (Tischendorf, Lachmann) the participle is dropped altogether so that St. Paul probably wrote: to soma to uper umon (the body for you, i.e. for your salvation). There is good reason, however, for regarding the word klomenon (from klan to break) as Pauline, since St. Paul shortly before spoke of the "breaking of bread" (1 Corinthians 10:16), which for him meant "to offer as food the true body of Christ". From this however we may conclude that the "breaking of the body" not only confines Christ's action to the strictly present, especially as His natural Body could not be "broken" on the cross (cf. Exodus 12:46; John 19:32 sq.), but also implies the intention of offering a "body broken for you" (uper umon) i.e. the act constituted in itself a true food offering. All doubt as to its sacrificial character is removed by the expression didomenon in St. Luke, which the Vulgate this time quite correctly translates into the present: "quod pro vobis datur." But "to give one's body for others" is as truly a Biblical expression for sacrifice (cf. John 6:52; Romans 7:4; Colossians 1:22; Hebrews 10:10, etc.) as the parallel phrase, "the shedding of blood". Christ, therefore, at the Last Supper offered up His Body as an unbloody sacrifice. Finally, that He commanded the renewal for all time of the Eucharistic sacrifice through the Church is clear from the addition: "Do this for a commemoration of me" (Luke 32:19; 1 Corinthians 11:24).


Proof from Tradition

Harnack is of opinion that the early Church up to the time of Cyprian (d. 258) the contented itself with the purely spiritual sacrifices of adoration and thanksgiving and that it did not possess the sacrifice of the Mass, as Catholicism now understands it. In a series of writings, Dr. Wieland, a Catholic priest, likewise maintained in the face of vigorous opposition from other theologians, that the early Christians confined the essence of the Christian sacrifice to a subjective Eucharistic prayer of thanksgiving, till Irenaeus (d. 202) brought forward the idea of an objective offering of gifts, and especially of bread and wine. He, according to this view, was the first to include in his expanded conception of sacrifice, the entirely new idea of material offerings (i.e. the Eucharistic elements) which up to that time the early Church had formally repudiated.

Were this assertion correct, the doctrine of the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, c. ii), according to which in the Mass "the priests offer up, in obedience to the command of Christ, His Body and Blood" (see Denzinger, "Enchir", n. 949), could hardly take its stand on Apostolic tradition; the bridge between antiquity and the present would thus have broken by the abrupt intrusion of a completely contrary view. An impartial study of the earliest texts seems indeed to make this much clear, that the early Church paid most attention to the spiritual and subjective side of sacrifice and laid chief stress on prayer and thanksgiving in the Eucharistic function.

This admission, however, is not identical with the statement that the early Church rejected out and out the objective sacrifice, and acknowledged as genuine only the spiritual sacrifice as expressed in the "Eucharistic thanksgiving". That there has been an historical dogmatic development from the indefinite to the definite, from the implicit to the explicit, from the seed to the fruit, no one familiar with the subject will deny. An assumption so reasonable, the only one in fact consistent with Christianity, is, however, fundamentally different from the hypothesis that the Christian idea of sacrifice has veered from one extreme to the other. This is a priori improbable and unproved in fact. In the Didache or "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles", the oldest post-Biblical literary monument (c. A.D. 96), not only is the "breaking of bread" (cf. Acts 20:7) referred to as a "sacrifice" (Thysia) and mention made of reconciliation with one's enemy before the sacrifice (cf. Matthew 5:23), but the whole passage is crowned with an actual quotation of the prophecy of Malachias, which referred, as is well known, to an objective and real sacrifice (Didache, c. xiv). The early Christians gave the name of "sacrifice"; not only to the Eucharistic "thanksgiving," but also to the entire ritual celebration including the liturgical "breaking of bread", without at first distinguishing clearly between the prayer and the gift (Bread and Wine, Body and Blood). When Ignatius of Antioch (d. 107), a disciple of the Apostles, says of the Eucharist: "There is only one flesh of Our Lord Jesus Christ, only one chalice containing His one Blood, one altar (en thysiasterion), as also only one bishop with the priesthood and the deacons" (Ep., ad. Philad. iv), he here gives to the liturgical Eucharistic celebration, of which alone he speaks, by his reference to the "altar" an evidently sacrificial meaning, often as he may use the word "altar" in other contexts in a metaphorical sense.

A heated controversy had raged round the conception of Justin Martyr (d. 166) from the fact that in his "Dialogue with Tryphon" (c. 117) he characterizes "prayer and thanksgiving" (euchai kai eucharistiai) as the "one perfect sacrifice acceptable to God" (teleiai monai kai euarestoi thysiai). Did he intend by thus emphasizing the interior spiritual sacrifice to exclude the exterior real sacrifice of the Eucharist? Clearly he did not, for in the same "Dialogue" (c. 41) he says the "food offering" of the lepers, assuredly a real gift offering (cf. Leviticus 14), was a figure (typos) of the bread of the Eucharist, which Jesus commanded to be offered (poiein) in commemoration of His sufferings." He then goes on: "of the sacrifices which you (the Jews) formerly offered, God through Malachias said: 'I have no pleasure, etc.' By the sacrifices (thysion), however, which we Gentiles present to Him in every place, that is (toutesti) of the bread of Eucharist and likewise of the chalice Eucharist, he then said that we glorify his name, while you dishonour him". Here "bread and chalice" are by the use of toutesti clearly included as objective gift offerings in the idea of the Christian sacrifice. If the other apologists (Aristides, Athenagoras, Minucius Felix, Arnobius) vary the thought a great deal — God has no need of sacrifice; the best sacrifice is the knowledge of the Creator; sacrifice and altars are unknown to the Christians — it is to be presumed not only that under the imposed by the disciplina arcani they withheld the whole truth, but also that they rightly repudiated all connection with pagan idolatry, the sacrifice of animals, and heathen altars. Tertullian bluntly declared: "we offer no sacrifice (non sacrificamus) because we cannot eat both the Supper of God and that of demons" (De spectac., c., xiii). And yet in another passage (On Prayer 19) he calls Holy Communion "participation in the sacrifice" (participatio sacrificii), which is accomplished "on the altar of God" (ad aram Dei); he speaks (De cult fem., II, xi) of a real, not a mere metaphorical, "offering up of sacrifice" (sacrificium offertur); he dwells still further as a Montanist (On Pudicity 9) as well on the "nourishing power of the Lord's Body" (opimitate dominici corporis) as on the "renewal of the immolation of Christ" (rursus illi mactabitur Christus).

With Irenaeus of Lyons there comes a turning point, in as much as he, with conscious clearness, first puts forward "bread and wine" as objective gift offerings, but at the same time maintains that these elements become the "body and blood" of the Word through consecration, and thus by simply combining these two thoughts we have the Catholic Mass of today. According to him (Against Heresies IV.18.4) it is the Church alone "that offers the pure oblation" (oblationem puram offert), whereas the Jews "did not receive the Word, which is offered (or through whom an offering is made) to God" (non receperunt Verbum quod [aliter, per quod] offertur Deo). Passing over the teaching of the Alexandrine Clement and Origen, whose love of allegory, together with the restrictions of the disciplina arcani, involved their writings in mystic obscurity, we make particular mention of Hippolytus of Rome (d. 235) whose celebrated fragment Achelis has wrongly characterized as spurious. He writes (Fragm. in Prov., ix, i, P.G., LXXX, 593), "The Word prepared His Precious and immaculate Body (soma) and His Blood (aima), that daily kath'ekasten) are set forth as a sacrifice (epitelountai thyomena) on the mystic and Divine table (trapeze) as a memorial of that ever memorable first table of the mysterious supper of the Lord". Since according to the judgment of even Protestant historians of dogma, St. Cyprian (d. 258) is to be regarded as the "herald" of Catholic doctrine on the Mass, we may likewise pass him over, as well as Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386) and Chrysostom (d. 407) who have been charged with exaggerated "realism", and whose plain discourses on the sacrifice rival those of Basil (d. 379), Gregory of Nyssa (d. c. 394) and Ambrose (d. 397). Only about Augustine (d. 430) must a word be said, since, in regard to the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist he is cited as favouring the "symbolical" theory. Now it is precisely his teaching on sacrifice that best serves to clear away the suspicion that he inclined to a merely spiritual interpretation.

For Augustine nothing is more certain than that every religion, whether true or false, must have an exterior form of celebration and worship (Reply to Faustus XIX.11). This applies as well to Christians (l. c., xx, 18), who "commemorate the sacrifice consummated (on the cross) by the holiest oblation and participation of the Body and Blood of Christ" (celebrant sacrosancta oblatione et participatione corporis et sanguinis Christi). The Mass is, in his eyes (City of God X.20), the "highest and true sacrifice" (summum verumque sacrificium), Christ being at once "priest and victim" (ipse offerens, ipse et oblatio) and he reminds the Jews (Adv. Jud, ix, 13) that the sacrifice of Malachias is now made in every place (in omni loco offerri sacrificium Christianorum). He relates of his mother Monica (Confess., ix, 13) that she had asked for prayers at the altar (ad altare) for her soul and had attended Mass daily. From Augustine onwards the current of the Church's tradition flows smoothly along in a well-ordered channel, without check or disturbance, through the Middle Ages to our own time. Even the powerful attempt made to stem it through the Reformation had no effect.

A briefer demonstration of the existence of the Mass is the so-called proof from prescription, which is thus formulated: A sacrificial rite in the Church which is older than the oldest attack made on it by heretics cannot be decried as "idolatry", but must be referred back to the Founder of Christianity as a rightful heritage of which He was the originator. Now the Church's legitimate possession as regards the Mass can be traced back to the beginnings of Christianity. It follows that the Mass was Divinely instituted by Christ. Regarding the minor proposition, the proof of which alone concerns us here, we may begin at once with the Reformation, the only movement that utterly did away with the Mass. Psychologically, it is quite intelligible that men like Zwingli, Karlstadt and Oecolampadius should tear down the altars, for they denied Christ's real presence in the Sacrament. Calvinism also in reviling the "papistical mass" which the Heidelberg catechism characterized as "cursed idolatry" was merely self-consistent since it admitted only a "dynamic" presence. It is rather strange on the other hand that, in spite of his belief in the literal meaning of the words of consecration, Luther, after a violent "nocturnal disputation with the devil", in 1521, should have repudiated the Mass. But it is exactly these measures of violence that best show to what a depth the institution of the Mass had taken root by that time in Church and people. How long had it been taking root? The answer, to begin with is: all through the Middle Ages back to Photius, the originator of the Eastern Schism (869). Though Wycliffe protested against the teaching of the Council of Constance (1414-18), which maintained that the Mass could be proved from Scripture; and though the Albigenses and Waldenses claimed for the laity also the power to offer sacrifice (cf. Denzinger, "Enchir.", 585 and 430), it is none the less true that even the schismatic Greeks held fast to the Eucharistic sacrifice as a precious heritage from their Catholic past. In the negotiations for reunion at Lyons (1274) and Florence (1439) they showed moreover that they had kept it intact; and they have faithfully safeguarded it to this day. From all which it is clear that the Mass existed in both Churches long before Photius, a conclusion borne out by the monuments of Christian antiquity.

Taking a long step backwards from the ninth to the fourth century, we come upon the Nestorians and Monophysites who were driven out of the Church during the fifth century at Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). From that day to this they have celebrated in their solemn liturgy the sacrifice of the New Law, and since they could only have taken it with them from the old Christian Church, it follows that the Mass goes back in the Church beyond the time of Nestorianism and Monophysitism. Indeed, the first Nicene Council (325) in its celebrated eighteenth canon forbade priests to receive the Eucharist from the hands of deacons for the very obvious reason that "neither the canon nor custom have handed down to us, that those, who have not the power to offer sacrifice (prospherein) may give Christ's body to those who offer (prospherousi)". Hence it is plain that for the celebration of the Mass there was required the dignity of a special priesthood, from which the deacons as such were excluded. Since, however, the Nicene Council speaks of a "custom that takes us at once into the third century, we are already in the age of the Catacombs with their Eucharistic pictures, which according to the best founded opinions represent the liturgical celebration of the Mass. According to Wilpert, the oldest representation of the Holy Sacrifice is the "Greek Chapel" in the Catacomb of St. Priscilla (c. 150). The most convincing evidence, however, from those early days is furnished by the liturgies of the West and the East, the basic principles of which reach back to Apostolic times and in which the sacrifical idea of the Eucharistic celebration found unadulterated and decisive expression (see LITURGIES). We have therefore traced the Masses from the present to the earliest times, thus establishing its Apostolic origin, which in turn goes back again to the Last Supper.


The Nature of the Mass

In its denial of the true Divinity of Christ and of every supernatural institution, modern unbelief endeavours, by means of the so-called historico-religious method, to explain the character of the Eucharist and the Eucharist sacrifice as the natural result of a spontaneous process of development in the Christian religion. In this connection it is interesting to observe how these different and conflicting hypotheses refute one another, with the rather startling result at the end of it all that a new, great, and insoluble problem looms of the investigation. While some discover the roots of the Mass in the Jewish funeral feasts (O. Holtzmann) or in Jewish Essenism (Bousset, Heitmuller, Wernle), others delve in the underground strata of pagan religions. Here, however, a rich variety of hypotheses is placed at their disposal. In this age of Pan-Babylonism it is not at all surprising that the germinal ideas of the Christian communion should be located in Babylon, where in the Adapa myth (on the tablet of Tell Amarna) mention has been found of "water of life" and "food of life" (Zimmern). Others (e.g. Brandt) fancy they have found a still more striking analogy in the "bread and water" (Patha and Mambuha) of the Mandaean religion. The view most widely held today among upholders of the historico-religious theory is that the Eucharist and the Mass originated in the practices of the Persian Mithraism (Dieterich, H. T. Holtzmann, Pfleiderer, Robertson, etc.). "In the Mandaean mass" writes Cumont ("Mysterien des Mithra", Leipzig, 1903, p. 118), "the celebrant consecrated bread and water, which he mixed with perfumed Haoma-juice, and ate this food while performing the functions of divine service". Tertullian in anger ascribed this mimicking of Christian rites to the "devil" and observed in astonishment (De prescript haeret, C. xl): "celebrat (Mithras) et panis oblationem." This is not the place to criticize in detail these wild creations of an overheated imagination. Let it suffice to note that all these explanations necessarily lead to impenetrable night, as long as men refuse to believe in the true Divinity of Christ, who commanded that His bloody sacrifice on the Cross should be daily renewed by an unbloody sacrifice of His Body and Blood in the Mass under the simple elements of bread and wine. This alone is the origin and nature of the Mass.


The Physical Character of the Mass

In regard to the physical character there arises not only the question as to the concrete portions of the liturgy, in which the real offering lies hidden, but also the question regarding the relation of the Mass to the bloody sacrifice of the Cross. To begin with the latter question as much the more important, Catholics and believing Protestants alike acknowledge that as Christians we venerate in the bloody sacrifice of the Cross the one, universal, absolute Sacrifice for the salvation of the world. And this indeed is true in a double sense first, because among all the sacrifices of the past and future the Sacrifice on the Cross alone stands without any relation to, and absolutely independent of, any other sacrifice, a complete totality and unity in itself; second because every grace, means of grace and sacrifice, whether belonging to the Jewish, Christian or pagan economy, derive their whole undivided strength, value, and efficiency singly and alone from this absolute sacrifice on the Cross. The first consideration implies that all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, as well as the Sacrifice of the Mass, bear the essential mark of relativity, in so far as they are necessarily related to the Sacrifice of the Cross, as the periphery of a circle to the centre. From the second consideration it follows that all other Sacrifices, the Mass included, are empty, barren and void of effect, so far and so long as they are not supplied from the mainstream of merits (due to the suffering) of the Crucified. Let us deal briefly with this double relationship.

Regarding the qualification of relativity, which adheres to every sacrifice other than the sacrifice of the Cross, there is no doubt that the sacrifices of the Old Testament by their figurative forms and prophetic significance point to the sacrifice of the Cross as their eventual fulfilment. The Epistle to the Hebrews (viii-x) in particular develops grandly the figurative character of the Old Testament. Not only was the Levitic priesthood, as a "shadow of the things to come" a faint type of the high priesthood of Christ, but the complex sacrificial cult, broadly spread out in its parts, prefigured the one sacrifice of the Cross. Serving only the legal "cleansing of the flesh" the Levitical sacrifices could effect no true "forgiveness of sins"; by their very inefficacy however they point prophetically to the perfect Sacrifice of propitiation on Golgotha. Just for that reason their continual repetition as well as their great diversity was essential to them, as a means of keeping alive in the Jews the yearning for the true sacrifice of expiation which the future was to bring. This longing was satiated only by the single Sacrifice of the Cross, which was never again to be repeated. Naturally the Mass, too, if it is to have the character of a legitimate sacrifice must be in accord with this inviolable rule, no longer Indeed as a type prophetic of future things, but rather as the living realization and renewal of the past. Only the Last Supper, standing midway as it were between the figure and its fulfilment, still looked to the future, in so far as it was an anticipatory commemoration of the sacrifice of the Cross. In the discourse in which the Eucharist was instituted, the "giving of the body" and the "Shedding of the Blood" were of necessity related to the physical separation of the blood from the body on the Cross, without which the sacramental immolation of Christ at the Last Supper would be inconceivable. The Fathers of the Church, such as Cyprian (Ep., lxiii, 9), Ambrose (De offic., I, xlviii), Augustine (Reply to Faustus XX.28) and Gregory the Great (Dial., IV, lviii), insist that the Mass in its essential nature must be that which Christ Himself characterized as a "commemoration" of Him (Luke 22:19) and Paul as the "showing of the death of the Lord" (1 Corinthians 11:26).

Regarding the other aspect of the Sacrifice on the Cross, viz. the impossibility of its renewal, its singleness and its power, Paul again proclaimed with energy that Christ on the Cross definitively redeemed the whole world, in that he "by His own Blood, entered once into the holier having obtained eternal redemption" (Hebrews 9:12). This does not mean that mankind is suddenly and without the action of its own will brought back to the state of innocence in Paradise and set above the necessity of working to secure for itself the fruits of redemption. Otherwise children would be in no need of baptism nor adults of justifying faith to win eternal happiness. The "completion" spoken of by Paul can therefore refer only to the objective side of redemption, which does not dispense with, but on the contrary requires, the proper subjective disposition. The sacrifice once offered on the Cross filled the infinite reservoirs to overflowing with healing waters but those who thirst after justice must come with their chalices and draw out what they need to quench their thirst. In this important distinction between objective and subjective redemption, which belongs to the essence of Christianity, lies not merely the possibility, but also the justification of the Mass. But here unfortunately Catholics and Protestants part company. The latter can see in the Mass only a "denial of the one sacrifice of Jesus Christ". This is a wrong view, for if the Mass can do and does no more than convey the merits of Christ to mankind by means of a sacrifice exactly as the sacraments do it without the use of sacrifice, it stands to reason that the Mass is neither a second independent sacrifice alongside of the sacrifice on the Cross, nor a substitute whereby the sacrifice on the Cross is completed or its value enhanced.

The only distinction between the Mass and the sacrament lies in this: that the latter applies to the individual the fruits of the Sacrifice on the Cross by simple distribution, the other by a specific offering. In both, the Church draws upon the one Sacrifice on the Cross. This is and remains the one Sun, that gives life, light and warmth to everything; the sacraments and the Mass are only the planets that revolve round the central body. Take the Sun away and the Mass is annihilated not one whit less than the sacraments. On the other hand, without these two the Sacrifice on the Cross would reign as independently as, conceivably the sun without the planets. The Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, can. iv) therefore rightly protested against the reproach that "the Mass is a blasphemy against or a derogation from the Sacrifice on the Cross" (cf. Denzinger, "Enchir.", 951). Must not the same reproach be cast upon the Sacraments also? Does it not apply to baptism and communion among Protestants? And how can Christ Himself put blasphemy and darkness in the way of His Sacrifice on the Cross when He Himself is the High Priest, in whose name and by whose commission His human representative offers sacrifice with the words: "This is my Body, this is my Blood"? It is the express teaching of the Church (cf. Trent, Sess. XXII, i) that the Mass is in its very nature a "representation" (representatio), a "commemoration" (memoria) and an "application" (applicatio) of the Sacrifice of the Cross. When indeed the Roman Catechism (II, c. iv, Q. 70) as a fourth relation, adopts the daily repetition (instauratio), it means that such a repetition is to be taken not in the sense of multiplication, but simply of an application of the merits of the Passion. Just as the Church repudiates nothing so much as the suggestion that by the Mass the sacrifice on the Cross is as it were set aside, so she goes a step farther and maintains the essential identity of both sacrifices, holding that the main difference between them is in the different manner of sacrifice — the one bloody the other unbloody (Trent, Sess. XXII, ii): "Una enim eademque est hostia idem nunc offerens sacerdotum ministerio, qui seipsum tunc in cruce obtulit, sofa offerendi ratione diversa". In as much as the sacrificing priest (offerens) and the sacrificial victim (hostia) in both sacrifices are Christ Himself, their same amounts even to a numerical identity. In regard to the manner of the sacrifice (offerendi ratio) on the other hand, it is naturally a question only of a specific identity or unity that includes the possibility of ten, a hundred, or a thousand masses.


The Constituent Parts of the Mass

Turning now to the other question as to the constituent parts of the liturgy of the Mass in which the real sacrifice is to be looked for we need only take into consideration its three chief parts: the Offertory, the Consecration and the Communion. The antiquated view of Johann Eck, according to which the act of sacrifice was comprised in the prayer "Unde et memores . . . offerimus", is thus excluded from our discussion, as is also the of Melchior Canus, who held that the sacrifice is accomplished in the symbolical ceremony of the breaking of the Host and its commingling with the Chalice. The question therefore arises first: Is the sacrifice comprised in the Offertory? From the wording of the prayer this much at least is clear that bread and wine constitute the secondary sacrificial elements of the Mass, since the priest in the true language of sacrifice, offers to God bread as an unspotted host (immaculatam hostiam) and wine as the chalice of salvation (calicem salutaris). But the very significance of this language proves that attention is mainly directed to the prospective transubstantiation of the Eucharistic elements. Since the Mass is not a mere offering of bread and wine, like the figurative food offering of Melchisedech, it is clear that only the Body and Blood of Christ can be the primary matter of the sacrifice as was the case at the Last Supper (cf. Trent, Sess. XXII, i, can. 2; Denzinger, n. 938, 949). Consequently the sacrifice is not in the Offertory. Does it consist then in the priest's Communion? There were and are theologians who favour that view. They can be ranged in two classes, according as they see in the Communion the essential or the co-essential.

