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St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-20-2022
Chapter 1 - The question is proposed about his temporal power
Chapter 2 - That the Pope is not Master of the Whole World
Chapter 3 - That the Pope is not Master of the Whole Christian World
Chapter 4 - That the Pope has no merely temporal power by divine law
Chapter 5 - Opposing Arguments are Resolved
Chapter 6 - That the Pope possesses the highest temporal power indirectly
Chapter 7 - The Opinion of Theologians is Proved by Reasons
Chapter 8 - The Same Points Proved by Examples
Chapter 9 - That one man should be the Ecclesiastical and, at the same time, a political Head
Chapter 10 - Opposing Arguments are Solved
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-20-2022
Chapter 1 - The question is proposed about his temporal power
Remaining is the last topic of dispute over the Pontiff, which concerns his temporal power: about this question three opinions can be found. The first is: the Supreme Pontiff has by divine right the fullest possible power over the whole world, both in ecclesiastical and political matters. In this vein teach Augustinus Triumphus (in his "Summa Concerning Ecclesiastical Power," question 1, article 1), Alvarus Pelagius (in the first book, "The Lament of the Church," "De Planctu Ecclesiae," chapter 13) and many jurists, like Ostiensis, Panormitanus, and Sylvester, and not a few others. Ostiensis even goes further than the others: He teaches that, with the advent of Christ, all dominion of infidel rulers has been transferred to the Church and resides in the Supreme Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ, the highest true King, and therefore, the Pontiff, by his own right, can give the kingdoms of infidels to whomever he wills of the faithful.
Another, I will not call an "opinion," but a "heresy," is found at the other extreme. First, the Pontiff, as Pontiff, has no temporal power nor can he in any way command secular rulers, nor deprive them of principality or kingdom, even if they deserve to be deprived. Secondly, it teaches that it is not licit for the Pontiff or other Bishops to accept temporal dominion, which they now have over some cities and provinces, whether such dominion was given to them or they usurped it. For divine law prohibits that the temporal and spiritual swords be entrusted to one and the same man. Thus teach all heretics of today, and especially Calvin (Book Four of his Institutes, chapter 11, paragraphs 8-14) and Peter Martyr and Brentius, Peter a Soto, who included among the traits of the Antichrist that the Pontiff bears two swords, from whatever source he got them.
A third opinion, moderate and common to Catholic theologians, is that the Pontiff has no direct and immediate temporal power but only spiritual, but by reason of his spiritual power he has a certain indirect power, and that of the highest order, over temporal matters. Of this opinion are Hugo of St. Victor whom Alexander Alensis follows. Others are St. Bonaventure, Durandus, Petrus ab Aliaco, John of Paris, Jacobis of Almain, Gabriel Biel, Henry of Gandavo, John Driedo, John of Turrecremata, Albertus Pighius, Thomas Waldensis, Petrus de Palude, Cajetan, Francis Victoria, Dominic de Sotis, Nicholas Sanders, Anthony of Corduba, and a great many others.
What St. Thomas held, is not too certain. For, at the end of the second volume of the Sentences, he says that in the Pope is the culmination of both powers [spiritual and temporal]. Nevertheless, in Chapter 13 of his commentary on Romans, he says clerics are exempt from taxes by a privilege granted by the secular rulers and that clerics can make arrangements for wars to the extent that they relate to a spiritual good which is the purpose of their power. From which it can be gathered that he does not dissent from other theologians.
We will, therefore, treat of the three opinions. First, we will show that the Pontiff does not have by divine right direct temporal power. Secondly, that he has, in some circumstances, by reason of his spiritual supremacy, the highest degree of temporal power. Thirdly, it is not contrary to divine law that Bishops should have, even actively and directly, temporal power over cities and provinces given to them by kings, or acquired by other just titles.
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-20-2022
Chapter 2 - That the Pope is not Master of the whole world
What pertains to this position, we will prove three things in order. First, that the Pope is not Master of the whole world. Secondly, that he is not master of the Christian world. Third that he is not master of any province or town, nor does he have by divine right any temporal power. The first point is taught expressly by John of Turrecremata. The Pope, he writes, should not be said to have merely temporal power by divine right, so that he could be said to be the "Master of the whole World," Francis Victoria says the same. The same is taught by others and proved, that the Pope is not Master of those domains which infidels obtain. For, first of all, the Lord, in the Gospel of John, entrusted only his sheep to Peter. Hence, the Pope may not adjudicate infidels who are not his sheep. Therefore, infidel Lords are true and supreme rulers of their kingdoms. For dominion is not founded on grace or faith but on free will and reason, nor does it descend by divine right (jure divino) but by reason of jus gentium (the law of nations), as is clear from the fact that God approves of the kingdoms of the nations in both the Old and New Testaments. In Daniel (chapter 11), in Matthew (chapter 22): "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's," i.e., what are due to him by right. "Render" to Caesar what are due to Caesar by right, not simply "Give" to Caesar. And in Romans 13, 7: "Render to all what is their due; pay taxes to whom taxes are due; toll to whom toll is due." And Paul also commands there that we should in conscience obey foreign rulers: but we are certainly not obliged by conscience to obey him who is not a lawful prince.