Those who belong to the first category (Dominicus Soto, Renz, Bellord) had to beware of the heretical doctrine proscribed by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, can. 1), viz., that Mass and Communion were identical. In American and English circles the so-called "banquet theory" of the late Bishop Bellord once created some stir (cf. The Ecclesiastical Review, XXXIII, 1905, 258 sq). According to that view, the essence of the sacrifice was not to be looked for in the offering of a gift to God, but solely in the Communion. Without communion there was no sacrifice. Regarding pagan sacrifices Döllinger ("Heidentum und Judentum", Ratisbon 1857) had already demonstrated the incompatibility of this view. With the complete shedding of blood pagan sacrifices ended, so that the supper which sometimes followed it was expressive merely of the satisfaction felt at the reconciliation with gods. Even the horrible human sacrifices had as their object the death of the victim only and not a cannibal feast. As to the Jews, only a few Levitical sacrifices, such as the peace offering, had feasting connected with them; most, and especially the burnt offerings (holocausta), were accomplished without feasting (cf. Leviticus 6:9 sq.). Bishop Bellord, having cast in his lot with the "banquet theory", could naturally find the essence of the Mass in the priests' Communion only. He was indeed logically bound to allow that the Crucifixion itself had the character of a sacrifice only in conjunction with the Last Supper, at which alone food was taken; for the Crucifixion excluded any ritual food offering. These disquieting consequences are all the more serious in that they are devoid of any scientific basis.

Harmless, even though improbable, is that other view (Bellarmine, De Lugo, Tournély, etc.) which includes the Communion as at least a co-essential factor in the constitution of the Mass; for the consumption of the Host and of the contents of the Chalice, being a kind of destruction, would appear to accord with the conception of the sacrifice developed above. But only in appearance; for the sacrificial transformation of the victim must take place on the altar, and not in the body of the celebrant, while the partaking of the two elements can at most represent the burial and not the sacrificial death of Christ. The Last Supper also would have been a true sacrifice only on condition that Christ had given the Communion not only to His apostles but also to Himself. There is however no evidence that such a Communion ever took place, probable as it may appear. For the rest, the Communion of the priest is not the sacrifice, but only the completion of, and participation in, the sacrifice, it belongs therefore not to the essence, but to the integrity of the sacrifice. And this integrity is also preserved absolutely even in the so-called "private Mass" at which the priest alone communicates; private Masses are allowed for that reason (cf. Trent, Sess. XXII, can. 8). When the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia (1786), proclaiming the false principle that "participation in the sacrifice is essential to the sacrifice", demanded at least the making of a "spiritual communion" on the part of the faithful as a condition of allowing private Masses, it was denied by Pius VI in his Bull "Auctorem fidei" (1796) (see Denzinger, n. 1528).

After the elimination of the Offertory and Communion, there remains only the Consecration as the part in which the true sacrifice is to be sought. In reality, that part alone is to be regarded as the proper sacrificial act which is such by Christ's own institution. Now the Lord's words are: "This is my Body; this is my Blood." The Oriental Epiklesis cannot be considered as the moment of consecration for the reason that it is absent in the Mass in the West and is known to have first come into practice after Apostolic times (see EUCHARIST). The sacrifice must also be at the point where Christ personally appears as High Priest and human celebrant acts only as his representative. The priest does not however assume the personal part of Christ either at the Offertory or Communion. He only does so when he speaks the words: "This is My Body; this is My Blood", in which there is no possible reference to the body and blood of the celebrant. While the Consecration as such can be shown with certainty to be the act of Sacrifice, the necessity of the twofold consecration can be demonstrated only as highly probable. Not only older theologians such as Frassen, Gotti, and Bonacina, but also later theologians such as Schouppen, Stentrup and Fr. Schmid, have supported the untenable theory that when one of the consecrated elements is invalid, such as barley bread or cider, the consecration of the valid element not only produces the Sacrament, but also the (mutilated) sacrifice. Their chief argument is that the sacrament in the Eucharist is inseparable in idea from the sacrifice. But they entirely overlooked the fact that Christ positively prescribed the twofold consecration for the sacrifice of the Mass (not for the sacrament), and especially the fact that in the consecration of one element only the intrinsically essential relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the Cross is not symbolically represented. Since it was no mere death from suffocation that Christ suffered, but a bloody death, in which His veins were emptied of their Blood, this condition of separation must receive visible representation on the altar, as in a sublime drama. This condition is fulfilled only by the double consecration, which brings before our eyes the Body and the Blood in the state of separation, and thus represents the mystical shedding of blood. Consequently, the double consecration is an absolutely essential element of the Mass as a relative sacrifice.


The Metaphysical Character of the Sacrifice of the Mass

The physical essence of the Mass having been established in the consecration of the two species, the metaphysical question arises as to whether and in what degree the scientific concept of sacrifice is realized in this double consecration. Since the three ideas, sacrificing priest, sacrificial gift, and sacrificial object, present no difficulty to the understanding, the problem is finally seen to lie entirely in the determination of the real sacrificial act (actio sacrifica), and indeed not so much in the form of this act as in the matter, since the glorified Victim, in consequence of Its impassibility, cannot be really transformed, much less destroyed. In their investigation of the idea of destruction, the post-Tridentine theologians have brought into play all their acuteness, often with brilliant results, and have elaborated a series of theories concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass, of which, however, we can discuss only the most notable and important. But first, that we may have at hand a reliable, critical standard wherewith to test the validity or invalidity of the various theories, we maintain that a sound and satisfactory theory must satisfy the following four conditions:
  • the twofold consecration must show not only the relative, but also the absolute moment of sacrifice, so that the Mass will not consist in a mere relation, but will be revealed as in itself a real sacrifice;
  • the act of sacrifice (actio sacrifica), veiled in the double consecration, must refer directly to the sacrificial matter — i.e. the Eucharistic Christ Himself — not to the elements of bread and wine or their unsubstantial species;
  • the sacrifice of Christ must somehow result in a kenosis, not in a glorification, since this latter is at most the object of the sacrifice, not the sacrifice itself;
  • since this postulated kenosis, however, can be no real, but only a mystical or sacramental one, we must appraise intelligently those moments which approximate in any degree the "mystical slaying" to a real exinanition, instead of rejecting them.
With the aid of these four criteria it is comparatively easy to arrive at a decision concerning the probability or otherwise of the different theories concerning the sacrifice of the Mass.

(i) The Jesuit Gabriel Vasquez, whose theory was supported by Perrone in the last century, requires for the essence of an absolute sacrifice only — and thus, in the present case, for the Sacrifice of the Cross — a true destruction or the real slaying of Christ, whereas for the idea of the relative sacrifice of the Mass it suffices that the former slaying on the Cross be visibly represented in the separation of Body and Blood on the altar. This view soon found a keen critic in Cardinal de Lugo, who, appealing to the Tridentine definition of the Mass as a true and proper sacrifice, upbraided Vasquez for reducing the Mass to a purely relative sacrifice. Were Jephta to arise again today with his daughter from the grave, he argues (De Euchar., disp. xix, sect. 4, n. 58), and present before our eyes a living dramatic reproduction of the slaying of his daughter after the fashion of a tragedy, we would undoubtedly see before us not a true sacrifice, but a historic or dramatic representation of the former bloody sacrifice. Such may indeed satisfy the notion of a relative sacrifice, but certainly not the notion of the Mass which includes in itself both the relative and the absolute (in opposition to the merely relative) sacrificial moment. If the Mass is to be something more than an Ober-Ammergau Passion Play, then not only must Christ appear in His real personality on the altar, but He must also be in some manner really sacrificed on that very altar. The theory of Vasquez thus fails to fulfil the first condition which we have named above.

To a certain extent the opposite of Vasquez's theory is that of Cardinal Cienfuegos, who, while exaggerating the absolute moment of the Mass, undervalues the equally essential relative moment of the sacrifice. The sacrificial destruction of the Eucharistic Christ he would find in the voluntary suspension of the powers of sense (especially of sight and hearing), which the sacramental mode of existence implies, and which lasts from the consecration to the mingling of the two Species. But, apart from the fact that one may not constitute a hypothetical theologumenon the basis of a theory, one can no longer from such a standpoint successfully defend the indispensability of the double consecration. Equally difficult is it to find in the Eucharistic Christ's voluntary surrender of his sensitive functions the relative moment of sacrifice, i.e. the representation of the bloody sacrifice of the Cross. The standpoint of Francisco Suárez, adopted by Scheeben, is both exalting and imposing; the real transformation of the sacrificial gifts he refers to the destruction of the Eucharistic elements (in virtue of the transubstantiation) at their conversion into the Precious Body and Blood of Christ (immulatio perfectiva), just as, in the sacrifice of incense in the Old Testament, the grains of incense were transformed by fire into the higher and more precious form of the sweetest odour and fragrance. But, since the antecedent destruction of the substance of bread and wine can by no means be regarded as the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ, Francisco Suárez is finally compelled to identify the substantial production of the Eucharistic Victim with the sacrificing of the same. Herein is straightway revealed a serious weakness, already clearly perceived by De Lugo. For the production of a thing can never be identical with its sacrifice; otherwise one might declare the gardener's production of plants or the farmer's raising of cattle a sacrifice. Thus, the idea of kenosis which in the minds of all men is intimately linked with the notion of sacrifice, and which we have given above as our third condition, is wanting in the theory of Francisco Suárez. To offer something as a sacrifice always means to divest oneself of it, even though this self-divestment may finally lead to exaltation.

In Germany the profound, but poorly developed theory of Valentin Thalhofer found great favour. We need not, however, develop it here, especially since it rests on the false basis of a supposed "heavenly sacrifice" of Christ, which, as the virtual continuation of the Sacrifice of the Cross, becomes a temporal and spatial phenomenon in the Sacrifice of the Mass. But, as practically all other theologians teach, the existence of this heavenly sacrifice (in the strict sense) is only a beautiful theological dream, and at any rate cannot be demonstrated from the Epistle to the Hebrews.

(ii) Disavowing the above-mentioned theories concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass, theologians of today are again seeking a closer approximation to the pre-Tridentine conception, having realized that post-Tridentine theology had perhaps for polemical reasons needlessly exaggerated the idea of destruction in the sacrifice. The old conception, which our catechisms even today proclaim to the people as the most natural and intelligible, may be fearlessly declared the patristic and traditional view; its restoration to a position of general esteem is the service of Father Billot (De sacram., I, 4th ed., Rome, 1907, pp. 567 sqq.). Since this theory refers the absolute moment of the sacrifice to the (active) "sacramental mystical slaying", and the relative to the (passive) "separation of Body and Blood", it has indeed made the "two-edged sword" of the double consecration the cause from which the double character of the Mass as an absolute (real in itself) and relative sacrifice proceeds. We have an absolute sacrifice, for the Victim is — not indeed in specie propria, but in specie aliena — sacramentally slain, we have also a relative sacrifice, since the sacramental separation of Body and Blood represents perceptibly the former shedding of Blood on the Cross.

While this view meets every requirement of the metaphysical nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass, we do not think it right to reject offhand the somewhat more elaborate theory of Lessius instead of utilizing it in the spirit of the traditional view for the extension of the idea of a "mystical slaying". Lessius (De perfect. moribusque div. XII, xiii) goes beyond the old explanation by adding the not untrue observation that the intrinsic force of the double consecration would have as result an actual and true shedding of blood on the altar, if this were not per accidens impossible in consequence of the impassibility of the transfigured Body of Christ. Since ex vi verborum the consecration of the bread makes really present only the Body, and the consecration of the Chalice only the Blood, the tendency or the double consecration is towards a formal exclusion of the Blood from the Body. The mystical slaying thus approaches nearer to a real destruction and the absolute sacrificial moment of the Mass receives an important confirmation. In the light of this view, the celebrated statement of St. Gregory of Nazianzus becomes of special importance ("Ep. clxxi, ad Amphil." in P.G., XXXVII, 282): "Hesitate not to pray for me . . . when with bloodless stroke [anaimakto tome] thou separatest [temnes] the Body and Blood of the Lord; having speech as a sword [phonen echon to Xiphos]." As an old pupil of Cardinal Franzelin (De Euchar., p. II, thes. xvi, Rome, 1887), the present writer may perhaps speak a good word for the once popular, but recently combatted theory of Cardinal De Hugo, which Franzelin revived after a long period of neglect; not however that he intends to proclaim the theory in its present form as entirely satisfactory, since, with much to recommend it, it has also serious defects. We believe, however, that this theory, like that of Lessius, might be most profitably utilized to develop, supplement, and deepen the traditional view. Starting from the principle that the Eucharistic destruction can be, not a physical but only a moral one, De Lugo finds this exinanition in the voluntary reduction of Christ to the condition of food (reductio ad statum cibi el potus), in virtue of which the Saviour, after the fashion of lifeless food, leaves himself at the mercy of mankind. That this is really equivalent to a true kenosis no one can deny. Herein the Christian pulpit has at its disposal a truly inexhaustible source of lofty thoughts wherewith to illustrate in glowing language the humility and love, the destitution and defencelessness of Our Saviour under the sacramental veil, His magnanimous submission to irreverence, dishonour, and sacrilege, and wherewith to emphasize that even today that fire of self-sacrifice which once burned on the Cross, still sends forth its tongues of flame in a mysterious manner from the Heart of Jesus to our altars. While, in this incomprehensible condescension, the absolute moment of sacrifice is disclosed in an especially striking manner, one is reluctantly compelled to recognize the absence of two of the other requisites: in the first place, the necessity of the double consecration is not made properly apparent, since a single consecration would suffice to produce the condition of food, would therefore achieve the sacrifice; secondly, the reduction to the state of articles of food reveals not the faintest analogy to the blood — shedding on the Cross, and thus the relative moment of the Sacrifice of the Mass is not properly dealt with. De Lugo's theory seems, therefore, of no service in this connection. It renders, howover, the most useful service in extending the traditional idea of a "mystical slaying", since indeed the reduction of Christ to food is and purports to be nothing else than the preparation of the mystically slain Victim for the sacrificial feast in the Communion of the priest and the faithful.


The Causality of the Mass

In this section we shall treat: (a) the effects (effectus) of the Sacrifice of the Mass, which practically coincide with the various ends for which the Sacrifice is offered, namely adoration, thanksgiving, impetration, and expiation; (b) the manner of its efficacy (modus efliciendi), which lies in part objectively in the Sacrifice of the Mass itself (ex opere operato), and partly depends subjectively on the personal devotion and piety of man (ex opere operantis).

The effects of the Sacrifice of the Mass
The Reformers found themselves compelled to reject entirely the Sacrifice of the Mass, since they recognized the Eucharist merely as a sacrament. Both their views were founded on the reflection, properly appraised above that the Bloody Sacrifice of the Cross was the sole Sacrifice of Christ and of Christendom and thus does not admit of the Sacrifice of the Mass. As a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving in the symbolical or figurative sense, they had earlier approved of the Mass, and Melanchthon resented the charge that Protestants had entirely abolished it. What they most bitterly opposed was the Catholic doctrine that the Mass is a sacrifice not only of praise and thanksgiving, but also of impetration and atonement, whose fruits may benefit others, while it is evident that a sacrament as such can profit merely the recipient. Here the Council of Trent interposed with a definition of faith (Sess. XXII, can. iii): "If any one saith, that the Mass is only a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. . . but not a propitiatory sacrifice; or, that it profits only the recipient, and that it ought not to be offered for the living and the dead for sins, punishments, satisfactions, and other necessities; let him be anathema" (Denzinger, n. 950). In this canon, which gives a summary of all the sacrificial effects in order, the synod emphasizes the propitiatory and impetratory nature of the sacrifice. Propitiation (propitiatio) and petition (impetratio) are distinguishable from each other, in as much as the latter appeals to the goodness and the former to the mercy of God. Naturally, therefore, they differ also as regards their objects, since, while petition is directed towards our spiritual and temporal concerns and needs of every kind, propitiation refers to our sins (peccata) and to the temporal punishments (poenae), which must be expiated by works of penance or satisfaction (satisfactiones) in this life, or otherwise by a corresponding suffering in purgatory. In all these respects the impetratory and expiatory Sacrifice of the Mass is of the greatest utility, both for the living and the dead.

Should a Biblical foundation for the Tridentine doctrine be asked for, we might first of all argue in general as follows: Just as there were in the Old Testament, in addition to sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving, propitiatory and impetratory sacrifices (cf. Leviticus 4 sqq.; 2 Samuel 24:21 sqq., etc.), the New Testament, as its antitype, must also have a sacrifice which serves and suffices for all these objects. But, according to the prophecy of Malachias, this is the Mass, which is to be celebrated by the Church in all places and at all times. Consequently, the Mass is the impetratory and propitiatory sacrifice. As for special reference to the propitiatory character, the record of institution states expressly that the Blood of Christ is in the chalice "unto remission of sins" (Matthew 26:28).

The chief source of our doctrine, however, is tradition, which from the earliest times declares the impetratory value of the Sacrifice of the Mass. According to Tertullian (Ad scapula, ii), the Christians sacrificed "for the welfare of the emperor" (pro salute imperatoris); according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxi in Act. Apost., n. 4), "for the fruits of the earth and other needs". St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386) describes the liturgy of the Mass of his day as follows (Mystagogical Catechesis 5, no. 8): "After the spiritual Sacrifice [pneumatike thysia], the unbloody service [anaimaktos latreia] is completed; we pray to God, over this sacrifice of propitiation [epi tes thysias ekeines tou ilasmou] for the universal peace of the churches, for the proper guidance of the world, for the emperor, soldiers and companions, for the infirm and the sick, for those stricken with trouble, and in general for all in need of help we pray and offer up this sacrifice [tauten prospheromen ten thysian]. We then commemorate the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, that God may, at their prayers and intercessions graciously accept our supplication. We afterwards pray for the dead . . . since we believe that it will be of the greatest advantage [megisten onesin esesthai], if we in the sight of the holy and most awesome Victim [tes hagias kai phrikodestates thysias] discharge our prayers for them. The Christ, who was slain for our sins, we sacrifice [Christon esphagmenon yper ton emeteron amartematon prospheromen] to propitiate the merciful God for those who are gone before and for ourselves." This beautiful passage, which reads like a modern prayer-book, is of interest in more than one connection. It proves in the first place that Christian antiquity recognized the offering up of the Mass for the deceased, exactly as the Church today recognizes requiem Masses — a fact which is confirmed by other independent witnesses, e.g. Tertullian (De monog., x), Cyprian (Ep. lxvi, n. 2), and Augustine (Confess., ix, 12). In the second place, it informs us that our so-called Masses of the Saints also had their prototype among the primitive Christians, and for this view we likewise find other testimonies — e.g. Tertullian (De Cor., iii) and Cyprian (Ep. xxxix, n. 3). By a Saint's Mass is meant, not the offering up of the Sacrifice of the Mass to a saint which would be impossible without most shameful idolatry, but a sacrifice, which, while offered to God alone, on the one hand thanks Him for the triumphal coronation of the saints, and on the other aims at procuring for us the saint's efficacious intercession with God. Such is the authentic explanation of the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII cap, iii, in Denzinger, n. 941). With this threefold limitation, Masses "in honour of the saints" are certainly no base "deception", but are morally allowable, as the Council of Trent specifically declares (loc. cit. can. v); "If any one saith, that it is an imposture to celebrate masses in honour of the saints and for obtaining their intercession with God, as the Church intends, let him be anathema". The general moral permissibility of invoking the intercession of the saints, concerning which this is not the place to speak, is of course assumed in the present instance.

While adoration and thanksgiving are effects of the Mass which relate to God alone, the success of impetration and expiation on the other hand reverts to man. These last two effects are thus also called by theologians the "fruits of the Mass" (fructus missae) and this distinction leads us to the discussion of the difficult and frequently asked question as to whether we are to impute infinite or finite value to the Sacrifice of the Mass. This question is not of the kind which may be answered with a simple yes or no. For, apart from the already indicated distinction between adoration and thanksgiving on the one hand and impetration and expiation on the other, we must also sharply distinguish between the intrinsic and the extrinsic value of the Mass (valor intrinsecus, extrinsecus). As for its intrinsic value, it seems beyond doubt that, in view of the infinite worth of Christ as the Victim and High Priest in one Person, the sacrifice must be regarded as of infinite value, just as the sacrifice of the Last Supper and that of the Cross. Here however, we must once more strongly emphasize the fact that the ever-continued sacrificial activity of Christ in Heaven does not and cannot serve to accumulate fresh redemptory merits and to assume new objective value; it simply stamps into current coin, so to speak, the redemptory merits definitively and perfectly obtained in the Sacrifice of the Cross, and sets them into circulation among mankind. This also is the teaching of the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII cap. ii): "of which bloody oblation the fruits are most abundantly obtained through this unbloody one [the Mass]." For, even in its character of a sacrifice of adoration and thanksgiving, the Mass draws its whole value and all Its power only from the Sacrifice of the Cross which Christ makes of unceasing avail in Heaven (cf. Romans 8:34; Hebrews 7:25). There is, however, no reason why this intrinsic value of the Mass derived from the Sacrifice of the Cross, in so far as it represents a sacrifice of adoration and thanksgiving, should not also operate outwardly to the full extent of its infinity, for it seems inconceivable that the Heavenly Father could accept with other than infinite satisfaction the sacrifice of His only-begotten Son. Consequently God, as Malachias had already prophesied, is in a truly infinite degree honoured, glorified, and praised in the Mass; through Our Lord Jesus Christ he is thanked by men for all his benefits in an infinite manner, in a manner worthy of God.

But when we turn to the Mass as a sacrifice of impetration and expiation, the case is different. While we must always regard its intrinsic value as infinite, since it is the sacrifice of the God-Man Himself, its extrinsic value must necessarily be finite in consequence of the limitations of man. The scope of the so-called "fruits of the Mass" is limited. Just as a tiny chip of wood can not within it contain the whole energy of the sun, so also, and in a still greater degree, is man incapable of converting the boundless value of the impetratory and expiatory sacrifice into an infinite effect for his soul. Wherefore, in practice, the impetratory value of the sacrifice is always as limited as is its propitiatory and satisfactory value. The greater or less measure of the fruits derived will naturally depend very much on the personal efforts and worthiness, the devotion and fervour of those who celebrate or are present at Mass. This limitation of the fruits of the Mass must, however, not be misconstrued to mean that the presence of a large congregation causes a diminution of the benefits derived from the Sacrifice by the individual, as if such benefits were after some fashion divided into so many aliquot parts. Neither the Church nor the Christian people has any tolerance for the false principle: "The less the number of the faithful in the church, the richer the fruits". On the contrary the Bride of Christ desires for every Mass a crowded church, being rightly convinced that from the unlimited treasures of the Mass much more grace will result to the individual from a service participated in by a full congregation, than from one attended merely by a few of the faithful. This relative infinite value refers indeed only to the general fruit of the Mass (fructus generalis), and not to the special (fructus specialis) two terms whose distinction will be more clearly characterized below. Here, however, we may remark that by the special fruit of the Mass is meant that for the application of which according to a special intention a priest may accept a stipend.