If, however, the Pope is not the Master of those areas which infidels hold, it follows that he is not the Lord of the whole world, unless, "per absurdum," those areas be said not to belong to the "world." They say that we are obliged to obey infidel Princes because they are vicars of the Pope! But, to the contrary, for the Pope would not want to have vicars of this kind, and if he were able, he would gladly give the kingdoms of infidel rulers to believing rulers. It is ridiculous, however, [to think] that God has given the Pope authority over the whole world but has not given him any capability to make use of such a right.
But, they reply, the Pope is the spiritual Monarch over the whole earth; and, nevertheless, he has not been able to exercise this primacy over the whole earth. I reply: the Pope is said to be spiritual Monarch over the whole earth, not because he presides over all men but because he presides over all Christians spread over the whole earth. And, again, also concluding from the hypothesis, namely, that if the whole world would be converted to the Faith, clearly the Pope would preside, by a spiritual jurisdiction, over the whole earth. Therefore, too, he has a right to send preachers of the Gospel over the whole earth.
But Alexander the Sixth divided the whole, recently discovered, world between the Spanish and Portugese Kings. I reply: He did not make the division for the purpose of having these kings set out to make war against infidel kings of the New World, but only that they might induce preachers of the Christian Faith to go forth and to protect and defend both the preachers and those converted by them. [A defense of the right to teach and believe!] and, at the same time, that he might prevent disagreements and wars between Christian rulers who sought to do business in those new areas. (See Cajetan and de Soto.)
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-20-2022
Chapter 3 - That the Pope is not Master of the Whole Christian World
Now to discuss what we proposed as a second consideration: that the Pope is not the Master of the whole Christian world. Hugh of St. Victor teaches (in the second book of his "De Sacramentis," Part II, chapter 4): "Earthly power has as its head the King, spiritual power, the Supreme Pontiff. And, even more clearly, John Driedo, in his work on Christian Liberty, chapter 2: "Christ," he says, "when He placed Peter as Pastor over the universal Church, did not at the same time give him temporal power over the whole Church, nor did He withdraw from emperors and kings their domains, nor did He will that all regal power as well as ecclesiastical power be derived and descend from the power of Peter." The same view is that of many others. And it is proved, first, because, if the arrangement were as they would have it, and indeed by divine law, it should be clear from the Scriptures or certainly from Apostolic Tradition: from Scripture, we have nothing, except the keys to the kingdom of heaven that were given to Peter: there is no mention of keys to the kingdoms of earth; the adversaries adduce no Apostolic Tradition. Moreover, Christ did not withdraw, nor does he take kingdoms from those to whom they belong; for Christ did not come to destroy those things that are in good condition but to perfect them; therefore, when a king becomes a Christian, he does not lose the earthly kingdom which he rightfully obtained but acquires a new right to an eternal kingdom: otherwise, the bounty of Christ would be a burden to kings, and grace would destroy nature. And this view is confirmed by the hymn of Sedulius: "What do you fear, enemy Herod, from Christ's coming? He who bestows heavenly kingdoms does not wrest away earthly kingdoms."
The same is true if the Pope were the Master of the whole Christian World; thus, individual Bishops are princes with temporal power over the towns subject to their episcopacys; if, indeed, what the Pope is in the universal Church, each bishop is in his particular church: that is, just as the Pope is the true head and Pastor of the universal Church, so a bishop is the Pastor and head of a particular diocese. But Bishops are princes of [some] towns where they are bishops, which adversaries refuse to concede. Whence Ambrose: "If the Emperor asks for tribute, it is not denied, the fields of the Church surrender it." And, further on, "That the imperial tax belongs to Caesar is not denied. The Church is God's and ought not to be assigned to Caesar." And in a letter of Athanasius, the Bishop Hosius says to the Emperor: 'To you God entrusted imperial rule, but to us Christ entrusted what belongs to the Church.'"
Finally, there is proof from the declarations of Pontiffs. Leo, in a letter to the Emperor Martianus, confesses that the Emperor Martianus was chosen by God for imperial rule, and in his letter 43 to the same man he declares that the Author of the imperial rule of Martianus is God. And similar statements he makes in nearly all the letters he writes to the emperors Theodosius, Martianus, and Leo, as they succeed one another. Gelasius, in a letter to Anastasius: "There are two, August Emperor," he says, "by whom this world is principally ruled, the sacred authority of the Pontiffs and royal power." Where, it should be noted, Gelasius speaks not merely about mere execution [or de facto performance] but of power and authority itself, lest adversaries say as they are wont, that the Pope had indeed both powers but chooses to delegate the exercise of these to others.
Gregory, in the Second Book of Letters, in Letter 61, to Martianus: "Power," he writes, "has been given to the piety of our princes [devotion of superiors to their subjects] over all men." And, most clearly, Nicholas, in a letter to Michael: "Do not develop any prejudice against the Church of God. It, indeed, carries no prejudice against your imperial power." And, further on, "The same Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, so carefully distinguished between the powers and dignities of both spheres, that Christian emperors would be in need of Pontiffs and Pontiffs would resort to imperial laws only in the conduct of their temporal affairs." Here, also, the Pontiff speaks not simply about enforcement [or execution of the laws] but also about power and dignity [of office].
Alexander the Third, when asked whether an appeal from a secular judge to the Pope has validity, replies: "It has validity in those matters that are subject to our temporal power: in other matters, however, we believe such an appeal has validity according to the rigor of law." Likewise, in a matter relating to which children are legitimate: "We await," he says, "for the disposition of the King in those matters that belong to him rather than to the Church."
Finally, Innocent the Third: "Since," he says, "we are unable to discharge the duties of our own jurisdiction, why would we wish to usurp another's?" Here, the Pontiff calls usurpation of another's jurisdiction, if he should attempt to exercise temporal jurisdiction in the kingdom of the Franks. And, further on, "We do not intend to make a judgment about a feud whose decision belongs to another, but only to discern where sin lies, whose censure belongs without doubt to our competence." "For the firmament of Heaven," he says, "that is, for the Universal Church, God has made two luminaries, that is, He has made two dignitaries which preside over the day, which are, one for spiritual matters, which are greater, and one for bodily matters, which are lesser, so that, as a great difference is recognized between the sun and the moon, so a similar difference should be acknowledged between Pontiffs and kings." Where, observe: Just as a star, the sun, and the moon are not the same thing, and as the sun did not establish the moon, but God, thus also, the Pontificate and the Imperial Power are not one and the same thing, nor does one absolutely depend upon the other. Similarly, the Pontiff alone has full temporal power over the patrimony of the Church [the places ruled by the Pope as their Prince], but in other spheres this is not so, and, in the same place: [???]
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-20-2022
Chapter 4 - That the Pope has no merely temporal power by divine law
What remains, now, is that we demonstrate that the Pope is not the temporal Lord of any locale [by divine law]. This is the express teaching of John of Turrecremata, in Book Two of his "On the Church," chapter 114; and of Cajetan, in his Apology, Part II, chapter 13, in response to 8; and of Navarre, in the chapter, "Novit," notably 4, where the language of Cajetan is as follows: "The power of the Pope is directly in regard to spiritual matters relating to the highest end of mankind; therefore, two observations relate to his power, first, that it does not pertain to temporal matters; secondly, that it is related to temporal matters only to the degree that they are ordered to spiritual affairs." This point is manifestly proved by the following reason: Christ, as man, so long as He lived on earth, did not accept nor did he want any merely temporal dominion over any province or town; the Supreme Pontiff, however, is the Vicar of Christ and represents for us Christ in the way He was so long as He lived among men; therefore, the Holy Father, as Vicar of Christ, has merely temporal jurisdiction over no province or town.
Both propositions of this reasoning should be proved. Above all, the first proposition must be proved. For, from the false principle, that Christ as man was a temporal King have been generated two contrary errors: For, from this source, certain individuals have concluded, as from a principal foundation, that the Pope who is the Vicar of Christ is a King and a Pontiff at the same time. To the contrary, however, the followers of Wycliff deduce from the same principle that Kings are superior to, and have greater dignity than Pontiffs, because Kings are Vicars of Christ the King and Pontiffs are Vicars of Christ the High Priest. Christ, however, was more a King than a Pontiff, for he descends from the royal tribe of Juda and the family of David, not from the tribe of Levi and the family of Aaron; and, therefore, by hereditary succession He was a King not a High Priest.
In order, then, that this principle be both explained and proved, that Christ was indeed forever, as Son of God, the King and Lord of all creatures in the same way that His Father was, but that this kingdom is eternal and divine and does not take away the dominions of men, nor would the opposite be compatible with the office of Pontiff. Moreover, Christ as man is the spiritual King of all men and has the most extensive spiritual power over all men, both faithful and infidel, in the order of eternal salvation, in such a way that he can oblige them to the duty of Faith and the reception of His Sacraments: and also He could have, through His spiritual power, have made dispositions concerning all temporal matters in so far as He judged they could promote His spiritual purpose: this spiritual kingdom of Christ will continue to exist after the day of judgment even in a visible way that is manifest, and so the glory of this kingdom has begun in Christ our Head when He rose from the dead; in other respects this is not a temporal kingdom such as belongs to our kings nor could such be communicated to the Pontiff, because it presupposes the resurrection. Finally, Christ as man could have, if He had wished and it had seemed expedient to Him, accepted regal authority; nevertheless, He did not wish nor in practice did He accept or possess either the exercise of regal authority or the authority or power itself of such a temporal kingdom. It is evident that if he had such dominion, it would through hereditary succession, or election, or by conquest, or by a special gift of God. For every kingdom is acquired by some one of these means, either by hereditary succession, or election by the people, or by conquest, or by the gift of a superior authority.
Christ the man did not have a hereditary kingdom: for, although He descended from a royal family, it is nevertheless not clear whether He was closer to David than many others who were of the same family: and, moreover, the kingdom was taken from the family of David, with God concurring, Who had also foretold that from the family of Jeconiah there would be no future king of a temporal kind, of the same kind that David was and his successors: in Jeremiah, XXII, we read about Jeconiah: "Thus says the Lord, write that the sterile man will be one who will not prosper in his time. For there will not be from his seed a man who will sit on the throne of David and have any longer power in Juda." But it is clear, from Matthew I, that Christ descends from Jeconiah.