The question now arises whether in this connection the applicable value of the Mass is to be regarded as finite or infinite (or, more accurately, unlimited). This question is of importance in view of the practical consequences it involves. For, if we decide in favour of the unlimited value, a single Mass celebrated for a hundred persons or intentions is as efficacious as a hundred Masses celebrated for a single person or intention. On the other hand, it is clear that, if we incline towards a finite value, the special fruit is divided pro rata among the hundred persons. In their quest for a solution of this question, two classes of theologians are distinguished according to their tendencies: the minority (Gotti, Billuart, Antonio Bellarini, etc.) are inclined to uphold the certainty or at least the probability of the former view, arguing that the infinite dignity of the High Priest Christ can not be limited by the finite sacrificial activity of his human representative. But, since the Church has entirely forbidden as a breach of strict justice that a priest should seek to fulfil, by reading a single Mass, the obligations imposed by several stipends (see Denzinger, n. 1110) these theologians hasten to admit that their theory is not to be translated into practice, unless the priest applies as many individual Masses for all the intentions of the stipend-givers as he has received stipends. But in as much as the Church has spoken of strict justice (justitia commutativa), the overwhelming majority of theologians incline even theoretically to the conviction that the satisfactory — and, according to many, also the propitiatory and impetratory — value of a Mass for which a stipend has been taken, is so strictly circumscribed and limited from the outset, that it accrues pro rata (according to the greater or less number of the living or the dead for whom the Mass is offered) to each of the individuals. Only on such a hypothesis is the custom prevailing among the faithful of having several Masses celebrated for the deceased or for their intentions intelligible. Only on such a hypothesis can one explain the widely established "Mass Association", a pious union whose members voluntarily bind themselves to read or get read at least one Mass annually for the poor souls in purgatory. As early as the eighth century we find in Germany a so-called "Totenbund" (see Pertz, "Monum. Germaniae hist.: Leg.", II, i, 221). But probably the greatest of such societies is the Messbund of Ingolstadt, founded in 1724; it was raised to a confraternity (Confraternity of the Immaculate Conception) on 3 Feb., 1874, and at present counts 680,000 members (cf. Beringer, "Die Ablasse, ihr Wesen u. ihr Gebrauch", 13th ed., Paderborn, 1906, pp. 610 sqq.). Tournély (De Euch. q. viii, a. 6) has also sought in favour of this view important internal grounds of probability, for example by adverting to the visible course of Divine Providence: all natural and supernatural effects in general are seen to be slow and gradual, not sudden or desultory, wherefore it is also the most holy intention of God that man should, by his personal exertions, strive through the medium of the greatest possible number of Masses to participate in the fruits of the Sacrifice of the Cross.

The manner of efficacy of the Mass
In theological phrase an effect "from the work of the action" (ex opere operato) signifies a grace conditioned exclusively by the objective bringing into activity of a cause of the supernatural order, in connection with which the proper disposition of the subject comes subsequently into account only as an indispensable antecedent condition (conditio sine qua non), but not as a real joint cause (concausa). Thus, for example, baptism by its mere ministration produces ex opere operato interior grace in each recipient of the sacrament who in his heart opposes no obstacle (obez) to the reception of the graces of baptism. On the other hand, all supernatural effects, which, presupposing the state of grace are accomplished by the personal actions and exertions of the subject (e.g. everything obtained by simple prayer), are called effects "from the work of the agent"; (ex opere operantis). we are now confronted with the difficult question: In what manner does the Eucharistic Sacrifice accomplish its effects and fruits? As the early scholastics gave scarcely any attention to this problem, we are indebted for almost all the light thrown upon it to the later scholastics.

(i) It is first of all necessary to make clear that in every sacrifice of the Mass four distinct categories of persons really participate.

At the head of all stands of course the High Priest, Christ Himself; to make the Sacrifice of the Cross fruitful for us and to secure its application, He offers Himself as a sacrifice, which is quite independent of the merits or demerits of the Church, the celebrant or the faithful present at the sacrifice, and is for these an opus operatum.

Next after Christ and in the second place comes the Church as a juridical person, who, according to the express teaching of the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, cap. i), has received from the hands of her Divine Founder the institution of the Mass and also the commission to ordain constantly priests and to have celebrated by these the most venerable Sacrifice. This intermediate stage between Christ and the celebrant may be neither passed over nor eliminated, since a bad and immoral priest, as an ecclesiastical official, does not offer up his own sacrifice — which indeed could only be impure — but the immaculate Sacrifice of Christ and his spotless Bride, which can be soiled by no wickedness of the celebrant. But to this special sacrificial activity of the Church, offering up the sacrifice together with Christ, must also correspond a special ecclesiastico-human merit as a fruit, which, although in itself an opus operantis of the Church, is yet entirely independent of the worthiness of the celebrant and the faithful and therefore constitutes for these an opus operatum. When, however, as De Lugo rightly points out, an excommunicated or suspended priest celebrates in defiance of the prohibition of the Church, this ecclesiastical merit is always lost, since such a priest no longer acts in the name and with the commission of the Church. His sacrifice is nevertheless valid, since, by virtue of his priestly ordination, he celebrates in the name of Christ, even though in opposition to His wishes, and, as the self-sacrifice of Christ, even such a Mass remains essentially a spotless and untarnished sacrifice before God. We are thus compelled to concur in another view of De Lugo, namely that the greatness and extent of this ecclesiastical service is dependent on the greater or less holiness of the reigning pope, the bishops, and the clergy throughout the World, and that for this reason in times of ecclesiastical decay and laxity of morals (especially at the papal court and among the episcopate) the fruits of the Mass, resulting from the sacrificial activity of the Church, might under certain circumstances easily be very small.

With Christ and His Church is associated in third place the celebrating priest, since he is the representative through whom the real and the mystical Christ offer up the sacrifice. If, therefore, the celebrant be a man of great personal devotion, holiness, and purity, there will accrue an additional fruit which will benefit not himself alone, but also those in whose favour he applies the Mass. The faithful are thus guided by sound instinct when they prefer to have Mass celebrated for their intentions by an upright and holy priest rather than by an unworthy one, since, in addition to the chief fruit of the Mass, they secure this special fruit which springs ex opera operantis, from the piety of the celebrant.

Finally, in the fourth place, must be mentioned those who participate actively in the Sacrifice of the Mass, e.g., the servers, sacristan, organist, singers, and the whole congregation joining in the sacrifice. The priest, therefore, prays also in their name: Offerimus (i.e. we offer). That the effect resulting from this (metaphorical) sacrificial activity is entirely dependent on the worthiness and piety of those taking part therein and thus results exclusively ex opere operantis is evident without further demonstration. The more fervent the prayer, the richer the fruit. Most intimate is the active participation in the Sacrifice of those who receive Holy Communion during the Mass since in their case the special fruits of the Communion are added to those of the Mass. Should sacramental Communion be impossible, the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII. cap. vi) advises the faithful to make at least a "spiritual communion" (spirituali effectu communicare), which consists in the ardent desire to receive the Eucharist. However, as we have already emphasized, the omission of real or spiritual Communion on the part of the faithful present does not render the Sacrifice of the Mass either invalid or unlawful, wherefore the Church even permits "private Masses", which may on reasonable grounds be celebrated in a chapel with closed doors.

(ii) In addition to the active, there are also passive participators in the Sacrifice of the Mass. These are the persons in whose favour — it may be even without their knowledge and in opposition to their wishes — the Holy Sacrifice is offered. They fall into three categories: the community, the celebrant, and the person (or persons) for whom the Mass is specially applied. To each of these three classes corresponds ex opere operato a special fruit of the Mass, whether the same be an impetratory effect of the Sacrifice of Petition or a propitiatory and satisfactory effect of the Sacrifice of Expiation. Although the development of the teaching concerning the threefold fruit of the Mass begins only with Scotus (Quaest. quodlibet, xx), it is nevertheless based on the very essence of the Sacrifice itself. Since, according to the wording of the Canon of the Mass, prayer and sacrifice is offered for all those present, the whole Church, the pope, the diocesan bishop, the faithful living and dead, and even "for the salvation of the whole world", there must first of all result a "general fruit" (fructus generalis) for all mankind, the bestowal of which lies immediately in the will of Christ and His Church, and can thus be frustrated by no contrary intention of the celebrant. In this fruit even the excommunicated, heretics, and infidels participate, mainly that their conversion may thus be effected. The second kind of fruit (fructus personalis, specialissimus) falls to the personal share of the celebrant, since it were unjust that he — apart from his worthiness and piety (opus operantis) — should come empty-handed from the sacrifice. Between these two fruits lies the third, the so-called "special fruit of the Mass" (fructus specialis, medius, or ministerialis), which is usually applied to particular living or deceased persons according to the intention of the celebrant or the donor of a stipend. This "application" rests so exclusively in the hands of the priest that even the prohibition of the Church cannot render it inefficacious, although the celebrant would in such a case sin through disobedience. For the existence of the special fruit of the Mass, rightly defended by Pius VI against the Jansenistic Synod of Pistoia (1786), we have the testimony also of Christian antiquity, which offered the Sacrifice for special persons and intentions. To secure in all cases the certain effect of this fructus specialis, Francisco Suárez (De Euch., disp. lxxix, Sect. 10) gives priests the wise advice that they should always add to the first a "second intention" (intentio secunda), which, should the first be inefficacious, will take its place.

(iii) A last and an entirely separate problem is afforded by the special mode of efficacy of the Sacrifice of Expiation. As an expiatory sacrifice, the Mass has the double function of obliterating actual sins, especially mortal sins (effectus stricte propitiatorius), and also of taking away, in the case of those already in the state of grace, such temporal punishments as may still remain to be endured (effectus satisfactorius). The main question is: Is this double effect ex opere operato produced mediately or immediately? As regards the actual forgiveness of sin, it must, in opposition to earlier theologians (Aragon, Casalis, Gregory of Valentia), be maintained as undoubtedly a certain principle, that the expiatory sacrifice of the Mass can never accomplish the forgiveness of mortal sins otherwise than by way of contrition and penance, and therefore only mediately through procuring the grace of conversion (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XXII, cap. ii: "donum paenitentiae concedens"). With this limitation, however, the Mass is able to remit even the most grievous sins (Council of Trent, 1. c., "Crimina et peccata etiam ingentia dimittit"). Since, according to the present economy of salvation, no sin whatsoever, grievous or trifling, can be forgiven without an act of sorrow, we must confine the efficacy of the Mass, even in the case of venial sins, to obtaining for Christians the grace of contrition for less serious sins (Sess. XXII, cap. i). It is indeed this purely mediate activity which constitutes the essential distinction between the sacrifice and the sacrament. Could the Mass remit sins immediately ex opere operato, like Baptism or Penance, it would be a sacrament of the dead and cease to be a sacrifice (see SACRAMENT). Concerning the remission of the temporal punishment due to sin, however, which appears to be effected in an immediate manner, our judgment must be different. The reason lies in the intrinsic distinction between sin and its punishment. Without the personal cooperation and sorrow of the sinner, all forgiveness of sin by God is impossible; this cannot however be said of a mere remission of punishment. One person may validly discharge the debts or fines of another, even without apprising the debtor of his intention. The same rule may be applied to a just person, who, after his justification, is still burdened with temporal punishment consequent on his sins. It is certain that, only in this immediate way, can assistance be given to the poor souls in purgatory through the Sacrifice of the Mass, since they are henceforth powerless to perform personal works of satisfaction (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XXV, de purgat.). From this consideration we derive by analogy the legitimate conclusion that the case exactly the same as regards the living.


Practical Questions concerning the Mass

From the exceedingly high valuation, which the Church places on the Mass as the unbloody Sacrifice of the God-Man, issue, as it were spontaneously all those practical precepts of a positive or a negative nature, which are given in the Rubrics of the Mass, in Canon Law, and in Moral Theology. They may be conveniently divided into two categories, according as they are intended to secure in the highest degree possible the objective dignity of the Sacrifice or the subjective worthiness of the celebrant.

1. Precepts for the Promotion of the Dignity of the Sacrifice

(a) One of the most important requisites for the worthy celebration of the Mass is that the place in which the all-holy Mystery is to be celebrated should be a suitable one. Since, in the days of the Apostolic Church, there were no churches or chapels, private houses with suitable accommodation were appointed for the solemnization of "the breaking of bread" (cf. Acts 2:46; 20:7 sq.; Colossians 4:15; Philemon 2). During the era of the persecutions the Eucharistic services in Rome were transferred to the catacombs, where the Christians believed themselves secure from government agents. The first "houses of God" reach back certainly to the end of the second century, as we learn from Tertullian (Adv. Valent., iii) and Clement of Alexandria (Stromata I.1). In the second half of the fourth century (A.D. 370), Optatus of Mileve (De Schism. Donat. II, iv) could already reckon more than forty basilicas which adorned the city of Rome. From this period dates the prohibition of the Synod of Laodicea (can. lviii) to celebrate Mass in private houses. Thenceforth the public churches were to be the sole places of worship. In the Middle Ages the synods granted to bishops the right of allowing house-chapels within their dioceses. According to the law of today (Council of Trent, Sess. XXII, de reform.), the Mass may be celebrated only in Chapels and public (or semi-public) oratories, which must be consecrated or at least blessed. At present, private chapels may be erected only in virtue of a special papal indult (S.C.C., 23 Jan., 1847, 6 Sept., 1870). In the latter case, the real place of sacrifice is the consecrated altar (or altar-stone), which must be placed in a suitable room (cf. Missale Romanum, Rubr. gen., tit. xx). In times of great need (e.g. war, persecution of Catholics), the priest may celebrate outside the church, but naturally only in a becoming place, provided with the most necessary utensils. On reasonable grounds the bishop may, in virtue of the so-called "quinquennial faculties", allow the celebration of Mass in the open air, but the celebration of Mass at sea is allowed only by papal indult. In such an indult it is usually provided that the sea be calm during the celebration, and that a second priest (or deacon) be at hand to prevent the spilling of the chalice in case of the rocking of the ship.

(b) For the worthy celebration of Mass the circumstance of time is also of great importance. In the Apostolic age the first Christians assembled regularly on Sundays for "the breaking of bread" (Acts 20:7: "on the first day of the week"), which day the "Didache" (c. xiv), and later Justin Martyr (I Apol., lxvi), already name "the Lord's day".

Justin himself seems to be aware only of the Sunday celebration, but Tertullian adds the fast-days on Wednesday and Friday and the anniversaries of the martyrs ("De cor. mil.", iii; "De orat.", xix). As Tertullian calls the whole paschal season (until Pentecost) "one long feast", we may conclude with some justice that during this period the faithful not only communicated daily, but were also present at the Eucharistic Liturgy. As regards the time of the day, there existed in the Apostolic age no fixed precepts regarding the hour at which the Eucharistic celebration should take place. The Apostle Paul appears to have on occasion "broken bread" about midnight (Acts 20:7). But Pliny the Younger, Governor of Bithynia (died A.D. 114), already states in his official report to Emperor Trajan that the Christians assembled in the early hours of the morning and bound themselves by a sacramentum (oath), by which we can understand today only the celebration of the mysteries. Tertullian gives as the hour of the assembly the time before dawn (De cor. mil., iii: antelucanis aetibus). When the fact was adverted to that the Saviour's Resurrection occurred in the morning before sunrise, a change of the hour set in, the celebration of Mass being postponed until this time. Thus Cyprian writes of the Sunday celebration (Ep., lxiii): "we celebrate the Resurrection of the Lord in the morning." Since the fifth century the "third hour" (i.e. 9 a.m.) was regarded as "canonical" for the Solemn Mass on Sundays and festivals. When the Little Hours (Prime, Terce, Sext, None) began in the Middle Ages to lose their significance as "canonical hours", the precepts governing the hour for the conventual Mass received a new meaning. Thus, for example, the precepts that the conventual Mass should be held after None on fast days does not signify that it be held between midday and evening, but only that "the recitation of None in choir is followed by the Mass". It is in general left to the discretion of the priest to celebrate at any hour between dawn and midday (ab aurora usque ad meridiem). It is proper that he should read beforehand Matins and Lauds from his breviary.

The sublimity of the Sacrifice of the Mass demands that the priest should approach the altar wearing the sacred vestments (amice, stole, cincture, maniple, and chasuble). Whether the priestly vestments are historical developments from Judaism or paganism, is a question still discussed by archaeologists. In any case the "Canones Hippolyti" require that at Pontifical Mass the deacons and priests appear in "white vestments", and that the lectors also wear festive garments. No priest may celebrate Mass without light (usually two candles), except in case of urgent necessity (e.g. to consecrate a Host as the Viaticum for a person seriously ill). The altar-cross is also necessary as an indication that the Sacrifice of the Mass is nothing else than the unbloody reproduction of the Sacrifice of the Cross. Usually, also, the priest must be attended at the altar by a server of the male sex. The celebration of Mass without a server is allowed only in case of need (e.g. to procure the Viaticum for a sick person, or to enable the faithful to satisfy their obligation of hearing Mass). A person of the female sex may not serve at the altar itself, e.g. transfer the missal, present the cruets, etc. (S.R.C., 27 August, 1836). Women (especially nuns) may, however, answer the celebrant from their places, if no male server be at hand. During the celebration of Mass a simple priest may not wear any head-covering — whether biretta, pileolus, or full wig (comae fictitiae) — but the bishop may allow him to wear a plain perruque as a protection for his hairless scalp.

© To preserve untarnished the honour of the most venerable sacrifice, the Church has surrounded with a strong rampart of special defensive regulations the institution of "mass-stipends"; her intention is on the one hand to keep remote from the altar all base avarice, and on the other, to ensure and safeguard the right of the faithful to the conscientious celebration of the Masses bespoken.

By a mass-stipend is meant a certain monetary offering which anyone makes to the priest with the accompanying obligation of celebrating a Mass in accordance with the intentions of the donor (ad intentionem dantis). The obligation incurred consists, concretely speaking, in the application of the "special fruit of the Mass" (fructus specialis), the nature of which we have already described in detail (A, 3). The idea of the stipend emanates from the earliest ages, and its justification lies incontestably in the axiom of St. Paul (1 Corinthians 9:13): "They that serve the altar, partake with the altar". Originally consisting of the necessaries of life, the stipend was at first considered as "alms for a Mass" (eleemosyna missarum), the object being to contribute to the proper support of the clergy. The character of a pure alms has been since lost by the stipend, since such may be accepted by even a wealthy priest. But the Pauline principle applies to the wealthy priest just as it does to the poor. The now customary money-offering, which was introduced about the eighth century and was tacitly approved by the Church, is to be regarded merely as the substitute or commutation of the earlier presentation of the necessaries of life. In this very point, also, a change from the ancient practice has been introduced, since at present the individual priest receives the stipend personally, whereas formerly all the clergy of the particular church shared among them the total oblations and gifts. In their present form, the whole matter of stipends has been officially taken by the Church entirely under her protection, both by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, de ref.) and by the dogmatic Bull "Auctorem fidei" (1796) of Pius VI (Denzinger, n. 1554). Since the stipend, in its origin and nature, claims to be and can be nothing else than a lawful contribution towards the proper support of the clergy, the false and foolish views of the ignorant are shown to be without foundation when they suppose that a Mass may be simoniacally purchased with money (Cf. Summa Theologica II-II:100:2). To obviate all abuses concerning of the amount of the stipend, there exists in each diocese a fixed "mass-tax" (settled either by ancient custom or by an episcopal regulation), which no priest may exceed, unless extraordinary inconvenience (e.g. long fasting or a long journey on foot) justifies a somewhat larger sum. To eradicate all unworthy greed from among both laity and clergy in connection with a thing so sacred, Pius IX in his Constitution "Apostolicae Sedis" of 12 Oct., 1869, forbade under penalty of excommunication the commercial traffic in stipends (mercimonium missae stipendiorum). The trafficking consists in reducing the larger stipend collected to the level of the "tax", and appropriating the surplus for oneself. Into the category of shameful traffic in stipends also falls the reprehensible practice of booksellers and tradesmen, who organize public collections of stipends and retain the money contributions as payment for books, merchandise, wines, etc., to be delivered to the clergy (S.C.C., 31 Aug., 1874, 25 May, 1893). As special punishment for this offence, suspensio a divinis reserved to the pope is proclaimed against priests, irregularity against other clerics, and excommunication reserved to the bishop, against the laity.

Another bulwark against avarice is the strict regulation of the Church, binding under pain of mortal sin, that priests shall not accept more intentions than they can satisfy within a reasonable period (S.C.C, 1904). This regulation was emphasized by the additional one which forbade stipends to be transferred to priests of another diocese without the knowledge of their ordinaries (S.C.C., 22 May, 1907). The acceptance of a stipend imposes under pain of mortal sin the obligation not only of reading the stipulated Mass, but also of fulfilling conscientiously all other appointed conditions of an important character (e.g. the appointed day, altar, etc.). Should some obstacle arise, the money must either be returned to the donor or a substitute procured. In the latter case, the substitute must be given, not the usual stipend, but the whole offering received (cf. Prop. ix damn. 1666 ab Alex. VIII in Denzinger, n. 1109), unless it be indisputably clear from the circumstances that the excess over the usual stipend was meant by the donor for the first priest alone. There is tacit condition which requires the reading of the stipulated Mass as soon as possible. According to the common opinion of moral theologians, a postponement of two months is in less urgent cases admissible, even though no lawful impediment can be brought forward. Should, however, a priest postpone a Mass for a happy delivery until after the event, he is bound to return the stipends. However, since all these precepts have been imposed solely in the interests of the stipend-giver, it is evident that he enjoys the right of sanctioning all unusual delays.

(d) To the kindred question of "mass-foundations" the Church has, in the interests of the founder and in her high regard for the Holy Sacrifice, devoted the same anxious care as in the case of stipends. Mass-foundations (fundationes missarum) are fixed bequests of funds or real property, the interest or income from which is to procure for ever the celebration of Mass for the founder or according to his intentions. Apart from anniversaries, foundations of Masses are divided, according to the testamentary arrangement of the testator, into monthly, weekly, and daily foundations. As ecclesiastical property, mass-foundations are subject to the administration of the ecclesiastical authorities, especially of the diocesan bishop, who must grant hls permission for the acceptance of such and must appoint for them the lowest rate. Only when episcopal approval has been secured can the foundation be regarded as completed; thenceforth it is unalterable for ever. In places where the acquirement of ecclesiastical property is subject to the approval of the State (e.g. in Austria), the establishment of a mass-foundation must also be submitted to the secular authorities. The declared wishes of the founder are sacred and decisive as to the manner of fulfillment. Should no special intention be mentioned in the deed of foundation, the Mass must be applied for the founder himself (S.C.C., 18 March, 1668). To secure punctuality in the execution of the foundation, Innocent XII ordered in 1697 that a list of the mass-foundations, arranged according to the months, be kept in each church possessing such endowments. The administrators of pious foundations are bound under pain of mortal sin to forward to the bishop at the end of each year a list of all founded Masses left uncelebrated together with the money therefor (S.C.C., 25 May, 18).