From which it clearly follows that Christ could not have had a temporal kingdom by hereditary succession, unless the prophecy were false which predicted in express language that no one of the posterity of Jeconiah would ever have power in Juda. Nor can the reply be made that the posterity of Jeconiah had a right to the kingdom but, in fact, did not sit on the throne of David. For to what purpose would be the right of a kind that the holders would never use? And this is confirmed from the Fathers (of the Church): For Jerome, commenting on this text, and Ambrose, ask how this prophecy of Jeremiah is not opposed to the prophecy of Gabriel the Archangel, who, in Luke I, says: "The Lord God will give Him the throne of David His Father." And they reply that there is no contradiction because Jeremiah is talking about a temporal and carnal kingdom but Gabriel about a spiritual and eternal kingdom. Augustine agrees with them (in Book XVII of The City of God, chapter seven), where he says: "The people that would have lost a kingdom would be ruled by Christ our Lord not by an earthly but by a spiritual rule."
Nor, also, was Christ a temporal King by election, as is clear from that text of Luke, in his Chapter XII: "Man, who has constituted me Judge or arbitrator between you," that is, neither the Emperor, nor the State has chosen Me as a Judge. Also, from the text, John VI, 15: "Jesus realized that they would come and carry Him off to make Him king, so He fled back to the mountain alone." It is therefore evident He did not will to accept His choice as king.
But neither was He a temporal king by conquest: for His war was not with mortal kings but with the Prince of darkness, as is clear from John, XII, 31: "Now will the prince of this world be cast out." And from Colossians II, 15: "Thus did God disarm the principalities and powers. He made a public show of them, and leading them off captive, triumphed in the person of Christ." And I John III, 8: "For this the Son of God appeared that He might undo the works of the Devil." Therefore, by right of war, Christ acquired for Himself a spiritual kingdom, that He might reign in our hearts through Faith and grace, where before [we were ruled] through vices and sins.
That, finally, He was not a temporal King by a special gift of God, is manifest from that text of John, XVIII, 36, "My kingdom does not belong to this world." And, in the same place, "My kingdom is not here." For as the Fathers (Chrysostom, Theophylactus, Cyril and Augustine interpret this Scriptural text and as Ambrose comments on the last part of the Gospel of Luke, the Lord, by His words, wished to liberate Pilate from the suspicion that He was enamored of a temporal kingdom of the Jews. Therefore, the meaning is: "I am indeed a King but not in the same sense as Caesar and Herod, for my kingdom is not of this world, that is, it does not consist in worldly honors, wealth or power, and the like." And this interpretation is confirmed, first by the testimony of many authorities: for St. Thomas teaches this interpretation in his commentary on the 18th chapter of John, St. Bonaventure, in his book on poverty, and Augustine de Ancona, in his Apology for Poverty, writing about the power of the Church, in question I, article 9; Cornelius Jansen, on the passage in Luke, "The Lord will give him the throne of David," Adam Sasbout, on the ninth chapter of Isaiah; Thomas Waldensis, in the second book on the doctrine of the Faith, in chapters 76, 77 and 78; Alvarus Pelagius, in book two of The Lament of the Church (de planctu Ecclesiae) article 57, Durandus, in his treatise on the origin of jurisdiction, 3rd question, John Driedo, in his work on the dogma of the Church, book 3, chapter 4, part 1, and others (Abulensis, on chapter XX of Matthew, q. 67, Albertus Pighius, lib. V, de Eccl., Adrianus Finus, Victoria, de Soto, Bartholomew Medina, and Navarrus). In sum, nearly all the interpreters of the passage in John XVIII, "My kingdom is not of this world." This is confirmed, secondly, by the fact that Christ never exercised regal power in this world: for He came "to serve, not to be served;" to be judged, not to judge; therefore, He would have received regal authority to no purpose, for that power is empty which is never reduced to action.
They reply: Christ exercised this power when He ejected from the Temple those who were selling sheep and cattle, in John, chapter 2. But, in the first place, to eject some persons from the Temple is not a duty of a King but of Priests. For, if Priests ejected the King himself, namely Ozias, from the temple, as in II Paralipomenon, XXVI, how much more easily could they have ejected some merchants? But, in addition, it should be acknowledged that they did not eject those men from the Temple by a kind of high priestly or regal power, but in the manner of the Prophets out of a certain divine zeal, such as that which motivated Phineas when he slew "scortatores," and Elijah the prophets of Baal; and for that reason, the Jews said to the Lord, "What sign do you show us why you do these things?" That is, whereby we can know that you are a Prophet, and sent by God with power of this kind.
The same reason is confirmed in a third way. For kingly power was neither necessary for Christ nor useful to Him, but rather clearly superfluous and useless. For the purpose of His coming to earth was the redemption of the human race; but for this purpose temporal power was not necessary but only spiritual; especially if He could dispose of all temporal affairs in a manner He judged expedient for human redemption. That, however, merely temporal power would have been useless to Christ can be understood from this, that Christ had to persuade men of a contempt for glory, delights, wealth, and all those things in which the kings of this world are affluent. "Remember, those who dress luxuriously are to be found in royal palaces." (Matt. 11: 8)
It is confirmed, fourthly, from the fact that Christ was truly a poor man, not merely in practice but also in lack of ownership, as St. Bonaventure proves in his book on the poverty of Christ. Which also Nicholas III declared when he said that Christ taught the poverty of religious both by word and deed, a poverty without any possessions. Also, Clement VI says that Christ was the Model of the heavenly life such as described in the rule of St. Francis. Nor is this opposed to the contention of John XXII, that Christ sometimes had places and possessions in common with the Apostles, which were given to them as alms; but he does not deny that sometimes He had nothing, even in common; and he expressly teaches that Christ taught a life of religious which is without any possession, at least individual. But if Christ sometimes lacked any property, how could He always be the temporal Lord over all things?
The point is confirmed, finally, from the fact that all places in Scripture where there is question of the Kingdom of Christ must be understood as referring to the spiritual and eternal kingdom of Christ; accordingly, it cannot be deduced from Scripture that there has been any temporal kingdom of Christ. Psalm II treats of the kingdom of Christ, where it is said: "I myself have set up my king;" but in the same place it is added, "[Praedicans proeceptum ejus]," in order that the kingdom may be shown to be a spiritual one. Likewise, in Daniel II, 44, "In the lifetime of those kings, the God of Heaven shall set up a kingdom that shall never be destroyed or delivered up to another people...it shall stand forever." In Luke I, 33: "Of his kingdom there will be no end."
But temporal kingdoms are not eternal, and if Christ were a King of the Jews of a human sort, while He lived on earth, He certainly refrained from ruling that way when He ascended to the Father. How, then, will there be no end of His kingdom? And since the same kingdom was occupied a little later by the Romans, then by the Saracens, and now by the Turks, in what manner has what Daniel spoke about been fulfilled, that His kingdom would not be given to another people? Therefore, Christ was not a temporal King of the Jews but the spiritual King of the Church; the figure of Whose kingdom was the temporal kingdom of David and Solomon; of this sort of kingdom, the Father gave to Christ, the throne of His father David, that He might reign "over the house of Jacob forever." [in the words of Gabriel to Mary, Luke 1: 32]
But now the assumption of the first argument must be explained. We say, therefore, the Pope holds that office which Christ had when He lived on earth in a human manner among men; for we cannot confer on the Pontiff the offices that Christ has as God, or even as an immortal and glorified man, but ony those statutes that He had as a mortal man. For since the Church is composed of men, it needs a visible Head, living in a human manner. Therefore, when Christ ceased to live in a human way, that is, after the resurrection, He left Peter in His place, in order that he might exhibit in His stead that visible and human governance that the Church had before Christ's Passion, as is clear from His words in John XX, 21: "As the Father has sent me, so I send you."
Add, too, that the Pontiff does not have all the power which Christ had as a mortal man. For He, because He was both God and man had a certain power, as they say, of excellence, by reason of which He was preeminent to both faithful and infidel: to the Pope He entrusted only His sheep, that is, the Faithful. Moreover, Christ was able to institute the Sacraments and perform miracles by His own power, which the Pontiff cannot do. Likewise, He was able to absolve from sins without the Sacraments, which the Pontiff cannot do. He communicated to the Pontiff only that power which could be conferred on a mere man and which was necessary so to govern the Faithful that without hindrance they could attain to eternal life. It evidently follows, therefore, from the fact that Christ, as a mortal man, had no temporal kingdom, nor does the Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ have any kingdom of the same sort.
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-20-2022
Chapter 5 - Opposing Arguments are Resolved
But certain ones will appear and object. First, the words of the Lord, in Matthew XVIII, "All power in heaven and on earth has been given to me;" from which can seemingly be inferred that Christ had both a spiritual and a terrestrial kingship; the keys of both kingships He gave to Peter, as Nicholas says in a letter to Mediolanus: "Christ," he says, "committed to Peter as key-bearer of eternal life both the rights of a terrestrial and a heavenly kingship."
I reply: The power of which the Lord speaks here is not temporal power like that of earthly kings but only spiritual, as Blessed Jerome and Blessed Anselm explain that this is the meaning of those words, "All power in heaven and on earth has been given to me," that is, as in heaven I am King of the Angels, so by Faith I would reign in the hearts of men, or (as Theophylactus adds) there is a certain supreme power over all creatures, not temporal but divine, or most like the divine, which cannot be conferred on a mortal man.
Relative to the testimony of Nicholas I say, in this sense Christ conceded to Peter the rights of an authority at the same time earthly and heavenly, that what he released from or obliged to on earth would be taken as released from or obliged to in heaven. For Nicholas alluded to the words of Matthew XVI: 19. Nor can we otherwise interpret it, unless we were to wish Nicholas II to be in conflict with Nicholas I, who in a letter to Michael expressly teaches that Christ differentiated between the acts, offices, and dignities of both Pontiff and Emperor, in order that neither the Emperor would presume to usurp the rights of the Pontiff, nor the Pontiff presume to usurp those of the Emperor.