The celebrant of a founded Mass is entitled to the full amount of the foundation, unless it is evident from the circumstances of the foundation or from the wording of the deed that an exception is justifiable. Such is the case when the foundation serves also as the endowment of a benefice, and consequently in such a case the beneficiary is bound to pay his substitute only the regular tax (S.C.C., 25 July, 1874). Without urgent reason, founded Masses may not be celebrated in churches (or on altars) other than those stipulated by the foundation. Permanent transference of such Masses is reserved to the pope, but in isolated instances the dispensation of the bishop suffices (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XXI de ref.; Sess. XXV de ref.). The unavoidable loss of the income of a foundation puts an end to all obligations connected with it. A serious diminution of the foundation capital, owing to the depreciation of money or property in value, also the necessary increase of the mass-tax, scarcity of priests, poverty of a church or of the clergy may constitute just grounds for the reduction of the number of Masses, since it may be reasonably presumed that the deceased founder would not under such difficult circumstance insist upon the obligation. On 21 June, 1625, the right of reduction, which the Council of Trent had conferred on bishops, abbots, and the generals of religious orders, was again reserved by Urban VIII to the Holy See.

2. Precepts to secure the Worthiness of the Celebrant

Although, as declared by the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, cap. i), the venerable, pure, and sublime Sacrifice of the God-man "cannot be stained by any unworthiness or impiety of the celebrant", still ecclesiastical legislation has long regarded it as a matter of special concern that priests should fit themselves for the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice by the cultivation of integrity, purity of heart, and other qualities of a personal nature.

(a) In the first place it may be asked: Who may celebrate Mass? Since for the validity of the sacrifice the office of a special priesthood is essential, it is clear, to begin with, that only bishops and priests (not deacons) are qualified to offer up the Holy Sacrifice (see EUCHARIST). The fact that even at the beginning of the second century the regular officiator at the Eucharistic celebration seems to have been the bishop will be more readily understood when we remember that at this early period there was no strict distinction between the offices of bishop and priest. Like the "Didache" (xv), Clement of Rome (Ad Cor., xl-xlii) speaks only of the bishop and his deacon in connection with the sacrifice. Ignatius of Antioch, indeed, who bears irrefutable testimony to the existence of the three divisions of the hierarchy — bishop (episkopos), priests (presbyteroi) and deacons (diakonoi) — confines to the bishop the privilege of celebrating thanksgiving Divine Service when he says: "It is unlawful to baptize or to hold the agape without the bishop." The "Canones Hippolyti", composed probably about the end of the second century, first contain the regulation (can. xxxii): "If, in the absence of the bishop, a priest be at hand, all shall devolve upon him, and he shall be honoured as the bishop is honoured. "Subsequent tradition recognizes no other celebrant of the Mystery of the Eucharist than the bishops and priests, who are validly ordained "according to the keys of the Church," (secundum claves Ecclesiae). (Cf. Lateran IV, cap. "Firmiter" in Denzinger, n. 430.)

But the Church demands still more by insisting also on the personal moral worthiness of the celebrant. This connotes not alone freedom from all ecclesiastical censures (excommunication, suspension, interdict), but also a becoming preparation of the soul and body of the priest before he approaches the altar. To celebrate in the state of mortal sin has always been regarded by the Church as an infamous sacrifice (cf. 1 Corinthians 11:27 sqq.). For the worthy (not for the valid) celebration of the Mass it is, therefore, especially required that the celebrant be in the state of grace. To place him in this condition, the awakening of perfect sorrow is no longer sufficient since the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, cap. vii in Denzinger, n. 880), for there is a strict eccleciastical precept that the reaction of the Sacrament of Penance must precede the celebration of Mass. This rule applies to all priests, even when they are bound by their office (ex officio) to read Mass, e.g. on Sundays for their parishioners. Only in instances when no confessor can be procured, may they content themselves with reciting an act of perfect sorrow (contritio), and they then incur the obligation of going to confession "as early as possible" (quam primum), which in canon law, signifies within three days at furthest. In addition to the pious preparation for the Mass (accessus), there is prescribed a correspondingly long thanksgiving after Mass (recessus), whose length is fixed by moral theologians between fifteen minutes and half an hour, although in this connection the particular official engagements of the priest must be considered. As regards the length of the Mass itself, the duration is naturally variable, according as a Solemn High Mass is sung or a Low Mass celebrated. To perform worthily all the ceremonies and pronounce clearly all the prayers in Low Mass requires on an average about half an hour. Moral theologians justly declare that the scandalous haste necessary to finish Mass in less than a quarter of an hour is impossible without grievous sin.

With regard to the more immediate preparation of the body, custom has declared from time immemorial, and positive canon law since the Council of Constance (1415), that the faithful, when receiving the Sacrament of Altar, and priests, when celebrating the Holy Sacrifice, must be fasting (jejunium naturale) which means that they must have partaken of no food or drink whatsoever from midnight. Midnight begins with the first stroke of the hour. In calculating the hour, the so-called "mean time" (or local time) must be used: according to a recent decision (S.C.C., 12 July, 1893), Central-European time may be also employed, and, in North America, "zone time". The movement recently begun among the German clergy, favouring a mitigation of the strict regulation for weak or overworked priests with the obligation of duplicating, has serious objections, since a general relaxation of the ancient strictness might easily result in lessening respect for the Blessed Sacrament and in a harmful reaction among thoughtless members of the laity. The granting of mitigations in general or in exceptional cases belongs to the Holy See alone. To keep away from the altar irreverent adventurers and unworthy priests, the Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII, de ref.) issued the decree, made much more stringent in later times, that an unknown priest without the Celebret may not be allowed to say Mass in any church.

(b) A second question may be asked: "Who must say Mass?" In the first place, if this question be considered identical with the enquiry as to whether a general obligation of Divine Law binds every priest by reason of his ordination, the old Scholastics are divided in opinion. St. Thomas, Durandus, Paludanus, and Anthony of Bologna certainly maintained the existence of such an obligation; on the other hand, Richard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Gabriel Biel, and Cardinal Cajetan declared for the opposite view. Canon law teaches nothing on the subject. In the absence of a decision, Francisco Suárez (De Euchar., disp. lxxx, sect. 1, n. 4) believes that one who conforms to the negative view, may be declared free from grievous sin. Of the ancient hermits we know that they did not celebrate the Holy Sacrifice in the desert, and St. Ignatius Loyola, guided by high motives, abstained for a whole year from celebrating. Cardinal De Lugo (De Euchar., disp. xx, sect. 1, n. 13) takes a middle course, by adopting theoretically the milder opinion, while declaring that, in practice, omission through lukewarmness and neglect may, on account of the scandal caused, easily amount to mortal sin. This consideration explains the teaching of the moral theologians that every priest is bound under pain of mortal sin to celebrate at least a few times each year (e.g. at Easter, Pentecost, Christmas, the Epiphany). The obligation of hearing Mass on all Sundays and holy days of obligation is of course not abrogated for such priests. The spirit of the Church demands — and it is today the practically universal custom — that a priest should celebrate daily, unless he prefers to omit his Mass occasionally through motives of reverence.

Until far into the Middle Ages it was left to the discretion of the priest, to his personal devotion and his zeal for souls, whether he should read more than one Mass on the same day. But since the twelfth century canon law declares that he must in general content himself with one daily Mass, and the synods of the thirteenth century allow, even in case of necessity, at most a duplication (see BINATION). In the course of time this privilege of celebrating the Holy Sacrifice twice on the same day was more and more curtailed. According to the existing law, duplication is allowed, under special conditions, only on Sundays and holy days, and then only in the interests of the faithful, that they may be enabled to fulfil their obligation of hearing Mass. For the feast of Christmas alone have priests universally been allowed to retain the privilege of three Masses, in Spain and Portugal this privilege was extended to All Souls' Day (2 Nov.) by special Indult of Benedict XIV (1746). Such customs are unknown in the East.

This general obligation of a priest to celebrate Mass must not be confounded with the special obligation which results from the acceptance of a Mass-stipend (obligatio ex stipendio) or from the cure of souls (obligatio ex cura animarum). Concerning the former sufficient has been already said. As regards the claims of the cure of souls, the obligation of Divine Law that parish priests and administrators of a parish should from time to time celebrate Mass for their parishioners, arises from the relations of pastor and flock. The Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII, de ref.) has specified this duty of application more closely, by directing that the parish priest should especially apply the Mass, for which no stipend may be taken, for his flock on all Sundays and holy days (cf. Benedict XIV, "Cum semper oblatas", 19 Aug., 1744). The obligation to apply the Mass pro populo extends also to the holy days abrogated by the Bull of Urban VIII, "Universa per orbem", of 13 Sept., 1642; for even today these remain "canonically fixed feast days", although the faithful are dispensed from the obligation of hearing Mass and may engage in servile works. The same obligation of applying the Mass falls likewise on bishops, as pastors of their dioceses, and on those abbots who exercize over clergy and people a quasi-episcopal jurisdiction. Titular bishops alone are excepted, although even in their case the application is to be desired (cf. Leo XIII, "In supremacy", 10 June, 1882). As the obligation itself is not only personal, but also real, the application must, in case of an impediment arising either be made soon afterwards, or be effected through a substitute, who has a right to a mass stipend as regulated by the tax. Concerning this whole question, see Heuser, "Die Verpflichtung der Pfarrer, die hl. Messe fur die Gemeinde zu applicieren" (Düsseldorf 1850).

© For the sake of completeness a third and last question must be touched on in this section: For whom may Mass be celebrated? In general the answer may be given: For all those and for those only, who are fitted to participate in the fruits of the Mass as an impetratory, propitiatory, and satisfactory sacrifice. From this as immediately derived the rule that Mass may not be said for the damned in Hell or the blessed in Heaven, since they are incapable of receiving the fruits of the Mass; for the same reason children who die unbaptized are excluded from the benefits of the Mass. Thus, there remain as the possible participants only the living on earth and the poor souls in purgatory (cf. Trent, Sess. XXII, can. iii; Sess. XXV, decret. de purgat.). Partly out of her great veneration of the Sacrifice, however, and partly to avoid scandal, the Church has surrounded with certain conditions, which priests are bound in obedience to observe, the application of Mass for certain classes of the living and dead. The first class are non-tolerated excommunicated persons, who are to be avoided by the faithful (excommunicati vitandi). Although, according to various authors, the priest is not forbidden to offer up Mass for such unhappy persons in private and with a merely mental intention, still to announce publicly such a Mass or to insert the name of the excommunicated person in the prayers, even though he may be in the state of grace owing to perfect sorrow or may have died truly repentant, would be a "communicatio in divinis", and is strictly forbidden under penalty of excommunication (cf. C. 28, de sent. excomm., V, t. 39). It is likewise forbidden to offer the Mass publicly and solemnly for deceased non-Catholics, even though they were princes (Innoc. III C. 12, X 1. 3, tit. 28). On the other hand it is allowed, in consideration of the welfare of the state, to celebrate for a non-Catholic living ruler even a public Solemn Mass. For living heretics and schismatics also for the Jews, Turks, and heathens, Mass may be privately applied (and even a stipend taken) with the object of procuring for them the grace of conversion to the true Faith. For a deceased heretic the private and hypothetical application of the Mass is allowed only when the priest has good grounds for believing that the deceased held his error in good faith (bona fide. Cf. S.C. Officii, 7 April, 1875). To celebrate Mass privately for deceased catechumens is permissible, since we may assume that they are already justified by their desire of Baptism and are in purgatory. In like manner Mass may be celebrated privately for the souls of deceased Jews and heathens, who have led an upright life, since the sacrifice is intended to benefit all who are in purgatory. For further details see Göpfert, "Moraltheologie", III (5th ed., Paderborn, 1906).
"So let us be confident, let us not be unprepared, let us not be outflanked, let us be wise, vigilant, fighting against those who are trying to tear the faith out of our souls and morality out of our hearts, so that we may remain Catholics, remain united to the Blessed Virgin Mary, remain united to the Roman Catholic Church, remain faithful children of the Church."- Abp. Lefebvre
Reply
#3
The Blessed Eucharist as a Sacrament

Since Christ is present under the appearances of bread and wine in a sacramental way, the Blessed Eucharist is unquestionably a sacrament of the Church. Indeed, in the Eucharist the definition of a Christian sacrament as "an outward sign of an inward grace instituted by Christ" is verified.

The investigation into the precise nature of the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar, whose existence Protestants do not deny, is beset with a number of difficulties. Its essence certainly does not consist in the Consecration or the Communion, the former being merely the sacrificial action, the latter the reception of the sacrament, and not the sacrament itself. The question may eventually be reduced to this whether or not the sacramentality is to be sought for in the Eucharistic species or in the Body and Blood of Christ hidden beneath them. The majority of theologians rightly respond to the query by saying, that neither the species themselves nor the Body and Blood of Christ by themselves, but the union of both factors constitute the moral whole of the Sacrament of the Altar. The species undoubtedly belong to the essence of the sacrament, since it is by means of them, and not by means of the invisible Body of Christ, that the Eucharist possesses the outward sign of the sacrament. Equally certain is it, that the Body and the Blood of Christ belong to the concept of the essence, because it is not the mere unsubstantial appearances which are given for the food of our souls but Christ concealed beneath the appearances. The twofold number of the Eucharistic elements of bread and wine does not interfere with the unity of the sacrament; for the idea of refection embraces both eating and drinking, nor do our meals in consequence double their number. In the doctrine of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, there is a question of even higher relation, in that the separated species of bread and wine also represent the mystical separation of Christ's Body and Blood or the unbloody Sacrifice of the Eucharistic Lamb. The Sacrament of the Altar may be regarded under the same aspects as the other sacraments, provided only it be ever kept in view that the Eucharist is a permanent sacrament. Every sacrament may be considered either in itself or with reference to the persons whom it concerns.

Passing over the Institution, which is discussed elsewhere in connection with the words of Institution, the only essentially important points remaining are the outward sign (matter and form) and inward grace (effects of Communion), to which may be added the necessity of Communion for salvation. In regard to the persons concerned, we distinguish between the minister of the Eucharist and its recipient or subject.


The Matter or Eucharistic Elements

There are two Eucharistic elements, bread and wine, which constitute the remote matter of the Sacrament of the Altar, while the proximate matter can be none other than the Eucharistic appearances under which the Body and Blood of Christ are truly present.

Bread
The first element is wheaten bread (panis triticeus), without which the "confection of the Sacrament does not take place" (Missale Romanum: De defectibus, sect. 3), Being true bread, the Host must be baked, since mere flour is not bread. Since, moreover, the bread required is that formed of wheaten flour, not every kind of flour is allowed for validity, such, e.g., as is ground from rye, oats, barley, Indian corn or maize, though these are all botanically classified as grain (frumentum), On the other hand, the different varieties of wheat (as spelt, amel-corn, etc.) are valid, inasmuch as they can be proved botanically to be genuine wheat. The necessity of wheaten bread is deduced immediately from the words of Institution: "The Lord took bread" (ton arton), in connection with which it may be remarked, that in Scripture bread (artos), without any qualifying addition, always signifies wheaten bread. No doubt, too, Christ adhered unconditionally to the Jewish custom of using only wheaten bread in the Passover Supper, and by the words, "Do this for a commemoration of me", commanded its use for all succeeding times. In addition to this, uninterrupted tradition, whether it be the testimony of the Fathers or the practice of the Church, shows wheaten bread to have played such an essential part, that even Protestants would be loath to regard rye bread or barley bread as a proper element for the celebration of the Lord's Supper.

The Church maintains an easier position in the controversy respecting the use of fermented or unfermented bread. By leavened bread (fermentum, zymos) is meant such wheaten bread as requires leaven or yeast in its preparation and baking, while unleavened bread (azyma, azymon) is formed from a mixture of wheaten flour and water, which has been kneaded to dough and then baked. After the Greek Patriarch Michael Cærularius of Constantinople had sought in 1053 to palliate the renewed rupture with Rome by means of the controversy, concerning unleavened bread, the two Churches, in the Decree of Union at Florence, in 1439, came to the unanimous dogmatic decision, that the distinction between leavened and unleavened bread did not interfere with the confection of the sacrament, though for just reasons based upon the Church's discipline and practice, the Latins were obliged to retain unleavened bread, while the Greeks still held on to the use of leavened (cf, Denzinger, Enchirid., Freiburg, 1908, no, 692), Since the Schismatics had before the Council of Florence entertained doubts as to the validity of the Latin custom, a brief defense of the use of unleavened bread will not be out of place here. Pope Leo IX had as early as 1054 issued a protest against Michael Cærularius (cf. Migne, P.L., CXLIII, 775), in which he referred to the Scriptural fact, that according to the three Synoptics the Last Supper was celebrated "on the first day of the azymes" and so the custom of the Western Church received its solemn sanction from the example of Christ Himself. The Jews, moreover, were accustomed even the day before the fourteenth of Nisan to get rid of all the leaven which chanced to be in their dwellings, that so they might from that time on partake exclusively of the so-called mazzoth as bread. As regards tradition, it is not for us to settle the dispute of learned authorities, as to whether or not in the first six or eight centuries the Latins also celebrated Mass with leavened bread (Sirmond, Döllinger, Kraus) or have observed the present custom ever since the time of the Apostles (Mabillon, Probst). Against the Greeks it suffices to call attention to the historical fact that in the Orient the Maronites and Armenians have used unleavened bread from time immemorial, and that according to Origen (Commentary on Matthew, XII.6) the people of the East "sometimes", therefore not as a rule, made use of leavened bread in their Liturgy. Besides, there is considerable force in the theological argument that the fermenting process with yeast and other leaven, does not affect the substance of the bread, but merely its quality. The reasons of congruity advanced by the Greeks in behalf of leavened bread, which would have us consider it as a beautiful symbol of the hypostatic union, as well as an attractive representation of the savor of this heavenly Food, will be most willingly accepted, provided only that due consideration be given to the grounds of propriety set forth by the Latins with St. Thomas Aquinas (III:74:4) namely, the example of Christ, the aptitude of unleavened bread to be regarded as a symbol of the purity of His Sacred Body, free from all corruption of sin, and finally the instruction of St. Paul (1 Corinthians 5:8) to keep the Pasch not with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth".

Wine
The second Eucharistic element required is wine of the grape (vinum de vite). Hence are excluded as invalid, not only the juices extracted and prepared from other fruits (as cider and perry), but also the so-called artificial wines, even if their chemical constitution is identical with the genuine juice of the grape. The necessity of wine of the grape is not so much the result of the authoritative decision of the Church, as it is presupposed by her (Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, cap. iv), and is based upon the example and command of Christ, Who at the Last Supper certainly converted the natural wine of grapes into His Blood, This is deduced partly from the rite of the Passover, which required the head of the family to pass around the "cup of benediction" (calix benedictionis) containing the wine of grapes, partly, and especially, from the express declaration of Christ, that henceforth He would not drink of the "fruit of the vine" (genimen vitis). The Catholic Church is aware of no other tradition and in this respect she has ever been one with the Greeks. The ancient Hydroparastatæ, or Aquarians, who used water instead of wine, were heretics in her eyes. The counter-argument of Ad. Harnack ["Texte und Untersuchungen", new series, VII, 2 (1891), 115 sqq.], that the most ancient of Churches was indifferent as to the use of wine, and more concerned with the action of eating and drinking than with the elements of bread and wine, loses all its force in view not only of the earliest literature on the subject (the Didache, Ignatius, Justin, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Cyprian), but also of non-Catholic and apocryphal writings, which bear testimony to the use of bread and wine as the only and necessary elements of the Blessed Sacrament. On the other hand, a very ancient law of the Church which, however, has nothing to do with the validity of the sacrament, prescribes that a little water be added to the wine before the Consecration (Decr. pro Armenis: aqua modicissima), a practice, whose legitimacy the Council of Trent (Sess. XXII, can. ix) established under pain of anathema. The rigor of this law of the Church may be traced to the ancient custom of the Romans and Jews, who mixed water with the strong southern wines (see Proverbs 9:2), to the expression of calix mixtus found in Justin (First Apology 65), Irenæus (Against Heresies V.2.3), and Cyprian (Epistle 63, no. 13 sq.), and especially to the deep symbolical meaning contained in the mingling, inasmuch as thereby are represented the flowing of blood and water from the side of the Crucified Savior and the intimate union of the faithful with Christ (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XXII, cap. vii).


The Sacramental Form or the Words of Consecration

In proceeding to verify the form, which is always made up of words, we may start from the indubitable fact, that Christ did not consecrate by the mere fiat of His omnipotence, which found no expression in articulate utterance, but by pronouncing the words of Institution: "This is my body . . . this is my blood", and that by the addition: "Do this for a commemoration of me", He commanded the Apostles to follow His example. Were the words of Institution a mere declarative utterance of the conversion, which might have taken place in the "benediction" unannounced and articulately unexpressed, the Apostles and their successors would, according to Christ's example and mandate, have been obliged to consecrate in this mute manner also, a consequence which is altogether at variance with the deposit of faith. It is true, that Pope Innocent III (De Sacro altaris myst., IV, vi) before his elevation to the pontificate did hold the opinion, which later theologians branded as "temerarious", that Christ consecrated without words by means of the mere "benediction". Not many theologians, however, followed him in this regard, among the few being Ambrose Catharinus, Cheffontaines, and Hoppe, by far the greater number preferring to stand by the unanimous testimony of the Fathers. Meanwhile, Innocent III also insisted most urgently that at least in the case of the celebrating priest, the words of Institution were prescribed as the sacramental form. It was, moreover, not until its comparatively recent adherence in the seventeenth century to the famous "Confessio fidei orthodoxa" of Peter Mogilas (cf. Kimmel, "Monum. fidei eccl. orient.", Jena, 1850, I, p. 180), that the Schismatical Greek Church adopted the view, according to which the priest does not at all consecrate by virtue of the words of Institution, but only by means of the Epiklesis occurring shortly after them and expressing in the Oriental Liturgies a petition to the Holy Spirit, "that the bread and wine may be converted into the Body and Blood of Christ". Were the Greeks justified in maintaining this position, the immediate result would be, that the Latins who have no such thing as the Epiklesis in their present Liturgy, would possess neither the true Sacrifice of the Mass nor the Holy Eucharist. Fortunately, however, the Greeks can be shown the error of their ways from their own writings, since it can be proved, that they themselves formerly placed the form of Transubstantiation in the words of Institution. Not only did such renowned Fathers as Justin (First Apology 66), Irenæus (Against Heresies V.2.3), Gregory of Nyssa (The Great Catechism, no. 37), Chrysostom (Hom. i, de prod. Judæ, n. 6), and John Damascene (Exposition of the Faith IV.13) hold this view, but the ancient Greek Liturgies bear testimony to it, so that Cardinal Bessarion in 1439 at Florence called the attention of his fellow-countrymen to the fact, that as soon as the words of Institution have been pronounced, supreme homage and adoration are due to the Holy Eucharist, even though the famous Epiklesis follows some time after.