Secondly, they advance the scriptural text of Luke XXII, 36-38, where the Lord granted two swords to Peter. For when the disciples said, "Here are two swords, the Lord did not say, "It is too much," but "It is enough." Wherefore, Bernard, in Book IV of his Considerations, and Boniface the VIII, in "Unam Sanctam," deduce that the Pontiff has, by Christ's institution, two swords.
I reply, there is literally no mention in that citation from the Gospel (of Luke) of either a spiritual or temporal sword of a Pontiff, but simply that the Lord wished by those words to alert His disciples to the fact that at the time of His passion they would be in such distress and fear as those experience who sell their tunic in order to buy a sword; as can be gathered from Theophylactus and other Fathers. Furthermore, Blessed Bernard and Pope Boniface interpreted this place in Scripture in a mystical sense nor do they wish to say that in the same way a Pontiff has two swords, but in two different ways, as we will later explain.
A third objection. All disputes and conflicts, both temporal and spiritual are pertinent to the judgment of the supreme Pontiff; for that is expressly held in Canon "Quicumque litem," and Canon "Quaecumque Contentiones," XI, question 4.
I reply: Of those Canons, the first is from the Emperor Theodosius, who from piety, not from justice, deferred it in honor of the Church. Furthermore, by virtue of that canon it was granted not only to the Roman Pontiff but to all bishops, that they could judge civil cases that were deferred to them. Finally, this has already been abrogated by other canons, as the Gloss at that point affirms. Concerning the second of the above canons, it is of uncertain authority; and on that account, it is marked by the word "ancient," ("palaea"): which cannot be terminated by secular Judges, either because a Judge does not want to administer justice, or the other party does not wish to agree; for then cases devolve on the judgment of the Church by way of fraternal correction, as Innocent III rightly teaches, under the heading, "Novit, de judic."
A fourth argument. Where the Imperial Throne is vacant, the Supreme Pontiff succeeds to its administration, and uses Imperial power until another Emperor is chosen, as can be gathered from Innocent the Third and from the Council of Vienna, that imperial power derives from the Supreme Pontiff as from the highest temporal Ruler.
I reply: That a Pontiff succeeds an Emperor, when the imperial throne is empty, not in all matters but only in judicial authority, and in bringing to a conclusion only those cases which are wont to be judged only by the Emperor, and which do not readily bear delay. The reason, however, for this is not that the Pontiff is the highest temporal Ruler, but because all cases which cannot be decided through temporal judges devolve upon a spiritual judge, as we shall discuss below and have already, in part, discussed.
A final Objection. St. Thomas, in the Third Book of his "De Regimine Principum" ("Concerning the Rule of Princes"), chapters 10 and 19, affirms that the Supreme Pontiff has by divine right spiritual and temporal power throughout the world, as the highest King of the entire world, so that he can impose contributions on all Christians, and can destroy cities and encampments to preserve Christianity. St. Thomas says the same thing in II. sent. dist. 44, prope finem: that in the Pope is the apex of both powers, spiritual and temporal. Many other Doctors follow St. Thomas, to the extent that this opinion can be said to be the "common opinion of theologians." I reply: not without reason do some learned men have doubts about the author of the books, "De Regimine Principum," which are included among the minor works ("opuscula") of St. Thomas; for many things point to the fact that St. Thomas is not the author of those books, but especially what is found in Book III, chapter 20, concerning the succession of the Emperors Adolph and Albert; for the author of those writes that in his time it happened that Adolph succeeded Rudolph and Albert succeeded Adolph. But it is beyond question that St. Thomas died in the year of salvation 1274 but Adolph succeeded Rudolph in the year 1292, and Albert succeeded Adolph in the year 1299, nor are there any disagreements with these given dates. It could not be possible, then, that St. Thomas was the author of those books, since he departed life so many years before the imperial rule of Adolph and Albert, unless perhaps that narrative portion were inserted into the work of St. Thomas by someone else. But whoever was the author of those books, he does not seem to dissent from our position, unless perhaps in the manner of speaking. For although he sometimes says the Supreme Pontiff has authority in all temporal matters, he nevertheless explains himself in many places, and teaches that the power of the Supreme Pontiff, properly, per se, and directly, is spiritual, but through him a disposition can be made concerning the temporal affairs of all Christians, when that is required to attain the purpose of his spiritual power, to which are subordinate the ends of all temporal powers. In this way he speaks in Book I, chapter 14: "Therefore, the ministry of this Kingdom (namely, the spiritual, which Christ instituted), that the spiritual might be distinct from the worldly, it was committed not to worldly Kings but to priests, and principally, to the High Priest Successor to St. Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff, to whom it is proper that all kings of Christian peoples be subordinate, as to Jesus Christ our Lord; for thus, those should be subordinate to him to whom concern for the ultimate goal [of man] belongs, since the former are occupied with the more immediate, not the ultimate, goals of man. Thus far, the author of the disputed opusculum of St. Thomas. He most clearly distinguishes earthly kingdoms, which have for their purpose temporal peace, from the spiritual kingdom of Christ and his Vicar, which has eternal life for its purpose. Once again from the same author: "It is sufficient, apparently," he says, "that the dominion of Christ is oriented to the salvation of the soul, although it is not excluded from temporal affairs to the extent that they impact spiritual concerns." Also, in the same place: "There is," he says, "another reason why our Lord took a lowly station, even though He is the Lord of the World, in order to imply for all to see the difference between His authority and that of other rulers: although He was the Lord of the World in time, He directly ordered His life to a spiritual sovereignty." Thus far, the author. By his words he signifies that Christ had temporal dominion of the whole world, but indirectly: directly, however, He had only spiritual dominion; wherefore, in the same book that author does not say that the Supreme Pontif can absolutely impose taxes on all Christians and destroy encampments and cities, but only in the event that the preservation of Christianity requires it: to accomplish which that is sufficient which the Supreme Pontiff has, namely, the most ample spiritual power over the whole Chrisitan world. Relative to that which St. Thomas writes in the "Sentences, II, d. 44, that there is in the Roman Pontiff the culmination of both powers, spiritual and temporal, a response can be made in two ways. First, that St. Thomas speaks of the power which the Roman Pontiff has over the temporal location of the Roman Church. For he had said a bit previously, that in those matters which pertain to the salvation of the soul, there is a greater obligation to the spiritual authority than to the secular; on the contrary, in those matters which pertain to the civil good, there is a greater obligation to obey the secular rather than the spiritual. Then he adds an exception, unless a secular authority be joined to a spiritual authority, as in the Roman Pontiff, in whom is the culmination of both powers. For, because the Roman Pontiff is not only the Pastor of the Church but also the secular Ruler of many provinces; therefore, in those provinces there is a greater obligation to obey, both in spiritual matters and in secular affairs, the Roman Pontiff than any other power whether spiritual or secular. Secondly, the response can be made: that St. Thomas wishes the culmination of both powers with respect to the whole Christian world, but not in the same way: for the culmination of spiritual power is in him directly and per se; but the culmination of secular power is in him only indirectly, and consequently, neither is it probable that St. Thomas was of the opinion that in merely civil matters the Roman Pontiff was more to be obeyed than one's own king, even in those provinces not subject to the Roman Church; the contrary can be openly gathered from the rescripts of the very Pontiffs cited above, with which, without any doubt, St. Thomas is not at variance. Therefore, St. Thomas wanted only that even in civil matters one should obey the Roman Pontiff rather than a secular ruler, if the salvation of souls depends on those civil matters: not however independently, for the most ample power of making dispositions of the temporal affairs of all Christians is linked to the fullest possible spiritual power of the Pontiff, as we will demonstrate in the following chapter. Moreover, I am persuaded that this is the meaning of St. Thomas from the fact that he states that clerics are exempt from taxes by a privilege granted by secular rulers, and also from the consensus of the followers of St. Thomas: for I see that, by the closest possible agreement, that opinion is taught by the disciples of St. Thomas which attributes to the Pontiff power over temporal matters, only indirectly and by derivation, as is clear, from Peter de Palude, John of Turrecremata, John of Paris, Thomas Cajetan, Francis Victoria, Dominicus a Soto, Bartholomew Medina, and others, of whom it is not at all credible that, in a matter of such importance, they would have wanted to depart from the steps of St. Thomas. Nor would it be difficult to call back some theologians, who seem to hold the contrary opinion, to agreement with the others: for even Augustinus Triumphus himself who seems most openly to assign to the Supreme Pontiff temporal power over the whole earth explains that temporal power is had differently by the Pontiff and by a King: for it is had by the Pontiff when he confirms or corrects but by the King in the process of administration. In article 8 (de potestate Pontificis), he writes more clearly that the Pope has spiritual power but, through it, makes dispositions that affect temporal matters. And in article 9, he demonstrates that Christ was not a temporal King but a spiritual one.
By similar reasoning, Alvarus Pelagius seems to have wished to make both Christ and his Vicar temporal Kings of the whole world; nevertheless, in the second part of the same work, in article 17, he teaches openly and profusely that Christ on earth did not have temporal dominion over the whole world but only a spiritual kingdom: and the Roman Pontiff as Christ's Vicar does not have, directly and of himself, temporal power but only spiritual, although by virtue of the spiritual he could regulate the temporal when a spiritual necessity requires it. Thus, also, Durandus, who has these words: "It must be observed that whoever says that Christ did not have all spiritual and temporal power contradicts the Gospel." And, further on, "After the resurrection, Christ conferred on Peter the whole rule over the Church, insofar as it was necessary for the regulation of the whole Church and because both temporal and spiritual powers are necessary; therefore, He conferred both powers on Peter." Thus far Durandus, who then explains himself by saying: There are true limits to spiritual and temporal jurisdictions from the the foundation of the Church which it is not permitted to transgress, because the temporal jurisdiction in no way extends to the spiritual, about which it knows nothing: spiritual jurisdiction, however, extends primarily and principally to spiritual matters but secondarily and, as a certain consequence, to the actions of men relating to temporal matters which are ordered to the spiritual as to their purpose." And, further on: "Nor do we intend to say that Christian rulers or kings hold their territories or kingdoms as if they were fiefs of the Church, as some have occasionally wrongly believed; but only this, precisely, we wish to say, that the regimen of Kings and all other Christian princes is subordinate to the regimen of the Church, to the extent that if it yields to the subversion of Faith or morals, correction and direction by very right belongs to the Church." Thus far the author.