The objection that the mere historical recitation of the words of Institution taken from the narrative of the Last Supper possesses no intrinsic consecratory force, would be well founded, did the priest of the Latin Church merely intend by means of them to narrate some historical event rather than pronounce them with the practical purpose of effecting the conversion, or if he pronounced them in his own name and person instead of the Person of Christ, whose minister and instrumental cause he is. Neither of the two suppositions holds in the case of a priest who really intends to celebrate Mass. Hence, though the Greeks may in the best of faith go on erroneously maintaining that they consecrate exclusively in their Epiklesis, they do, nevertheless, as in the case of the Latins, actually consecrate by means of the words of Institution contained in their Liturgies, if Christ has instituted these words as the words of consecration and the form of the sacrament. We may in fact go a step farther and assert, that the words of Institution constitute the only and wholly adequate form of the Eucharist and that, consequently, the words of the Epiklesis possess no inherent consecratory value. The contention that the words of the Epiklesis have joint essential value and constitute the partial form of the sacrament, was indeed supported by individual Latin theologians, as Touttée, Renaudot, and Lebrun. Though this opinion cannot be condemned as erroneous in faith, since it allows to the words of Institution their essential, though partial, consecratory value, appears nevertheless to be intrinsically repugnant. For, since the act of Consecration cannot remain, as it were, in a state of suspense, but is completed in an instant of time, there arises the dilemma: Either the words of Institution alone and, therefore, not the Epiklesis, are productive of the conversion, or the words of the Epiklesis alone have such power and not the words of Institution. Of more considerable importance is the circumstance that the whole question came up for discussion in the council for union held at Florence in 1439. Pope Eugene IV urged the Greeks to come to a unanimous agreement with the Roman faith and subscribe to the words of Institution as alone constituting the sacramental form, and to drop the contention that the words of the Epiklesis also possessed a partial consecratory force. But when the Greeks, not without foundation, pleaded that a dogmatic decision would reflect with shame upon their whole ecclesiastical past, the ecumenical synod was satisfied with the oral declaration of Cardinal Bessarion recorded in the minutes of the council for 5 July, 1439 (P.G., CLXI, 491), namely, that the Greeks follow the universal teaching of the Fathers, especially of "blessed John Chrysostom, familiarly known to us", according to whom the "Divine words of Our Redeemer contain the full and entire force of Transubstantiation".

The venerable antiquity of the Oriental Epiklesis, its peculiar position in the Canon of the Mass, and its interior spiritual unction, oblige the theologian to determine its dogmatic value and to account for its use. Take, for instance, the Epiklesis of the Ethiopian Liturgy: "We implore and beseech Thee, O Lord, to send forth the Holy Spirit and His Power upon this Bread and Chalice and convert them into the Body and Blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ." Since this prayer always follows after the words of Institution have been pronounced, the theological question arises, as to how it may be made to harmonize with the words of Christ, which alone possess the consecrated power. Two explanations have been suggested which, however, can be merged in one. The first view considers the Epiklesis to be a mere declaration of the fact, that the conversion has already taken place, and that in the conversion just as essential a part is to be attributed to the Holy Spirit as Co-Consecrator as in the allied mystery of the Incarnation. Since, however, because of the brevity of the actual instant of conversion, the part taken by the Holy Spirit could not be expressed, the Epiklesis takes us back in imagination to the precious moment and regards the Consecration as just about to occur. A similar purely psychological retrospective transfer is met with in other portions of the Liturgy, as in the Mass for the Dead, wherein the Church prays for the departed as if they were still upon their bed of agony and could still be rescued from the gates of hell. Thus considered, the Epiklesis refers us back to the Consecration as the center about which all the significance contained in its words revolves. A second explanation is based, not upon the enacted Consecration, but upon the approaching Communion, inasmuch as the latter, being the effective means of uniting us more closely in the organized body of the Church, brings forth in our hearts the mystical Christ, as is read in the Roman Canon of the Mass: "Ut nobis corpus et sanguis fiat", i.e. that it may be made for us the body and blood. It was in this purely mystical manner that the Greeks themselves explained the meaning of the Epiklesis at the Council of Florence (Mansi, Collect. Concil., XXXI, 106). Yet since much more is contained in the plain words than this true and deep mysticism, it is desirable to combine both explanations into one, and so we regard the Epiklesis, both in point of liturgy and of time, as the significant connecting link, placed midway between the Consecration and the Communion in order to emphasize the part taken by the Holy Spirit in the Consecration of bread and wine, and, on the other hand, with the help of the same Holy Spirit to obtain the realization of the true Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ by their fruitful effects on both priest and people.


The Effects of the Holy Eucharist

The doctrine of the Church regarding the effects or the fruits of Holy Communion centres around two ideas: (a) the union with Christ by love and (b) the spiritual repast of the soul. Both ideas are often verified in one and same effect of Holy Communion.

The Union with Christ by Love

The first and principal effect of the Holy Eucharist is union with Christ by love (Decr. pro Armenis: adunatio ad Christum), which union as such does not consist in the sacramental reception of the Host, but in the spiritual and mystical union with Jesus by the theological virtue of love. Christ Himself designated the idea of Communion as a union love: "He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh blood, abideth in me, and I in him" (John 6:57). St. Cyril of Alexandria (Hom. in Joan., IV, xvii) beautifully represents this mystical union as the fusion of our being into that of the God-man, as "when melted wax is fused with other wax". Since the Sacrament of Love is not satisfied with an increase of habitual love only, but tends especially to fan the flame of actual love to an intense ardor, the Holy Eucharist is specifically distinguished from the other sacraments, and hence it is precisely in this latter effect that Francisco Suárez, recognizes the so-called "grace of the sacrament", which otherwise is so hard to discern. It stands to reason that the essence of this union by love consists neither in a natural union with Jesus analogous to that between soul and body, nor in a hypostatic union of the soul with the Person of the Word, nor finally in a pantheistical deification of the communicant, but simply in a moral but wonderful union with Christ by the bond of the most ardent charity. Hence the chief effect of a worthy Communion is to a certain extent a foretaste of heaven, in fact the anticipation and pledge of our future union with God by love in the Beatific Vision. He alone can properly estimate the precious boon which Catholics possess in the Holy Eucharist, who knows how to ponder these ideas of Holy Communion to their utmost depth. The immediate result of this union with Christ by love is the bond of charity existing between the faithful themselves as St. Paul says: "For we being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread" (1 Corinthians 10:17). And so the Communion of Saints is not merely an ideal union by faith and grace, but an eminently real union, mysteriously constituted, maintained, and guaranteed by partaking in common of one and the same Christ.

The Spiritual Repast of the Soul
A second fruit of this union with Christ by love is an increase of sanctifying grace in the soul of the worthy communicant. Here let it be remarked at the outset, that the Holy Eucharist does not per se constitute a person in the state of grace as do the sacraments of the dead (baptism and penance), but presupposes such a state. It is, therefore, one of the sacraments of the living. It is as impossible for the soul in the state of mortal sin to receive this Heavenly Bread with profit, as it is for a corpse to assimilate food and drink. Hence the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII. can. v), in opposition to Luther and Calvin, purposely defined, that the "chief fruit of the Eucharist does not consist in the forgiveness of sins". For though Christ said of the Chalice: "This is my blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many unto remission of sins" (Matthew 26:28), He had in view an effect of the sacrifice, not of the sacrament; for He did not say that His Blood would be drunk unto remission of sins, but shed for that purpose. It is for this very reason that St. Paul (1 Corinthians 11:28) demands that rigorous "self-examination", in order to avoid the heinous offense of being guilty of the Body and the Blood of the Lord by "eating and drinking unworthily", and that the Fathers insist upon nothing so energetically as upon a pure and innocent conscience. In spite of the principles just laid down, the question might be asked, if the Blessed Sacrament could not at times per accidens free the communicant from mortal sin, if he approached the Table of the Lord unconscious of the sinful state of his soul. Presupposing what is self-evident, that there is question neither of a conscious sacrilegious Communion nor a lack of imperfect contrition (attritio), which would altogether hinder the justifying effect of the sacrament, theologians incline to the opinion, that in such exceptional cases the Eucharist can restore the soul to the state of grace, but all without exception deny the possibility of the reviviscence of a sacrilegious or unfruitful Communion after the restoration of the soul's proper moral condition has been effected, the Eucharist being different in this respect from the sacraments which imprint a character upon the soul (baptism, confirmation, and Holy orders). Together with the increase of sanctifying grace there is associated another effect, namely, a certain spiritual relish or delight of soul (delectatio spiritualis). Just as food and drink delight and refresh the heart of man, so does this "Heavenly Bread containing within itself all sweetness" produce in the soul of the devout communicant ineffable bliss, which, however, is not to be confounded with an emotional joy of the soul or with sensible sweetness. Although both may occur as the result of a special grace, its true nature is manifested in a certain cheerful and willing fervor in all that regards Christ and His Church, and in the conscious fulfillment of the duties of one's state of life, a disposition of soul which is perfectly compatible with interior desolation and spiritual dryness. A good Communion is recognized less in the transitory sweetness of the emotions than in its lasting practical effects on the conduct of our daily lives.


Forgiveness of Venial Sin and Preservation from Mortal Sin

Though Holy Communion does not per se remit mortal sin, it has nevertheless the third effect of "blotting out venial sin and preserving the soul from mortal sin" (Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, cap. ii). The Holy Eucharist is not merely a food, but a medicine as well. The destruction of venial sin and of all affection to it, is readily understood on the basis of the two central ideas mentioned above. Just as material food banishes minor bodily weaknesses and preserves man's physical strength from being impaired, so does this food of our souls remove our lesser spiritual ailments and preserve us from spiritual death. As a union based upon love, the Holy Eucharist cleanses with its purifying flame the smallest stains which adhere to the soul, and at the same time serves as an effective prophylactic against grievous sin. It only remains for us to ascertain with clearness the manner in which this preservative influence against relapse into mortal sin is exerted. According to the teaching of the Roman Catechism, it is effected by the allaying of concupiscence, which is the chief source of deadly sin, particularly of impurity. Therefore it is that spiritual writers recommend frequent Communion as the most effective remedy against impurity, since its powerful influence is felt even after other means have proved unavailing (cf. St. Thomas: III:79:6). Whether or not the Holy Eucharist is directly conducive to the remission of the temporal punishment due to sin, is disputed by St. Thomas (III:79:5), since the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar was not instituted as a means of satisfaction; it does, however, produce an indirect effect in this regard, which is proportioned to the communicant's love and devotion. The case is different as regards the effects of grace in behalf of a third party. The pious custom of the faithful of "offering their Communion" for relations, friends, and the souls departed, is to be considered as possessing unquestionable value, in the first place, because an earnest prayer of petition in the presence of the Spouse of our souls will readily find a hearing, and then, because the fruits of Communion as a means of satisfaction for sin may be applied to a third person, and especially per modum suffragii to the souls in purgatory.


The Pledge of our Resurrection

As a last effect we may mention that the Eucharist is the "pledge of our glorious resurrection and eternal happiness" (Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, cap. ii), according to the promise of Christ: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life: and I will raise him up on the last day." Hence the chief reason why the ancient Fathers, as Ignatius (Letter to the Ephesians 20), Irenæus (Against Heresies IV.18.4), and Tertullian (On the Resurrection of the Flesh 8), as well as later patristic writers, insisted so strongly upon our future resurrection, was the circumstance that it is the door by which we enter upon unending happiness. There can be nothing incongruous or improper in the fact that the body also shares in this effect of Communion, since by its physical contact with the Eucharist species, and hence (indirectly) with the living Flesh of Christ, it acquires a moral right to its future resurrection, even as the Blessed Mother of God, inasmuch as she was the former abode of the Word made flesh, acquired a moral claim to her own bodily assumption into heaven. The further discussion as to whether some "physical quality" (Contenson) or a "sort of germ of immortality" (Heimbucher) is implanted in the body of the communicant, has no sufficient foundation in the teaching of the Fathers and may, therefore, be dismissed without any injury to dogma.


The Necessity of the Holy Eucharist for Salvation

We distinguish two kinds of necessity,
  • the necessity of means (necessitas medii) and
  • the necessity of precept (necessitas præcepti).
In the first sense a thing or action is necessary because without it a given end cannot be attained; the eye, e.g. is necessary for vision. The second sort of necessity is that which is imposed by the free will of a superior, e.g. the necessity of fasting. As regards Communion a further distinction must be made between infants and adults. It is easy to prove that in the case of infants Holy Communion is not necessary to salvation, either as a means or as of precept. Since they have not as yet attained to the use of reason, they are free from the obligation of positive laws; consequently, the only question is whether Communion is, like Baptism, necessary for them as a means of salvation. Now the Council of Trent under pain of anathema, solemnly rejects such a necessity (Sess. XXI, can. iv) and declares that the custom of the primitive Church of giving Holy Communion to children was not based upon the erroneous belief of its necessity to salvation, but upon the circumstances of the times (Sess. XXI, cap. iv). Since according to St. Paul's teaching (Romans 8:1) there is "no condemnation" for those who have been baptized, every child that dies in its baptismal innocence, even without Communion, must go straight to heaven. This latter position was that usually taken by the Fathers, with the exception of St. Augustine, who from the universal custom of the Communion of children drew the conclusion of its necessity for salvation (see COMMUNION OF CHILDREN). 

On the other hand, Communion is prescribed for adults, not only by the law of the Church, but also by a Divine command (John 6:50 sqq.), though for its absolute necessity as a means to salvation there is no more evidence than in the case of infants. For such a necessity could be established only on the supposition that Communion per se constituted a person in the state of grace or that this state could not be preserved without Communion. Neither supposition is correct. Not the first, for the simple reason that the Blessed Eucharist, being a sacrament of the living, presupposes the state of sanctifying grace; not the second, because in case of necessity, such as might arise, e.g., in a long sea-voyage, the Eucharistic graces may be supplied by actual graces. It is only when viewed in this light that we can understand how the primitive Church, without going counter to the Divine command, withheld the Eucharist from certain sinners even on their deathbeds. There is, however, a moral necessity on the part of adults to receive Holy Communion, as a means, for instance, of overcoming violent temptation, or as a viaticum for persons in danger of death. Eminent divines, like Francisco Suárez, claim that the Eucharist, if not absolutely necessary, is at least a relatively and morally necessary means to salvation, in the sense that no adult can long sustain his spiritual, supernatural life who neglects on principle to approach Holy Communion. This view is supported, not only by the solemn and earnest words of Christ, when He Promised the Eucharist, and by the very nature of the sacrament as the spiritual food and medicine of our souls, but also by the fact of the helplessness and perversity of human nature and by the daily experience of confessors and directors of souls.

Since Christ has left us no definite precept as to the frequency with which He desired us to receive Him in Holy Communion, it belongs to the Church to determine the Divine command more accurately and prescribe what the limits of time shall be for the reception of the sacrament. In the course of centuries the Church's discipline in this respect has undergone considerable change. Whereas the early Christians were accustomed to receive at every celebration of the Liturgy, which probably was not celebrated daily in all places, or were in the habit of Communicating privately in their own homes every day of the week, a falling-off in the frequency of Communion is noticeable since the fourth century. Even in his time Pope Fabian (236-250) made it obligatory to approach the Holy Table three times a year, viz, at Christmas, Easter, and Pentecost, and this custom was still prevalent in the sixth century [cf. Synod of Agde (506), c. xviii]. Although St. Augustine left daily Communion to the free choice of the individual, his admonition, in force even at the present day, was: Sic vive, ut quotidie possis sumere (The Gift of Perseverance 14), i.e. "So live that you may receive every day." From the tenth to the thirteenth century, the practice of going to Communion more frequently during the year was rather rare among the laity and obtained only in cloistered communities. St. Bonaventure reluctantly allowed the lay brothers of his monastery to approach the Holy Table weekly, whereas the rule of the Canons of Chrodegang prescribed this practice. When the Fourth Council of Lateran (1215), held under Innocent III, mitigated the former severity of the Church's law to the extent that all Catholics of both sexes were to communicate at least once a year and this during the paschal season, St. Thomas (III:80:10) ascribed this ordinance chiefly to the "reign of impiety and the growing cold of charity". The precept of the yearly paschal Communion was solemnly reiterated by the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, can. ix). The mystical theologians of the later Middle Ages, as Tauler, St. Vincent Ferrer, Savonarola, and later on St. Philip Neri, the Jesuit Order, St. Francis de Sales and St. Alphonsus Liguori were zealous champions of frequent Communion; whereas the Jansenists, under the leadership of Antoine* Arnauld (De la fréquente communion, Paris, 1643), strenuously opposed and demanded as a condition for every Communion the "most perfect penitential dispositions and the purest love of God". This rigorism was condemned by Pope Alexander VIII (7 Dec., 1690); the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, cap. viii; Sess. XXII, cap. vi) and Innocent XI (12 Feb., 1679) had already emphasized the permissibility of even daily Communion. To root out the last vestiges of Jansenistic rigorism, Pius X issued a decree (24 Dec., 1905) wherein he allows and recommends daily Communion to the entire laity and requires but two conditions for its permissibility, namely, the state of grace and a right and pious intention. Concerning the non-requirement of the twofold species as a means necessary to salvation see COMMUNION UNDER BOTH KINDS.


The Minister of the Eucharist
The Eucharist being a permanent sacrament, and the confection (confectio) and the reception (susceptio) thereof being separated from each other by an interval of time, the minister may be and in fact is twofold: (a) the minister of consecration and (b) the minister of administration.


The Minister of Consecration

In the early Christian Era the Peputians, Collyridians, and Montanists attributed priestly powers even to women (cf. Epiphanius, De hær., xlix, 79); and in the Middle Ages the Albigenses and Waldenses ascribed the power to consecrate to every layman of upright disposition. Against these errors the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) confirmed the ancient Catholic teaching, that "no one but the priest [sacerdos], regularly ordained according to the keys of the Church, has the power of consecrating this sacrament". Rejecting the hierarchical distinction between the priesthood and the laity, Luther later on declared, in accord with his idea of a "universal priesthood" (cf. 1 Peter 2:5), that every layman was qualified, as the appointed representative of the faithful, to consecrate the Sacrament of the Eucharist. The Council of Trent opposed this teaching of Luther, and not only confirmed anew the existence of a "special priesthood" (Sess. XXIII, can. i), but authoritatively declared that "Christ ordained the Apostles true priests and commanded them as well as other priests to offer His Body and Blood in the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass" (Sess. XXII, can. ii). By this decision it was also declared that the power of consecrating and that of offering the Holy Sacrifice are identical. Both ideas are mutually reciprocal. To the category of "priests" (sacerdos, iereus) belong, according to the teaching of the Church, only bishops and priests; deacons, subdeacons, and those in minor orders are excluded from this dignity.

Scripturally considered, the necessity of a special priesthood with the power of validly consecrating is derived from the fact that Christ did not address the words, "Do this", to the whole mass of the laity, but exclusively to the Apostles and their successors in the priesthood; hence the latter alone can validly consecrate. It is evident that tradition has understood the mandate of Christ in this sense and in no other. We learn from the writings of Justin, Origen, Cyprian, Augustine, and others, as well as from the most ancient Liturgies, that it was always the bishops and priests, and they alone, who appeared as the property constituted celebrants of the Eucharistic Mysteries, and that the deacons merely acted as assistants in these functions, while the faithful participated passively therein. When in the fourth century the abuse crept in of priests receiving Holy Communion at the hands of deacons, the First Council of Nicæa (325) issued a strict prohibition to the effect, that "they who offer the Holy Sacrifice shall not receive the Body of the Lord from the hands of those who have no such power of offering", because such a practice is contrary to "rule and custom". The sect of the Luciferians was founded by an apostate deacon named Hilary, and possessed neither bishops nor priests; wherefore St. Jerome concluded (Dial. adv. Lucifer., n. 21), that for want of celebrants they no longer retained the Eucharist. It is clear that the Church has always denied the laity the power to consecrate. When the Arians accused St. Athanasius (d. 373) of sacrilege, because supposedly at his bidding the consecrated Chalice had been destroyed during the Mass which was being celebrated by a certain Ischares, they had to withdraw their charges as wholly untenable when it was proved that Ischares had been invalidly ordained by a pseudo-bishop named Colluthos and, therefore, could neither validly consecrate nor offer the Holy Sacrifice.


The Minister of Administration

The dogmatic interest which attaches to the minister of administration or distribution is not so great, for the reason that the Eucharist being a permanent sacrament, any communicant having the proper dispositions could receive it validly, whether he did so from the hand of a priest, or layman, or woman. Hence, the question is concerned, not with the validity, but with the liceity of administration. In this matter the Church alone has the right to decide, and her regulations regarding the Communion rite may vary according to the circumstances of the times. In general it is of Divine right, that the laity should as a rule receive only from the consecrated hand of the priest (cf. Trent, Sess. XIII, cap. viii). The practice of the laity giving themselves Holy Communion was formerly, and is today, allowed only in case of necessity. In ancient Christian times it was customary for the faithful to take the Blessed Sacrament to their homes and Communicate privately, a practice (Tertullian, Ad uxor., II, v), to which, even as late as the fourth century, St. Basil makes reference (Epistle 93). Up to the ninth century, it was usual for the priest to place the Sacred Host in the right hand of the recipient, who kissed it and then transferred it to his own mouth; women, from the fourth century onward, were required in this ceremony to have a cloth wrapped about their right hand. The Precious Blood was in early times received directly from the Chalice, but in Rome the practice, after the eighth century, was to receive it through a small tube (fistula); at present this is observed only in the pope's Mass. The latter method of drinking the Chalice spread to other localities, in particular to the Cistercian monasteries, where the practice was partially continued into the eighteenth century.

Whereas the priest is both by Divine and ecclesiastical right the ordinary dispenser (minister ordinarius) of the sacrament, the deacon is by virtue of his order the extraordinary minister (minister extraordinarius), yet he may not administer the sacrament except ex delegatione, i.e. with the permission of the bishop or priest. As has already been mentioned above, the deacons were accustomed in the Early Church to take the Blessed Sacrament to those who were absent from Divine service, as well as to present the Chalice to the laity during the celebration of the Sacred Mysteries (cf. Cyprian, Treatise 3, nos. 17 and 25), and this practice was observed until Communion under both kinds was discontinued. In St. Thomas' time (III:82:3), the deacons were allowed to administer only the Chalice to the laity, and in case of necessity the Sacred Host also, at the bidding of the bishop or priest. After the Communion of the laity under the species of wine had been abolished, the deacon's powers were more and more restricted. According to a decision of the Sacred Congregation of Rites (25 Feb., 1777), still in force, the deacon is to administer Holy Communion only in case of necessity and with the approval of his bishop or his pastor. (Cf. Funk, "Der Kommunionritus" in his "Kirchengeschichtl. Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen", Paderborn, 1897, I, pp. 293 sqq.; see also "Theol. praktische Quartalschrift", Linz, 1906, LIX, 95 sqq.)


The Recipient of the Eucharist

The two conditions of objective capacity (capacitas, aptitudo) and subjective worthiness (dignitas) must be carefully distinguished. Only the former is of dogmatic interest, while the latter is treated in moral theology. The first requisite of aptitude or capacity is that the recipient be a "human being", since it was for mankind only that Christ instituted this Eucharistic food of souls and commanded its reception. This condition excludes not only irrational animals, but angels also; for neither possess human souls, which alone can be nourished by this food unto eternal life. The expression "Bread of Angels" (Psalm 77:25) is a mere metaphor, which indicates that in the Beatific Vision where He is not concealed under the sacramental veils, the angels spiritually feast upon the God-man, this same prospect being held out to those who shall gloriously rise on the Last Day. The second requisite, the immediate deduction from the first, is that the recipient be still in the "state of pilgrimage" to the next life (status viatoris), since it is only in the present life that man can validly Communicate. Exaggerating the Eucharist's necessity as a means to salvation, Rosmini advanced the untenable opinion that at the moment of death this heavenly food is supplied in the next world to children who had just departed this life, and that Christ could have given Himself in Holy Communion to the holy souls in Limbo, in order to "render them apt for the vision of God". This evidently impossible view, together with other propositions of Rosmini, was condemned by Leo XIII (14 Dec., 1887). In the fourth century the Synod of Hippo (393) forbade the practice of giving Holy Communion to the dead as a gross abuse, and assigned as a reason, that "corpses were no longer capable of eating". Later synods, as those of Auxerre (578) and the Trullan (692), took very energetic measures to put a stop to a custom so difficult to eradicate. The third requisite, finally, is baptism, without which no other sacrament can be validly received; for in its very concept baptism is the "spiritual door" to the means of grace contained in the Church. A Jew or Mohammedan might, indeed, materially receive the Sacred Host, but there could be no question in this case of a sacramental reception, even though by a perfect act of contrition or of the pure love of God he had put himself in the state of sanctifying grace. Hence in the Early Church the catechumens were strictly excluded from the Eucharist.
"So let us be confident, let us not be unprepared, let us not be outflanked, let us be wise, vigilant, fighting against those who are trying to tear the faith out of our souls and morality out of our hearts, so that we may remain Catholics, remain united to the Blessed Virgin Mary, remain united to the Roman Catholic Church, remain faithful children of the Church."- Abp. Lefebvre
Reply
#4
The Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist


In this article we shall consider:
  • the fact of the Real Presence, which is, indeed, the central dogma;
  • the several allied dogmas grouped about it, namely:
  • Totality of Presence,
  • Transubstantiation,
  • Permanence of Presence and the Adorableness of the Eucharist
  • the speculations of reason, so far as speculative investigation regarding the august mystery under its various aspects is permissible, and so far as it is desirable to illumine it by the light of philosophy.

The Real Presence as a Fact

According to the teaching of theology a revealed fact can be proved solely by recurrence to the sources of faith, viz. Scripture and Tradition, with which is also bound up the infallible magisterium of the Church.

Proof from Scripture

This may be adduced both from the words of promise (John 6:26 sqq.) and, especially, from the words of Institution as recorded in the Synoptics and St. Paul (1 Corinthians 11:23 sqq.).

The Words of Promise (John 6)

By the miracles of the loaves and fishes and the walking upon the waters, on the previous day, Christ not only prepared His hearers for the sublime discourse containing the promise of the Eucharist, but also proved to them that He possessed, as Almighty God-man, a power superior to and independent of the laws of nature, and could, therefore, provide such a supernatural food, none other, in fact, than His own Flesh and Blood. This discourse was delivered at Capharnaum (John 6:26-72), and is divided into two distinct parts, about the relation of which Catholic exegetes vary in opinion. Nothing hinders our interpreting the first part [John 6:26-48 (51)] metaphorically and understanding by "bread of heaven" Christ Himself as the object of faith, to be received in a figurative sense as a spiritual food by the mouth of faith. Such a figurative explanation of the second part of the discourse (John 6:52-72), however, is not only unusual but absolutely impossible, as even Protestant exegetes (Delitzsch, Kostlin, Keil, Kahnis, and others) readily concede. First of all the whole structure of the discourse of promise demands a literal interpretation of the words: "eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood". For Christ mentions a threefold food in His address, the manna of the past (John 6:31, 32, 49,, 59), the heavenly bread of the present (John 6:32 sq.), and the Bread of Life of the future (John 6:27, 52). Corresponding to the three kinds of food and the three periods, there are as many dispensers — Moses dispensing the manna, the Father nourishing man's faith in the Son of God made flesh, finally Christ giving His own Flesh and Blood. Although the manna, a type of the Eucharist, was indeed eaten with the mouth, it could not, being a transitory food, ward off death. The second food, that offered by the Heavenly Father, is the bread of heaven, which He dispenses hic et nunc to the Jews for their spiritual nourishment, inasmuch as by reason of the Incarnation He holds up His Son to them as the object of their faith. If, however, the third kind of food, which Christ Himself promises to give only at a future time, is a new refection, differing from the last-named food of faith, it can be none other than His true Flesh and Blood, to be really eaten and drunk in Holy Communion. This is why Christ was so ready to use the realistic expression "to chew" (John 6:54, 56, 58: trogein) when speaking of this, His Bread of Life, in addition to the phrase, "to eat" (John 6:51, 53: phagein). Cardinal Bellarmine (De Euchar., I, 3), moreover, calls attention to the fact, and rightly so, that if in Christ's mind the manna was a figure of the Eucharist, the latter must have been something more than merely blessed bread, as otherwise the prototype would not substantially excel the type. The same holds true of the other figures of the Eucharist, as the bread and wine offered by Melchisedech, the loaves of proposition (panes propositionis), the paschal lamb. The impossibility of a figurative interpretation is brought home more forcibly by an analysis of the following text: "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath everlasting life: and I will raise him up in the last day. For my flesh is meat indeed: and my blood is drink indeed" (John 6:54-56). It is true that even among the Semites, and in Scripture itself, the phrase, "to eat some one's flesh", has a figurative meaning, namely, "to persecute, to bitterly hate some one". If, then, the words of Jesus are to be taken figuratively, it would appear that Christ had promised to His enemies eternal life and a glorious resurrection in recompense for the injuries and persecutions directed against Him. The other phrase, "to drink some one's blood", in Scripture, especially, has no other figurative meaning than that of dire chastisement (cf. Isaiah 49:26; Apocalypse 16:6); but, in the present text, this interpretation is just as impossible here as in the phrase, "to eat some one's flesh". Consequently, eating and drinking are to be understood of the actual partaking of Christ in person, hence literally.

This interpretation agrees perfectly with the conduct of the hearers and the attitude of Christ regarding their doubts and objections. Again, the murmuring of the Jews is the clearest evidence that they had understood the preceding words of Jesus literally (John 6:53). Yet far from repudiating this construction as a gross misunderstanding, Christ repeated them in a most solemn manner, in John (6:54 sqq.). In consequence, many of His Disciples were scandalized and said: "This saying is hard, and who can hear it?" (John 6:61); but instead of retracting what He had said, Christ rather reproached them for their want of faith, by alluding to His sublimer origin and His future Ascension into heaven. And without further ado He allowed these Disciples to go their way (John 6:62 sqq.). Finally He turned to His twelve Apostles with the question: "Will you also go away?

Then Peter stepped forth and with humble faith replied: "Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life. And we have believed and have known, that thou art the Christ, the Son of God" (John 6:68 sqq.). The entire scene of the discourse and murmurings against it proves that the Zwinglian and Anglican interpretation of the passage, "It is the spirit that quickeneth", etc., in the sense of a glossing over or retractation, is wholly inadmissible. For in spite of these words the Disciples severed their connection with Jesus, while the Twelve accepted with simple faith a mystery which as yet they did not understand. Nor did Christ say: "My flesh is spirit", i.e. to be understood in a figurative sense, but: "My words are spirit and life". There are two views regarding the sense in which this text is to be interpreted. Many of the Fathers declare that the true Flesh of Jesus (sarx) is not to be understood as separated from His Divinity (spiritus), and hence not in a cannibalistic sense, but as belonging entirely to the supernatural economy. The second and more scientific explanation asserts that in the Scriptural opposition of "flesh and blood" to "spirit", the former always signifies carnal-mindedness, the latter mental perception illumined by faith, so that it was the intention of Jesus in this passage to give prominence to the fact that the sublime mystery of the Eucharist can be grasped in the light of supernatural faith alone, whereas it cannot be understood by the carnal-minded, who are weighed down under the burden of sin. Under such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the Fathers and several Ecumenical councils (Ephesus, 431; Nicæa, 787) adopted the literal sense of the words, though it was not dogmatically defined (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XXI, c. i). If it be true that a few Catholic theologians (as Cajetan, Ruardus Tapper, Johann Hessel, and the elder Jansenius) preferred the figurative interpretation, it was merely for controversial reasons, because in their perplexity they imagined that otherwise the claims of the Hussite and Protestant Utraquists for the partaking of the Chalice by the laity could not be answered by argument from Scripture. (Cf. Patrizi, "De Christo pane vitæ", Rome, 1851; Schmitt, "Die Verheissung der Eucharistie bei den Vütern", 2 vols., Würzburg, 1900-03.)


The Words of Institution

The Church's Magna Charta, however, are the words of Institution, "This is my body — this is my blood", whose literal meaning she has uninterruptedly adhered to from the earliest times. The Real Presence is evinced, positively, by showing the necessity of the literal sense of these words, and negatively, by refuting the figurative interpretations. As regards the first, the very existence of four distinct narratives of the Last Supper, divided usually into the Petrine (Matthew 26:26 sqq.; Mark 14:22 sqq.) and the double Pauline accounts (Luke 22:19 sq.; 1 Corinthians 11:24 sq.), favors the literal interpretation. In spite of their striking unanimity as regards essentials, the Petrine account is simpler and clearer, whereas Pauline is richer in additional details and more involved in its citation of the words that refer to the Chalice. It is but natural and justifiable to expect that, when four different narrators in different countries and at different times relate the words of Institution to different circles of readers, the occurrence of an unusual figure of speech, as, for instance, that bread is a sign of Christ's Body, would, somewhere or other, betray itself, either in the difference of word-setting, or in the unequivocal expression of the meaning really intended, or at least in the addition of some such mark as: "He spoke, however, of the sign of His Body." But nowhere do we discover the slightest ground for a figurative interpretation. If, then, natural, literal interpretation were false, the Scriptural record alone would have to be considered as the cause of a pernicious error in faith and of the grievous crime of rendering Divine homage to bread (artolatria) — a supposition little in harmony with the character of the four Sacred Writers or with the inspiration of the Sacred Text. Moreover, we must not omit the important circumstance, that one of the four narrators has interpreted his own account literally. This is St. Paul (1 Corinthians 11:27 sq.), who, in the most vigorous language, brands the unworthy recipient as "guilty of body and of the blood of the Lord". There can be no question of a grievous offense against Christ Himself unless we suppose that the true Body and the true Blood of Christ are really present in the Eucharist. 

Further, if we attend only to the words themselves their natural sense is so forceful and clear that Luther wrote to the Christians of Strasburg in 1524: "I am caught, I cannot escape, the text is too forcible" (De Wette, II, 577). The necessity of the natural sense is not based upon the absurd assumption that Christ could not in general have resorted to use of figures, but upon the evident requirement of the case, which demand that He did not, in a matter of such paramount importance, have recourse to meaningless and deceptive metaphors. For figures enhance the clearness of speech only when the figurative meaning is obvious, either from the nature of the case (e.g. from a reference to a statue of Lincoln, by saying: "This is Lincoln") or from the usages of common parlance (e.g. in the case of this synecdoche: "This glass is wine"), Now, neither from the nature of the case nor in common parlance is bread an apt or possible symbol of the human body. Were one to say of a piece of bread: "This is Napoleon", he would not be using a figure, but uttering nonsense. There is but one means of rendering a symbol improperly so called clear and intelligible, namely, by, conventionally settling beforehand what it is to signify, as, for instance, if one were to say: "Let us imagine these two pieces of bread before us to be Socrates and Plato". Christ, however, instead of informing His Apostles that he intended to use such a figure, told them rather the contrary in the discourse containing the promise: "the bread that I will give, is my flesh, for the life of the world" (John 6:52), Such language, of course, could be used only by a God-man; so that belief in the Real Presence necessarily presupposes belief in the true Divinity of Christ, The foregoing rules would of themselves establish the natural meaning with certainty, even if the words of Institution, "This is my body — this is my blood", stood alone, But in the original text corpus (body) and sanguis (blood) are followed by significant appositional additions, the Body being designated as "given for you" and the Blood as "shed for you [many]"; hence the Body given to the Apostles was the self same Body that was crucified on Good Friday, and the Chalice drunk by them, the self same Blood that was shed on the Cross for our sins, Therefore the above-mentioned appositional phrases directly exclude every possibility of a figurative interpretation.

We reach the same conclusion from a consideration of the concomitant circumstances, taking into account both the hearers and the Institutor. Those who heard the words of Institution were not learned Rationalists, possessed of the critical equipment that would enable them, as philologists and logicians, to analyze an obscure and mysterious phraseology; they were simple, uneducated fishermen, from the ordinary ranks of the people, who with childlike naïveté hung upon the words of their Master and with deep faith accepted whatever He proposed to them, This childlike disposition had to be reckoned with by Christ, particularly on the eve of His Passion and Death, when He made His last will and testament and spoke as a dying father to His deeply afflicted children. In such a moment of awful solemnity, the only appropriate mode of speech would be one which, stripped of unintelligible figures, made use of words corresponding exactly to the meaning to be conveyed. It must be remembered, also, that Christ as omniscient God-man, must have foreseen the shameful error into which He would have led His Apostles and His Church by adopting an unheard-of metaphor; for the Church down to the present day appeals to the words of Christ in her teaching and practice. If then she practices idolatry by the adoration of mere bread and wine, this crime must be laid to the charge of the God-man Himself. Besides this, Christ intended to institute the Eucharist as a most holy sacrament, to be solemnly celebrated in the Church even to the end of time. But the content and the constituent parts of a sacrament had to be stated with such clearness of terminology as to exclude categorically every error in liturgy and worship. As may be gathered from the words of consecration of the Chalice, Christ established the New Testament in His Blood, just as the Old Testament had been established in the typical blood of animals (cf. Exodus 24:8; Hebrews 9:11 sqq.). With the true instinct of justice, jurists prescribe that in all debatable points the words of a will must be taken in their natural, literal sense; for they are led by the correct conviction, that every testator of sound mind, in drawing up his last will and testament, is deeply concerned to have it done in language at once clear and unencumbered by meaningless metaphors. Now, Christ, according to the literal purport of His testament, has left us as a precious legacy, not mere bread and wine, but His Body and Blood. Are we justified, then, in contradicting Him to His face and exclaiming: "No, this is not your Body, but mere bread, the sign of your Body!"

The refutation of the so-called Sacramentarians, a name given by Luther to those who opposed the Real Presence, evinces as clearly the impossibility of a figurative meaning. Once the manifest literal sense is abandoned, occasion is given to interminable controversies about the meaning of an enigma which Christ supposedly offered His followers for solution. There were no limits to the dispute in the sixteenth century, for at that time Christopher Rasperger wrote a whole book on some 200 different interpretations: "Ducentæ verborum, 'Hoc est corpus meum' interpretationes" (Ingolstadt, 1577). In this connection we must restrict ourselves to an examination of the most current and widely known distortions of the literal sense, which were the butt of Luther's bitter ridicule even as early as 1527. The first group of interpreters, with Zwingli, discovers a figure in the copula est and renders it: "This signifies (est = significat) my Body". In proof of this interpretation, examples are quoted from scripture, as: "The seven kine are seven years" (Genesis 41:26) or: "Sara and Agar are the two covenants" (Galatians 4:24), Waiving the question whether the verb "to be" (esse, einai) of itself can ever be used as the "copula in a figurative relation" (Weiss) or express the "relation of identity in a metaphorical connection" (Heinrici), which most logicians deny, the fundamental principles of logic firmly establish this truth, that all propositions may be divided into two great categories, of which the first and most comprehensive denominates a thing as it is in itself (e.g. "Man is a rational being"), whereas the second designates a thing according as it is used as a sign of something else (e.g, "This picture is my father"). 

To determine whether a speaker intends the second manner of expression, there are four criteria, whose joint concurrence alone will allow the verb "to be" to have the meaning of "signify". Abstracting from the three criteria, mentioned above, which have reference either to the nature of the case, or to the usages of common parlance, or to some convention previously agreed upon, there remains a fourth and last of decisive significance, namely: when a complete substance is predicated of another complete substance, there can exist no logical relation of identity between them, but only the relation of similarity, inasmuch as the first is an image, sign, symbol, of the other. Now this last-named criterion is inapplicable to the Scriptural examples brought forward by the Zwinglians, and especially so in regard to their interpretation of the words of Institution; for the words are not: "This bread is my Body", but indefinitely: "This is my Body". In the history of the Zwinglian conception of the Lord's Supper, certain "sacramental expressions" (locutiones sacramentales) of the Sacred Text, regarded as parallelisms of the words of Institution, have attracted considerable attention. The first is to be found in 1 Corinthians 10:4: "And the rock was [signified] Christ", Yet it is evident that, if the subject rock is taken in its material sense, the metaphor, according to the fourth criterion just mentioned, is as apparent as in the analogous phrase "Christ is the vine". If, however, the word rock in this passage is stripped of all that is material, it may be understood in a spiritual sense, because the Apostle himself is speaking of that "spiritual rock" (petra spiritalis), which in the Person of the Word in an invisible manner ever accompanied the Israelites in their journeyings and supplied them with a spiritual fountain of waters. According to this explanation the copula would here retain its meaning "to be". A nearer approach to a parallel with the words of Institution is found apparently in the so-called "sacramental expressions": "Hoc est pactum meum" (Genesis 17:10), and "est enim Phase Domini" (Exodus 12:11). It is well known how Zwingli by a clever manipulation of the latter phrase succeeded in one day in winning over to his interpretation the entire Catholic population of Zurich. And yet it is clear that no parallelism can be discerned between the aforesaid expressions and the words of Institution; no real parallelism, because there is question of entirely different matters. Not even a verbal parallelism can be pointed out, since in both texts of the Old Testament the subject is a ceremony (circumcision in the first case, and the rite of the paschal lamb in the second), while the predicate involves a mere abstraction (covenant, Passover of the Lord). 

A more weighty consideration is this, that on closer investigation the copula est will be found to retain its proper meaning of "is" rather than "signifies". For just as the circumcision not only signified the nature or object of the Divine covenant, but really was such, so the rite of the Paschal lamb was really the Passover (Phase) or Pasch, instead of its mere representation. It is true that in certain Anglican circles it was formerly the custom to appeal to the supposed poverty of the Aramaic tongue, which was spoken by Christ in the company of His Apostles; for it was maintained that no word could be found in this language corresponding to the concept "to signify". Yet, even prescinding from the fact that in the Aramaic tongue the copula est is usually omitted and that such an omission rather makes for its strict meaning of "to be", Cardinal Wiseman (Horæ Syriacæ, Rome, 1828, pp. 3-73) succeeded in producing no less than forty Syriac expressions conveying the meaning of "to signify" and thus effectually exploded the myth of the Semitic tongue's limited vocabulary.

A second group of Sacramentarians, with Œcolampadius, shifted the diligently sought-for metaphor to the concept contained in the predicate corpus, giving to the latter the sense of "signum corporis", so that the words of Institution were to be rendered: "This is a sign [symbol, image, type] of my Body". Essentially tallying with the Zwinglian interpretation, this new meaning is equally untenable. In all the languages of the world the expression "my body" designates a person's natural body, not the mere sign or symbol of that body. True it is that the Scriptural words "Body of Christ" not infrequently have the meaning of "Church", which is called the mystical Body of Christ, a figure easily and always discernible as such from the text or context (cf. Colossians 1:24). This mystical sense, however, is impossible in the words of Institution, for the simple reason that Christ did not give the Apostles His Church to eat, but His Body, and that "body and blood", by reason of their real and logical association, cannot be separated from one another, and hence are all the less susceptible of a figurative use. The case would be different if the reading were: "This is the bread of my Body, the wine of my Blood". In order to prove at least this much, that the contents of the Chalice are merely wine and, consequently, a mere sign of the Blood, Protestants have recourse to the text of St. Matthew, who relates that Christ, after the completion of the Last Supper, declared: "I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine [genimen vitis]" (Matthew 26:29). It is to be noted that St. Luke (22:18 sqq.), who is chronologically more exact, places these words of Christ before his account of the Institution, and that the true Blood of Christ may with right still be called (consecrated) wine, on the one hand, because the Blood was partaken of after the manner in which wine is drunk and, on the other, because the Blood continues to exist under the outward appearances of the wine. 

In its multifarious wanderings from the old beaten path being consistently forced with the denial of Christ's Divinity to abandon faith in the Real Presence, also, modern criticism seeks to account for the text along other lines. With utter arbitrariness, doubting whether the words of Institution originated from the mouth of Christ, it traces them to St. Paul as their author, in whose ardent soul something original supposedly mingled with his subjective reflections on the value attached to "Body" and on the "repetition of the Eucharistic banquet". From this troubled fountain-head the words of Institution first found their way into the Gospel of St. Luke and then, by way of addition, were woven into the texts of St. Matthew and St. Mark. It stands to reason that the latter assertion is nothing more than a wholly unwarrantable conjecture, which may be passed over as gratuitously as it was advanced. It is, moreover, essentially untrue that the value attached to the Sacrifice and the repetition of the Lord's Supper are mere reflections of St. Paul, since Christ attached a sacrificial value to His Death (cf. Mark 10:45) and celebrated His Eucharistic Supper in connection with the Jewish Passover, which itself had to be repeated every year. As regards the interpretation of the words of Institution, there are at present three modern explanations contending for supremacy — the symbolical, the parabolical, and the eschatological. According to the symbolical interpretation, corpus is supposed to designate the Church as the mystical Body and sanguis the New Testament. We have already rejected this last meaning as impossible. For is it the Church that is eaten and the New Testament that is drunk? Did St. Paul brand the partaking of the Church and of the New Testament as a heinous offense committed against the Body and Blood of Christ? The case is not much better in regard to the parabolical interpretation, which would discern in the pouring out of the wine a mere parable of the shedding of the Blood on the Cross. This again is a purely arbitrary explanation, an invention, unsupported by any objective foundation. Then, too, it would follow from analogy, that the breaking of the bread was a parable of the slaying of Christ's Body, a meaning utterly inconceivable. Rising as it were out of a dense fog and laboring to take on a definite form, the incomplete eschatological explanation would make the Eucharist a mere anticipation of the future heavenly banquet. Supposing the truth of the Real Presence, this consideration might be open to discussion, inasmuch as the partaking of the Bread of Angels is really the foretaste of eternal beatitude and the anticipated transformation of earth into heaven. But as implying mere symbolical anticipation of heaven and a meaningless manipulation of unconsecrated bread and wine the eschatological interpretation is diametrically opposed to the text and finds not the slightest support in the life and character of Christ.


Proof from Tradition

As for the cogency of the argument from tradition, this historical fact is of decided significance, namely, that the dogma of the Real Presence remained, properly speaking, unmolested down to the time of the heretic Berengarius of Tours (d. 1088), and so could claim even at that time the uninterrupted possession of ten centuries. In the course of the dogma's history there arose in general three great Eucharistic controversies, the first of which, begun by Paschasius Radbertus, in the ninth century, scarcely extended beyond the limits of his audience and concerned itself solely with the philosophical question, whether the Eucharistic Body of Christ is identical with the natural Body He had in Palestine and now has in heaven. Such a numerical identity could well have been denied by Ratramnus, Rabanus Maurus, Ratherius, Lanfranc, and others, since even nowadays a true, though accidental, distinction between the sacramental and the natural condition of Christ's Body must be rigorously maintained. The first occasion for an official procedure on the part of the Church was offered when Berengarius of Tours, influenced by the writings of Scotus Eriugena (d. about 884), the first opponent of the Real Presence, rejected both the latter truth and that of Transubstantiation. He repaired, however, the public scandal he had given by a sincere retraction made in the presence of Pope Gregory VII at a synod held in Rome in 1079, and died reconciled to the Church. The third and the sharpest controversy was that opened by the Reformation in the sixteenth century, in regard to which it must be remarked that Luther was the only one among the Reformers who still clung to the old Catholic doctrine, and, though subjecting it to manifold misrepresentations, defended it most tenaciously. He was diametrically opposed by Zwingli of Zurich, who, as was seen above, reduced the Eucharist to an empty, meaningless symbol. Having gained over to his views such friendly contemporary partisans as Carlstadt, Bucer, and Œcolampadius, he later on secured influential allies in the Arminians, Mennonites, Socinians, and Anglicans, and even today the rationalistic conception of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper does not differ substantially from that of the Zwinglians. In the meantime, at Geneva, Calvin was cleverly seeking to bring about a compromise between the extremes of the Lutheran literal and the Zwinglian figurative interpretations, by suggesting instead of the substantial presence in one case or the merely symbolical in the other, a certain mean, i.e. "dynamic", presence, which consists essentially in this, that at the moment of reception, the efficacy of Christ's Body and Blood is communicated from heaven to the souls of the predestined and spiritually nourishes them. Thanks to Melanchthon's pernicious and dishonest double-dealing, this attractive intermediary position of Calvin made such an impression even in Lutheran circles that it was not until the Formula of Concord in 1577 that the "crypto-Calvinistic venom" was successfully rejected from the body of Lutheran doctrine. The Council of Trent met these widely divergent errors of the Reformation with the dogmatic definition, that the God-man is "truly, really, and substantially" present under the appearances of bread and wine, purposely intending thereby to oppose the expression vere to Zwingli's signum, realiter to Œcolampadius's figura, and essentialiter to Calvin's virtus (Sess. XIII, can. i). And this teaching of the Council of Trent has ever been and is now the unwavering position of the whole of Catholic Christendom.

As regards the doctrine of the Fathers, it is not possible in the present article to multiply patristic texts, which are usually characterized by wonderful beauty and clearness. Suffice it to say that, besides the Didache (9, 10, 14), the most ancient Fathers, as Ignatius (Smyrnæans 7; Ephesians 20; Philadelphians 4), Justin (First Apology 66), Irenæus (Against Heresies IV.17.5, IV.18.4 and V.2.2), Tertullian (On the Resurrection of the Flesh 8; On Pudicity 9; On Prayer 19; On Baptism 16), and Cyprian (Treatise 3.16 and Treatise 4.18), attest without the slightest shadow of a misunderstanding what is the faith of the Church, while later patristic theology bears witness to the dogma in terms that approach exaggeration, as Gregory of Nyssa (Great Catechism III.37), Cyril of Jerusalem (Mystagogical Catechesis 4, no. 2 sqq.), and especially the Doctor of the Eucharist, Chrysostom [Homily 82 on Matthew, 1 sqq.; Homily 46 on John, 2 sqq.; Homily 24 on First Corinthians, 1 sqq.; Homily 9 de pœnit., 1], to whom may be added the Latin Fathers, Hilary (On the Holy Trinity VIII.4.13) and Ambrose (On the Mysteries 8.49, 9.51 sq.). Concerning the Syriac Fathers see Th. Lamy "De Syrorum fide in re eucharisticâ" (Louvain, 1859).

The position held by St. Augustine is at present the subject of a spirited controversy, since the adversaries of the Church rather confidently maintain that he favored their side of the question in that he was an out-and-out "Symbolist". In the opinion of Loofs ("Dogmengeschichte", 4th ed., Halle, 1906, p. 409), St. Augustine never gives the "reception of the true Body and Blood of Christ" a thought; and this view Ad. Harnack (Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed., Freiburg, 1897, III, 148) emphasizes when he declares that St. Augustine "undoubtedly was one in this respect with the so-called pre-Reformation and with Zwingli". Against this rather hasty conclusion Catholics first of all advance the undoubted fact that Augustine demanded that Divine worship should be rendered to the Eucharistic Flesh (Enarration on Psalm 33, no. 1), and declared that at the Last Supper "Christ held and carried Himself in His own hands" (Enarration on Psalm 98, no. 9). They insist, and rightly so, that it is not fair to separate this great Doctor's teaching concerning the Eucharist from his doctrine of the Holy Sacrifice, since he clearly and unmistakably asserts that the true Body and Blood are offered in the Holy Mass. The variety of extreme views just mentioned requires that an attempt be made at a reasonable and unbiased explanation, whose verification is to be sought for and found in the acknowledged fact that a gradual process of development took place in the mind of St. Augustine. No one will deny that certain expressions occur in Augustine as forcibly realistic as those of Tertullian and Cyprian or of his intimate literary friends, Ambrose, Optatus of Mileve, Hilary, and Chrysostom. On the other hand, it is beyond question that, owing to the determining influence of Origen and the Platonic philosophy, which, as is well known, attached but slight value to visible matter and the sensible phenomena of the world, Augustine did not refer what was properly real (res) in the Blessed Sacrament to the Flesh of Christ (caro), but transferred it to the quickening principle (spiritus), i.e. to the effects produced by a worthy Communion. A logical consequence of this was that he allowed to caro, as the vehicle and antitype of res, not indeed a mere symbolical worth, but at best a transitory, intermediary, and subordinate worth (signum), and placed the Flesh and Blood of Christ, present under the appearances (figuræ) of bread and wine, in too decided an opposition to His natural, historical Body. Since Augustine was a strenuous defender of personal co-operation and effort in the work of salvation and an enemy to mere mechanical activity and superstitious routine, he omitted insisting upon a lively faith in the real personality of Jesus in the Eucharist, and called attention to the spiritual efficiency of the Flesh of Christ instead. His mental vision was fixed, not so much upon the saving caro, as upon the spiritus, which alone possessed worth. Nevertheless a turning-point occurred in his life. The conflict with Pelagianism and the diligent perusal of Chrysostom freed him from the bondage of Platonism, and he thenceforth attached to caro a separate, individual value independent of that of spiritus, going so far, in fact, as to maintain too strongly that the Communion of children was absolutely necessary to salvation.

If, moreover, the reader finds in some of the other Fathers difficulties, obscurities, and a certain inaccuracy of expression, this may be explained on three general grounds:
  • because of the peace and security there is in their possession of the Church's truth, whence resulted a certain want of accuracy in their terminology;
  • because of the strictness with which the Discipline of the Secret, expressly concerned with the Holy Eucharist, was maintained in the East until the end of the fifth, in the West down to the middle of the sixth century;
  • because of the preference of many Fathers for the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, which was especially in vogue in the Alexandrian School (Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyril), but which found a salutary counterpoise in the emphasis laid on the literal interpretation by the School of Antioch (Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret). Since, however, the allegorical sense of the Alexandrians did not exclude the literal, but rather supposed it as a working basis, the realistic phraseology of Clement (The Pedagogue I.6), of Origen (Against Celsus VIII.13; Hom. ix, in Levit., x) and of Cyril (in Matt., xxvi, xxvii; Contra Nestor., IV, 5) concerning the Real Presence is readily accounted for. (For the solution of patristic difficulties, see Pohle, "Dogmatik", 3rd ed., Paderborn, 1908, III, 209 sqq.)
The argument from tradition is supplemented and completed by the argument from prescription, which traces the constant belief in the dogma of the Real Presence through the Middle Ages back to the early Apostolic Church, and thus proves the anti-Eucharistic heresies to have been capricious novelties and violent ruptures of the true faith as handed down from the beginning. Passing over the interval that has elapsed since the Reformation, as this period receives its entire character from the Council of Trent, we have for the time of the Reformation the important testimony of Luther (Wider etliche Rottengeister, 1532) for the fact that the whole of Christendom then believed in the Real Presence. And this firm, universal belief can be traced back uninterruptedly to Berengarius of Tours (d. 1088), in fact — omitting the sole exception of Scotus Eriugena — to Paschasius Radbertus (831). On these grounds, therefore, we may proudly maintain that the Church has been in legitimate possession of this dogma for fully eleven centuries. 

When Photius started the Greek Schism in 869, he took over to his Church the inalienable treasure of the Catholic Eucharist, a treasure which the Greeks, in the negotiations for reunion at Lyons in 1274 and at Florence in 1439, could show to be still intact, and which they vigorously defended in the schismatical Synod of Jerusalem (1672) against the sordid machinations of the Calvinistic-minded Cyril Lucar, Patriarch of Constantinople (1629). From this it follows conclusively that the Catholic dogma must be much older than the Eastern Schism under Photius. In fact, even the Nestorians and Monophysites, who broke away from Rome in the fifth century, have, as is evident from their their literature and liturgical books, preserved their faith in the Eucharist as unwaveringly as the Greeks, and this in spite of the dogmatic difficulties which, on account of their denial of the hypostatic union, stood in the way of a clear and correct notion of the Real Presence. Therefore the Catholic dogma is at least as old as Nestorianism (A.D. 431). But is it not of even greater antiquity? To decide this question one has only to examine the oldest Liturgies of the Mass, whose essential elements date back to the time of the Apostles (see articles on the various liturgies), to visit the Roman Catacombs, where Christ is shown as present in the Eucharistic food under the symbol of a fish (see EARLY SYMBOLS OF THE EUCHARIST), to decipher the famous Inscription of Abercius of the second century, which, though composed under the influence of the Discipline of the Secret, plainly attests the faith of that age. And thus the argument from prescription carries us back to the dim and distant past and thence to the time of the Apostles, who in turn could have received their faith in the Real Presence from no one but Christ Himself.


The Totality of the Real Presence

In order to forestall at the very outset, the unworthy notion, that in the Eucharist we receive merely the Body and merely the Blood of Christ but not Christ in His entirety, the Council of Trent defined the Real Presence to be such as to include with Christ's Body and His Soul and Divinity as well. A strictly logical conclusion from the words of promise: "he that eateth me the same also shall live by me", this Totality of Presence was also the constant property of tradition, which characterized the partaking of separated parts of the Savior as a sarcophagy (flesh-eating) altogether derogatory to God. Although the separation of the Body, Blood, Soul, and Logos, is, absolutely speaking, within the almighty power of God, yet then actual inseparability is firmly established by the dogma of the indissolubility of the hypostatic union of Christ's Divinity and Humanity. In case the Apostles had celebrated the Lord's Supper during the triduum mortis (the time during which Christ's Body was in the tomb), when a real separation took place between the constitutive elements of Christ, there would have been really present in the Sacred Host only, the bloodless, inanimate Body of Christ as it lay in tomb, and in the Chalice only the Blood separated from His Body and absorbed by the earth as it was shed, both the Body and the Blood, however, hypostatically united to His Divinity, while His Soul, which sojourned in Limbo, would have remained entirely excluded from the Eucharistic presence. This unreal, though not impossible, hypothesis, is well calculated to throw light upon the essential difference designated by the Council of Trent (Sess, XIII, c. iii), between the meanings of the words ex vi verborum and per concomitantiam. By virtue of the words of consecration, or ex vi verborum, that only is made present which is expressed by the words of Institution, namely the Body and the Blood of Christ. But by reason of a natural concomitance (per concomitantiam), there becomes simultaneously present all that which is physically inseparable from the parts just named, and which must, from a natural connection with them, always be their accompaniment. Now, the glorified Christ, Who "dieth now no more" (Romans 6:9) has an animate Body through whose veins courses His life's Blood under the vivifying influence of soul. Consequently, together with His Body and Blood and Soul, His whole Humanity also, and, by virtue of the hypostatic union, His Divinity, i.e. Christ whole and entire, must be present. Hence Christ is present in the sacrament with His Flesh and Blood, Body and Soul, Humanity and Divinity.

This general and fundamental principle, which entirely abstracts from the duality of the species, must, nevertheless, be extended to each of the species of bread and wine. For we do not receive in the Sacred Host one part of Christ and in the Chalice the other, as though our reception of the totality depended upon our partaking of both forms; on the contrary, under the appearance of bread alone, as well as under the appearance of wine alone, we receive Christ whole and entire (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, can. iii). This, the only reasonable conception, finds its Scriptural verification in the fact, that St. Paul (1 Corinthians 11:27, 29) attaches the same guilt "of the body and the blood of the Lord" to the unworthy "eating or drinking", understood in a disjunctive sense, as he does to "eating and drinking", understood in a copulative sense. The traditional foundation for this is to be found in the testimony of the Fathers and of the Church's liturgy, according to which the glorified Savior can be present on our altars only in His totality and integrity, and not divided into parts or distorted to the form of a monstrosity. It follows, therefore, that supreme adoration is separately due to the Sacred Host and to the consecrated contents of the Chalice. On this last truth are based especially the permissibility and intrinsic propriety of Communion only under one kind for the laity and for priests not celebrating Mass (see COMMUNION UNDER BOTH KINDS). But in particularizing upon the dogma, we are naturally led to the further truth, that, at least after the actual division of either Species into parts, Christ is present in each part in His full and entire essence. If the Sacred Host be broken into pieces or if the consecrated Chalice be drunk in small quantities, Christ in His entirety is present in each particle and in each drop. By the restrictive clause, separatione factâ the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, can. iii) rightly raised this truth to the dignity of a dogma. While from Scripture we may only judge it improbable that Christ consecrated separately each particle of the bread He had broken, we know with certainty, on the other hand, that He blessed the entire contents of the Chalice and then gave it to His disciples to be partaken of distributively (cf. Matthew 26:27 sq.; Mark 14:23). It is only on the basis of the Tridentine dogma that we can understand how Cyril of Jerusalem (Mystagogical Catechesis 5, no. 21) obliged communicants to observe the most scrupulous care in conveying the Sacred Host to their mouths, so that not even "a crumb, more precious than gold or jewels", might fall from their hands to the ground; how Cæsarius of Arles taught that there is "just as much in the small fragment as in the whole"; how the different liturgies assert the abiding integrity of the "indivisible Lamb", in spite of the "division of the Host"; and, finally, how in actual practice the faithful partook of the broken particles of the Sacred Host and drank in common from the same cup.

While the three foregoing theses contain dogmas of faith, there is a fourth proposition which is merely a theological conclusion, namely, that even before the actual division of the Species, Christ is present wholly and entirely in each particle of the still unbroken Host and in each drop of the collective contents of the Chalice. For were not Christ present in His entire Personality in every single particle of the Eucharistic Species even before their division took place, we should be forced to conclude that it is the process of dividing which brings about the Totality of Presence, whereas according to the teaching of the Church the operative cause of the Real and Total Presence is to be found in Transubstantiation alone. No doubt this last conclusion directs the attention of philosophical and scientific inquiry to a mode of existence peculiar to the Eucharistic Body, which is contrary to the ordinary laws of experience. It is, indeed, one of those sublime mysteries, concerning which speculative theology attempts to offer various solutions [see below under (5)].


Transubstantiation

Before proving dogmatically the fact of the substantial change here under consideration, we must first outline its history and nature.

(a) The scientific development of the concept of Transubstantiation can hardly be said to be a product of the Greeks, who did not get beyond its more general notes; rather, it is the remarkable contribution of the Latin theologians, who were stimulated to work it out in complete logical form by the three Eucharistic controversies mentioned above, The term transubstantiation seems to have been first used by Hildebert of Tours (about 1079). His encouraging example was soon followed by other theologians, as Stephen of Autun (d. 1139), Gaufred (1188), and Peter of Blois (d. about 1200), whereupon several ecumenical councils also adopted this significant expression, as the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215), and the Council of Lyons (1274), in the profession of faith of the Greek Emperor Michael Palæologus. The Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, cap. iv; can. ii) not only accepted as an inheritance of faith the truth contained in the idea, but authoritatively confirmed the "aptitude of the term" to express most strikingly the legitimately developed doctrinal concept. In a closer logical analysis of Transubstantiation, we find the first and fundamental notion to be that of conversion, which may be defined as "the transition of one thing into another in some aspect of being". As is immediately evident, conversion (conversio) is something more than mere change (mutatio). Whereas in mere changes one of the two extremes may be expressed negatively, as, e.g., in the change of day and night, conversion requires two positive extremes, which are related to each other as thing to thing, and must have, besides, such an intimate connection with each other, that the last extreme (terminus ad quem) begins to be only as the first (terminus a quo) ceases to be, as, e.g., in the conversion of water into wine at Cana. A third element is usually required, known as the commune tertium, which, even after conversion has taken place, either physically or at least logically unites one extreme to the other; for in every true conversion the following condition must be fulfilled: "What was formerly A, is now B." 

A very important question suggests itself as to whether the definition should further postulate the previous non-existence of the last extreme, for it seems strange that an existing terminus a quo, A, should be converted into an already existing terminus ad quem, B. If the act of conversion is not to become a mere process of substitution, as in sleight-of-hand performances, the terminus ad quem must unquestionably in some manner newly exist, just as the terminus a quo must in some manner really cease to exist. Yet as the disappearance of the latter is not attributable to annihilation properly so called, so there is no need of postulating creation, strictly so called, to explain the former's coming into existence. The idea of conversion is amply realized if the following condition is fulfilled, viz., that a thing which already existed in substance, acquires an altogether new and previously non-existing mode of being. Thus in the resurrection of the dead, the dust of the human bodies will be truly converted into the bodies of the risen by their previously existing souls, just as at death they had been truly converted into corpses by the departure of the souls. This much as regards the general notion of conversion. Transubstantiation, however, is not a conversion simply so called, but a substantial conversion (conversio substantialis), inasmuch as one thing is substantially or essentially converted into another. Thus from the concept of Transubstantiation is excluded every sort of merely accidental conversion, whether it be purely natural (e.g. the metamorphosis of insects) or supernatural (e.g. the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor). Finally, Transubstantiation differs from every other substantial conversion in this, that only the substance is converted into another — the accidents remaining the same — just as would be the case if wood were miraculously converted into iron, the substance of the iron remaining hidden under the external appearance of the wood.

The application of the foregoing to the Eucharist is an easy matter. First of all the notion of conversion is verified in the Eucharist, not only in general, but in all its essential details. For we have the two extremes of conversion, namely, bread and wine as the terminus a quo, and the Body and Blood of Christ as the terminus ad quem. Furthermore, the intimate connection between the cessation of one extreme and the appearance of the other seems to be preserved by the fact, that both events are the results, not of two independent processes, as, e.g. annihilation and creation, but of one single act, since, according to the purpose of the Almighty, the substance of the bread and wine departs in order to make room for the Body and Blood of Christ. Lastly, we have the commune tertium in the unchanged appearances of bread and wine, under which appearances the pre-existent Christ assumes a new, sacramental mode of being, and without which His Body and Blood could not be partaken of by men. That the consequence of Transubstantiation, as a conversion of the total substance, is the transition of the entire substance of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, is the express doctrine of the Church (Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, can. ii). Thus were condemned as contrary to faith the antiquated view of Durandus, that only the substantial form (forma substantialis) of the bread underwent conversion, while the primary matter (materia prima) remained, and, especially, Luther's doctrine of Consubstantiation, i.e. the coexistence of the substance of the bread with the true Body of Christ. Thus, too, the theory of Impanation advocated by Osiander and certain Berengarians, and according to which a hypostatic union is supposed to take place between the substance of the bread and the God-man (impanatio = Deus panis factus), is authoritatively rejected. So the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation sets up a mighty bulwark around the dogma of the Real Presence and constitutes in itself a distinct doctrinal article, which is not involved in that of the Real Presence, though the doctrine of the Real Presence is necessarily contained in that of Transubstantiation. It was for this very reason that Pius VI, in his dogmatic Bull "Auctorem fidei" (1794) against the Jansenistic pseudo Synod of Pistoia (1786), protested most vigorously against suppressing this "scholastic question", as the synod had advised pastors to do.

(b) In the mind of the Church, Transubstantiation has been so intimately bound up with the Real Presence, that both dogmas have been handed down together from generation to generation, though we cannot entirely ignore a dogmatico-historical development. The total conversion of the substance of bread is expressed clearly in the words of Institution: "This is my body". These words form, not a theoretical, but a practical proposition, whose essence consists in this, that the objective identity between subject and predicate is effected and verified only after the words have all been uttered, not unlike the pronouncement of a king to a subaltern: "You are a major", or, "You are a captain", which would immediately cause the promotion of the officer to a higher command. When, therefore, He Who is All Truth and All Power said of the bread: "This is my body", the bread became, through the utterance of these words, the Body of Christ; consequently, on the completion of the sentence the substance of bread was no longer present, but the Body of Christ under the outward appearance of bread. Hence the bread must have become the Body of Christ, i.e. the former must have been converted into the latter. The words of Institution were at the same time the words of Transubstantiation. Indeed the actual manner in which the absence of the bread and the presence of the Body of Christ is effected, is not read into the words of Institution but strictly and exegetically deduced from them. The Calvinists, therefore, are perfectly right when they reject the Lutheran doctrine of Consubstantiation as a fiction, with no foundation in Scripture. For had Christ intended to assert the coexistence of His Body with the Substance of the bread, He would not have expressed a simple identity between hoc and corpus by means of the copula est, but would have resorted to some such expression as: "This bread contains my body", or, "In this bread is my Body." Had He desired to constitute bread the sacramental receptacle of His Body, He would have had to state this expressly, for neither from the nature of the case nor according to common parlance can a piece of bread be made to signify the receptacle of a human body. On the other hand, the synecdoche is plain in the case of the Chalice: "This is my blood", i.e. the contents of the Chalice are my blood, and hence no longer wine.

Regarding tradition, the earliest witnesses, as Tertullian and Cyprian, could hardly have given any particular consideration to the genetic relation of the natural elements of bread and wine to the Body and Blood of Christ, or to the manner in which the former were converted into the latter; for even Augustine was deprived of a clear conception of Transubstantiation, so long as he was held in the bonds of Platonism. On the other hand, complete clearness on the subject had been attained by writers as early as Cyril of Jerusalem, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, and Cyril of Alexandria in the East, and by Ambrose and the later Latin writers in the West. Eventually the West became the classic home of scientific perfection in the difficult doctrine of Transubstantiation. The claims of the learned work of the Anglican Dr. Pusey (The Doctrine of the Real Presence as contained in the Fathers, Oxford, 1855), who denied the cogency of the patristic argument for Transubstantiation, have been met and thoroughly answered by Cardinal Franzelin (De Euchar., Rome, 1887, xiv). The argument from tradition is strikingly confirmed by the ancient liturgies, whose beautiful prayers express the idea of conversion in the clearest manner. Many examples may be found in Renaudot, "Liturgiæ orient." (2nd ed., 1847); Assemani, "Codex liturg." (13 vols., Rome 1749-66); Denzinger, "Ritus Orientalium" (2 vols., Würzburg, 1864), Concerning the Adduction Theory of the Scotists and the Production Theory of the Thomists, see Pohle, "Dogmatik" (3rd ed., Paderborn, 1908), III, 237 sqq.


The Permanence and Adorableness of the Eucharist

Since Luther arbitrarily restricted Real Presence to the moment of reception (in usu, non extra), the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, can. iv) by a special canon emphasized the fact, that after the Consecration Christ is truly present and, consequently, does not make His Presence dependent upon the act of eating or drinking. On the contrary, He continues His Eucharistic Presence even in the consecrated Hosts and Sacred particles that remain on the altar or in the ciborium after the distribution of Holy Communion. In the deposit of faith the Presence and the Permanence of Presence are so closely allied, that in the mind of the Church both continue on as an undivided whole. And rightly so; for just as Christ promised His Flesh and blood as meat and drink, i.e. as something permanent (cf. John 6:50 sqq.), so, when He said: "Take ye, and eat. This is my body", the Apostles received from the hand of the Lord His Sacred Body, which was already objectively present and did not first become so in the act of partaking. This non-dependence of the Real Presence upon the actual reception is manifested very clearly in the case of the Chalice, when Christ said: "Drink ye all of this. For [enim] this is my Blood." Here the act of drinking is evidently neither the cause nor the conditio sine qua non for the presence of Christ's Blood.

Much as he disliked it, even Calvin had to acknowledge the evident force of the argument from tradition (Instit. IV, xvii, sect. 739). Not only have the Fathers, and among them Chrysostom with special vigor, defended in theory the permanence of the Real Presence, but the constant practice of the Church has also established its truth. In the early days of the Church the faithful frequently carried the Blessed Eucharist with them to their homes (cf. Tertullian, "Ad uxor.", II, v; Cyprian, Treatise 3.26) or upon long journeys (Ambrose, De excessu fratris, I, 43, 46), while the deacons were accustomed to take the Blessed Sacrament to those who did not attend Divine service (cf. Justin, Apol., I, n. 67), as well as to the martyrs, the incarcerated, and the infirm (cf. Eusebius, Church History VI.44). 

The deacons were also obliged to transfer the particles that remained to specially prepared repositories called Pastophoria (cf. Apostolic Constitutions, VIII, xiii). Furthermore, it was customary as early as the fourth century to celebrate the Mass of the Presanctifed (cf. Synod of Laodicea, can. xlix), in which were received the Sacred Hosts that had been consecrated one or more days previously. In the Latin Church the celebration of the Mass of the Presanctified is nowadays restricted to Good Friday, whereas, ever since the Trullan Synod (692), the Greeks celebrate it during the whole of Lent, except on Saturdays, Sundays, and the feast of the Annunciation (25 March). 

A deeper reason for the permanence of Presence is found in the fact, that some time elapses between the confection and the reception of the sacrament, i.e. between the Consecration and the Communion, whereas in the case of the other sacraments both the confection and the reception take place at the same instant. Baptism, for instance, lasts only as long as the baptismal action or ablution with water, and is, therefore, a transitory sacrament; on the contrary, the Eucharist, and the Eucharist alone, constitutes a permanent sacrament (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, cap. iii). The permanence of Presence, however, is limited to an interval of time of which the beginning is determined by the instant of Consecration and the end by the corruption of the Eucharistic Species. If the Host has become moldy or the contents of the Chalice sour, Christ has discontinued His Presence therein. Since in the process of corruption those elementary substances return which correspond to the peculiar nature of the changed accidents, the law of the indestructibility of matter, notwithstanding the miracle of the Eucharistic conversion, remains in force without any interruption.

The Adorableness of the Eucharist is the practical consequence of its permanence. According to a well known principle of Christology, the same worship of latria (cultus latriæ) as is due to the Triune God is due also to the Divine Word, the God-man Christ, and in fact, by reason of the hypostatic union, to the Humanity of Christ and its individual component parts, as, e.g., His Sacred Heart. Now, identically the same Lord Christ is truly present in the Eucharist as is present in heaven; consequently He is to be adored in the Blessed Sacrament, and just so long as He remains present under the appearances of bread and wine, namely, from the moment of Transubstantiation to the moment in which the species are decomposed (cf. Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, can. vi).

In the absence of Scriptural proof, the Church finds a warrant for, and a propriety in, rendering Divine worship to the Blessed Sacrament in the most ancient and constant tradition, though of course a distinction must be made between the dogmatic principle and the varying discipline regarding the outward form of worship. While even the East recognized the unchangeable principle from the earliest ages, and, in fact, as late as the schismatical Synod of Jerusalem in 1672, the West has furthermore shown an untiring activity in establishing and investing with more and more solemnity, homage and devotion to the Blessed Eucharist. In the early Church, the adoration of the Blessed Sacrament was restricted chiefly to Mass and Communion, just as it is today among the Orientals and the Greeks. Even in his time Cyril of Jerusalem insisted just as strongly as did Ambrose and Augustine on an attitude of adoration and homage during Holy Communion (cf. Ambrose, De Sp. Sancto, III, ii, 79; Augustine, In Ps. xcviii, n. 9). In the West the way was opened to a more and more exalted veneration of the Blessed Eucharist when the faithful were allowed to Communicate even outside of the liturgical service. After the Berengarian controversy, the Blessed Sacrament was in the eleventh and twelfth centuries elevated for the express purpose of repairing by its adoration the blasphemies of heretics and, strengthening the imperiled faith of Catholics. In the thirteenth century were introduced, for the greater glorification of the Most Holy, the "theophoric processions" (circumgestatio), and also the feast of Corpus Christi, instituted under Urban IV at the solicitation of St. Juliana of Liège. In honor of the feast, sublime hymns, such as the "Pange Lingua" of St. Thomas Aquinas, were composed. In the fourteenth century the practice of the Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament arose. The custom of the annual Corpus Christi procession was warmly defended and recommended by the Council of Trent (Sess. XIII, cap. v). A new impetus was given to the adoration of the Eucharist through the visits to the Blessed Sacrament (Visitatio SS. Sacramenti), introduced by St. Alphonsus Liguori; in later times the numerous orders and congregations devoted to Perpetual Adoration, the institution in many dioceses of the devotion of "Perpetual Prayer", the holding of International Eucharistic Congresses, e.g. that of London in September, 1908, have all contributed to keep alive faith in Him Who has said: "behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world" (Matthew 28:20).


Speculative Discussion of the Real Presence

The principal aim of speculative theology with regard to the Eucharist, should be to discuss philosophically, and seek a logical solution of, three apparent contradictions, namely:
  • the continued existence of the Eucharistic Species, or the outward appearances of bread and wine, without their natural underlying subject (accidentia sine subjecto);
  • the spatially uncircumscribed, spiritual mode of existence of Christ's Eucharistic Body (existentia corporis ad modum spiritus);
  • the simultaneous existence of Christ in heaven and in many places on earth (multilocatio).
(a) The study of the first problem, viz. whether or not the accidents of bread and wine continue their existence without their proper substance, must be based upon the clearly established truth of Transubstantiation, in consequence of which the entire substance of the bread and the entire substance of the wine are converted respectively into the Body and Blood of Christ in such a way that "only the appearances of bread and wine remain" (Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, can. ii: manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini). Accordingly, the continuance of the appearances without the substance of bread and wine as their connatural substratum is just the reverse of Transubstantiation. If it be further asked, whether these appearances have any subject at all in which they inhere, we must answer with St. Thomas Aquinas (III:77:1), that the idea is to be rejected as unbecoming, as though the Body of Christ, in addition to its own accidents, should also assume those of bread and wine. The most that may be said is, that from the Eucharistic Body proceeds a miraculous sustaining power, which supports the appearances bereft of their natural substances and preserves them from collapse. The position of the Church in this regard may be readily determined from the Council of Constance (1414-1418). In its eighth session, approved in 1418 by Martin V, this synod condemned the following articles of Wyclif:
  • "Substantia panis materialis et similiter substantia vini materialis remanent in Sacramento altaris", i.e. the material substance of bread and likewise the material substance of wine remain in the Sacrament of the Altar;
  • "Accidentia panis non manent sine subjecto", i.e. the accidents of the bread do not remain without a subject.
The first of these articles contains an open denial of Transubstantiation. The second, so far as the text is concerned, might be considered as merely a different wording of the first, were it not that the history of the council shows that Wyclif had directly opposed the Scholastic doctrine of "accidents without a subject" as absurd and even heretical (cf, De Augustinis, De re sacramentariâ, Rome, 1889, II, 573 sqq.), Hence it was the intention of the council to condemn the second article, not merely as a conclusion of the first, but as a distinct and independent proposition; wherefore we may gather the Church's teaching on the subject from the contradictory proposition; "Accidentia panis manent sine subjecto," i.e. the accidents of bread do remain without a subject. Such, at least, was the opinion of contemporary theologians regarding the matter; and the Roman Catechism, referring to the above-mentioned canon of the Council of Trent, tersely, explains: "The accidents of bread and wine inhere in no substance, but continue existing by themselves." This being the case, some theologians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who inclined to Cartesianism, as E, Maignan, Drouin, and Vitasse, displayed but little theological penetration when they asserted that the Eucharistic appearances were optical illusions, phantasmagoria, and make-believe accidents, ascribing to Divine omnipotence an immediate influence upon the five senses, whereby a mere subjective impression of what seemed to be the accidents of bread and wine was created. 

Since Descartes (d. 1650) places the essence of corporeal substance in its actual extension and recognizes only modal accidents metaphysically united to their substance, it is clear, according to his theory, that together with the conversion of the substance of bread and wine, the accidents must also be converted and thereby made to disappear. If the eye nevertheless seems to behold bread and wine, this is to be attributed to an optical illusion alone. But it is clear at first blush, that no doubt can be entertained as to the physical reality, or in fact, as to the identity of the accidents before and after Transubstantiation, This physical, and not merely optical, continuance of the Eucharistic accidents was repeatedly insisted upon by the Fathers, and with such excessive rigor that the notion of Transubstantiation seemed to be in danger. Especially against the Monophysites, who based on the Eucharistic conversion an a pari argument in behalf of the supposed conversion of the Humanity of Christ into His Divinity, did the Fathers retort by concluding from the continuance of the unconverted Eucharistic accidents to the unconverted Human Nature of Christ. Both philosophical and theological arguments were also advanced against the Cartesians, as, for instance, the infallible testimony of the senses, the necessity of the commune tertium to complete the idea of Transubstantiation [see above, (3)], the idea of the Sacrament of the Altar as the visible sign of Christ's invisible Body, the physical signification of Communion as a real partaking of food and drink the striking expression "breaking of bread" (fractio panis), which supposes the divisible reality of the accidents, etc. For all these reasons, theologians consider the physical reality of the accidents as an incontrovertible truth, which cannot without temerity be called in question.

As regards the philosophical possibility of the accidents existing without their substance, the older school drew a fine distinction between modal and absolute accidents, By the modal accidents were understood such as could not, being mere modes, be separated from their substance without involving a metaphysical contradiction, e.g. the form and motion of a body. Those accidents were designated absolute, whose objective reality was adequately distinct from the reality of their substance, in such a way that no intrinsic repugnance was involved in their separability, as, e.g., the quantity of a body. Aristotle, himself taught (Metaphys., VI, 3rd ed. of Bekker, p. 1029, a. 13), that quantity was not a corporeal substance, but only a phenomenon of substance. Modern philosophy, on the other hand, has endeavored since the time of John Locke, to reject altogether from the realm of ideas the concept of substance as something imaginary, and to rest satisfied with qualities alone as the excitants of sensation, a view of the material world which the so-called psychology of association and actuality is trying to carry out in its various details. The Catholic Church does not feel called upon to follow up the ephemeral vagaries of these new philosophical systems, but bases her doctrine on the everlasting philosophy of sound reason, which rightly distinguishes between the thing in itself and its characteristic qualities (color, form, size, etc.). Though the "thing in itself" may even remain imperceptible to the senses and therefore be designated in the language of Kant as a noumenon, or in the language of Spencer, the Unknowable, yet we cannot escape the necessity of seeking beneath the appearances the thing which appears, beneath the colour that which is colored beneath the form that which has form, i.e. the substratum or subject which sustains the phenomena. The older philosophy designated the appearances by the name of accidents, the subject of the appearances, by that of substance. It matters little what the terms are, provided the things signified by them are rightly understood. What is particularly important regarding material substances and their accidental qualities, is the necessity of proceeding cautiously in this discussion, since in the domain of natural philosophy the greatest uncertainty reigns even at the present day concerning the nature of matter, one system pulling down what another has reared, as is proved in the latest theories of atomism and energy, of ions and electrons.

The old theology tried with St. Thomas Aquinas (III:77) to prove the possibility of absolute accidents on the principles of the Aristotelean-Scholastic hylomorphism, i.e. the system which teaches that the essential constitution of bodies consists in the substantial union of materia prima and forma substantialis. Some theologians of today would seek to come to an understanding with modern science, which bases all natural processes upon the very fruitful theory of energy, by trying with Leibniz to explain the Eucharistic accidentia sine subjecto according to the dynamism of natural philosophy. Assuming, according to this system, a real distinction between force and its manifestations, between energy and its effects, it may be seen that under the influence of the First Cause the energy (substance) necessary for the essence of bread is withdrawn by virtue of conversion, while the effects of energy (accidents) in a miraculous manner continue. For the rest it may be said, that it is far from the Church's intention to restrict the Catholic's investigation regarding the doctrine of the Blessed Sacrament to any particular view of natural philosophy or even to require him to establish its truth on the principles of medieval physics; all that the Church demands is, that those theories of material substances be rejected which not only contradict the teaching of the Church, but also are repugnant to experience and sound reason, as Pantheism, Hylozoism, Monism, Absolute Idealism, Cartesianism, etc.

(b) The second problem arises from the Totality of Presence, which means that Christ in His entirety is present in the whole of the Host and in each smallest part thereof, as the spiritual soul is present in the human body [see above, (2)]. The difficulty reaches its climax when we consider that there is no question here of the Soul or the Divinity of Christ, but of His Body, which, with its head, trunk, and members, has assumed a mode of existence spiritual and independent of space, a mode of existence, indeed, concerning which neither experience nor any system of philosophy can have the least inkling. That the idea of conversion of corporeal matter into a spirit can in no way be entertained, is clear from the material substance of the Eucharistic Body itself. Even the above-mentioned separability of quantity from substance gives us no clue to the solution, since according to the best founded opinions not only the substance of Christ's Body, but by His own wise arrangement, its corporeal quantity, i.e. its full size, with its complete organization of integral members and limbs, is present within the diminutive limits of the Host and in each portion thereof. Later theologians (as Rossignol, Legrand) resorted to the unseemly explanation, according to which Christ is present in diminished form and stature, a sort of miniature body; while others (as Oswald, Fernandez, Casajoana) assumed with no better sense of fitness the mutual compenetration of the members of Christ's Body to within the narrow compass of the point of a pin. 

The vagaries of the Cartesians, however, went beyond all bounds. Descartes had already, in a letter to P. Mesland (ed. Emery, Paris, 1811), expressed the opinion, that the identity of Christ's Eucharistic with His Heavenly Body was preserved by the identity of His Soul, which animated all the Eucharistic Bodies. On this basis, the geometrician Varignon suggested a true multiplication of the Eucharistic Bodies upon earth, which were supposed to be most faithful, though greatly reduced, miniature copies of the prototype, the Heavenly Body of Christ. Nor does the modern theory of n-dimensions throw any light upon the subject; for the Body of Christ is not invisible or impalpable to us because it occupies the fourth dimension, but because it transcends and is wholly independent of space. Such a mode of existence, it is clear, does not come within the scope of physics and mechanics, but belongs to a higher, supernatural order, even as does the Resurrection from the sealed tomb, the passing in and out through closed doors, the Transfiguration of the future glorified risen Body. What explanation may, then, be given of the fact?

The simplest treatment of the subject was that offered by the Schoolmen, especially St. Thomas (III:76:4), They reduced the mode of being to the mode of becoming, i.e. they traced back the mode of existence peculiar to the Eucharistic Body to the Transubstantiation; for a thing has to so "be" as it was in "becoming", Since ex vi verborum the immediate result is the presence of the Body of Christ, its quantity, present merely per concomitantiam, must follow the mode of existence peculiar to its substance, and, like the latter, must exist without division and extension, i.e. entirely in the whole Host and entirely in each part thereof. In other words, the Body of Christ is present in the sacrament, not after the manner of "quantity" (per modum quantitatis), but of "substance" (per modum substantiæ), Later Scholasticism (Bellarmine, Francisco Suárez, Billuart, and others) tried to improve upon this explanation along other lines by distinguishing between internal and external quantity. By internal quantity (quantitas interna seu in actu primo) is understood that entity, by virtue of which a corporeal substance merely possesses "aptitudinal extension", i.e. the "capability" of being extended in tri-dimensional space. External quantity, on the other hand (quantitas externa seu in actu secundo), is the same entity, but in so far as it follows its natural tendency to occupy space and actually extends itself in the three dimensions. While aptitudinal extension or internal quantity is so bound up with the essences of bodies that its separability from them involves a metaphysical contradiction, external quantity is, on the other hand, only a natural consequence and effect, which can be so suspended and withheld by the First Cause, that the corporeal substance, retaining its internal quantity, does not extend itself into space. At all events, however plausibly reason may seem to explain the matter, it is nevertheless face to face with a great mystery.

© The third and last question has to do with the multilocation of Christ in heaven and upon thousands of altars throughout the world. Since in the natural order of events each body is restricted to one position in space (unilocatio), so that before the law proof of an alibi immediately frees a person from the suspicion of crime, multilocation without further question belongs to the supernatural order. First of all, no intrinsic repugnance can be shown in the concept of multilocation. For if the objection be raised, that no being can exist separated from itself or show forth local distances between its various selves, the sophism is readily detected; for multilocation does not multiply the individual object, but only its external relation to and presence in space. Philosophy distinguishes two modes of presence in creatures:
  • the circumscriptive, and
  • the definitive.
The first, the only mode of presence proper to bodies, is that by virtue of which an object is confined to a determinate portion of space in such wise that its various parts (atoms, molecules, electrons) also occupy their corresponding positions in that space. The second mode of presence, that properly belonging to a spiritual being, requires the substance of a thing to exist in its entirety in the whole of the space, as well as whole and entire in each part of that space. The latter is the soul's mode of presence in the human body. The distinction made between these two modes of presence is important, inasmuch as in the Eucharist both kinds are found in combination. For, in the first place, there is verified a continuous definitive multilocation, called also replication, which consists in this, that the Body of Christ is totally present in each part of the continuous and as yet unbroken Host and also totally present throughout the whole Host, just as the human soul is present in the body. And precisely this latter analogy from nature gives us an insight into the possibility of the Eucharistic miracle. For if, as has been seen above, Divine omnipotence can in a supernatural manner impart to a body such a spiritual, unextended, spatially uncircumscribed mode of presence, which is natural to the soul as regards the human body, one may well surmise the possibility of Christ's Eucharistic Body being present in its entirety in the whole Host, and whole and entire in each part thereof.

There is, moreover, the discontinuous multilocation, whereby Christ is present not only in one Host, but in numberless separate Hosts, whether in the ciborium or upon all the altars throughout the world. The intrinsic possibility of discontinuous multilocation seems to be based upon the non-repugnance of continuous multilocation. For the chief difficulty of the latter appears to be that the same Christ is present in two different parts, A and B, of the continuous Host, it being immaterial whether we consider the distant parts A and B joined by the continuous line AB or not. The marvel does not substantially increase, if by reason of the breaking of the Host, the two parts A and B are now completely separated from each other. Nor does it matter how great the distance between the parts may be. Whether or not the fragments of a Host are distant one inch or a thousand miles from one another is altogether immaterial in this consideration; we need not wonder, then, if Catholics adore their Eucharistic Lord at one and the same time in New York, London, and Paris. Finally, mention must be made of mixed multilocation, since Christ with His natural dimensions reigns in heaven, whence he does not depart, and at the same time dwells with His Sacramental Presence in numberless places throughout the world. This third case would be in perfect accordance with the two foregoing, were we per impossible permitted to imagine that Christ were present under the appearances of bread exactly as He is in heaven and that He had relinquished His natural mode of existence. This, however, would be but one more marvel of God's omnipotence. Hence no contradiction is noticeable in the fact, that Christ retains His natural dimensional relations in heaven and at the same time takes up His abode upon the altars of earth.

There is, furthermore, a fourth kind of multilocation, which, however, has not been realized in the Eucharist, but would be, if Christ's Body were present in its natural mode of existence both in heaven and on earth. Such a miracle might be assumed to have occurred in the conversion of St. Paul before the gates of Damascus, when Christ in person said to him: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" So too the bilocation of saints, sometimes read of in the pages of hagiography, as, e.g., in the case of St. Alphonsus Liguori, cannot be arbitrarily cast aside as untrustworthy. The Thomists and some later theologians, it is true, reject this kind of multilocation as intrinsically impossible and declare bilocation to be nothing more than an "apparition" without corporeal presence. But Cardinal De Lugo is of opinion, and justly so, that to deny its possibility might reflect unfavorably upon the Eucharistic multilocation itself. If there were question of the vagaries of many Nominalists, as, e.g., that a bilocated person could be living in Paris and at the same time dying in London, hating in Paris and at the same time loving in London, the impossibility would be as plain as day, since an individual, remaining such as he is, cannot be the subject of contrary propositions, since they exclude one another. The case assumes a different aspect, when wholly external contrary propositions, relating to position in space, are used in reference to the bilocated individual. In such a bilocation, which leaves the principle of contradiction intact, it would be hard to discover an intrinsic impossibility.
"So let us be confident, let us not be unprepared, let us not be outflanked, let us be wise, vigilant, fighting against those who are trying to tear the faith out of our souls and morality out of our hearts, so that we may remain Catholics, remain united to the Blessed Virgin Mary, remain united to the Roman Catholic Church, remain faithful children of the Church."- Abp. Lefebvre
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