Also St. Bonaventure, in his book on the hierarchy of the Church, writes that the Supreme Pontiff can depose Emperor or Kings, as one who has supreme power over the Christian world; and, nevertheless, he himself, in the same book, says that the power of bishops is purely spiritual, the power of kings, however, purely temporal; and, in chapter 1, p. 2, he repeats that the priestly power, also of the Supreme Pontiff, is entirely spiritual but greater than the temporal, in such a way that the temporal is subject to the spiritual, and not contrariwise; and this is the judgment and confession of all Catholics. Finally, while omitting more recent authors, the first who attribute temporal power, by the institution of Christ, to the Supreme Pontiff, appear to be: Hugo of St. Victor and St. Bernard; but Alexander, Bonaventure, Henry, Durandus, and others of a later date followed the previous two. Moreover, Hugo writes, indeed, that because of the more important spiritual power which is had by the Supreme Pontiff, there is a right to judge and correct the temporal power of kings: nevertheless, in the same place, he writes explicitly that the principal holder of temporal power is the king, just as the principal holder of the spiritual power is the Pope. Saint Bernard, however, says that both swords, are had by the Supreme Pontiff; nevertheless, in many places of the same work he openly demonstrates that the power of the Supreme Pontiff is properly spiritual not temporal. "Your power is over crimes not possessions," he writes. Finally, he assigns to the Church both swords, but he places the spiritual in the hand of the Pontiff and the temporal in the hands of earthly rulers; nevertheless, he says that both belong to the Church, both because the two swords should be at the service of the Church and because the temporal sword should be subordinate to the spiritual, as shall be elaborated in the following chapter.
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-21-2022
Chapter 6 - That the Pope possesses the highest temporal power indirectly.
The opinion of theologians must first be explained and then proven. As to the first, we affirm that the Pontiff as Pontiff, even though he does not have any merely temporal power, nevertheless has the greatest spiritual power of making disposition of temporal matters that are directed to a spiritual good: many explain this by similes that refer to a "fraenifactoriam" skill ["rein-making skill"], to an equestrian skill, and the like. Inasmuch as those two skills are different from each other, because they have different objects, subjects, and actions, nevertheless, because the purpose of the one is ordered to the purpose of the other, therefore one takes precedence over the other and prescribes the rules for it; so the ecclesiastical and the political powers appear distinct from each other and, nevertheless, one is subordinate to the other, because the purpose of the one by its nature has a reference to the other.
But this similitude is not altogether suitable, for in those skills the inferior exists only on account of the superior, in such a way that, if the higher is removed, the inferior disappears directly: for if there were no equestrian art, certainly a rein-making skill would be superfluous. But the political power does not exist only because of the ecclesiastical, for even if there were no ecclesiastical power, there would still be a political, as is manifest in infidel lands, where there is true temporal and political power, nevertheless, without any relationship to a true ecclesiastical and spiritual power.
There is, however, an available simile far more apt, by which Gregory Nazianzen explains this very matter. And following him, Hugo of St. Victor, Thomas Waldensis, John Driedo and Victor de Soto. For as spirit and flesh are present in man, so there are in the Church those two powers: for the flesh and the spirit are like two republics which can be found both separate and conjoined. The flesh has sensory powers and appetites to which correspond proportionate acts and powers, and of all of them the built-in purpose is health and the good constitution of the body. The spirit [spiritual soul] has intellect and will and their proportionate acts and objects, and for their purpose the health and perfection of the soul: flesh can be found without the spirit in animals while the spirit can be found without flesh in the angels.
From this example, it appears that neither component exists precisely just for the other. For flesh is found conjoined with spirit in man, when, because they constitute one person, they necessarily have union and subordination: for the flesh is subordinate and the spirit is primary, and although the spirit does not mingle with the acts of the flesh but allows the flesh to perform its own actions, as the flesh does in animals, nevertheless, when those actions affect the purpose of the spirit itself, the spirit commands the flesh and even castigates it, and, if necessary, imposes fasts and other afflictions, even with some detriment to and weakening of the body, and forces the tongue not to speak and the eyes to refrain from looking, etc. For a similar reason, if some activity of the body is necessary to obtain an objective of the spirit, even death itself, the spirit can command the body to expose itself and its powers, as we see Martyrs doing.
Entirely in the same way, the political power has its own princes, laws, justices, and the like, and likewise, the ecclesiastical power has its Bishops, canons, and tribunals. The former has for its purpose temporal peace and the latter, eternal salvation. Sometimes they are found separated, as formerly, in the time of the Apostles, sometimes the two powers are bound together, as now: when they are found joined together, they constitute one body, and, therefore, they need to be connected, and the inferior power subject and subordinate to the higher. Therefore, the spiritual power does not mix in temporal business but leaves everything proceed in the way it did before the two powers were joined together, provided that the temporal affairs do not present an obstacle to the spiritual purpose or are not necessary for attaining that purpose. If, however, something of that sort happens, the spiritual power can and ought to coerce the temporal power by every reason and way that seem necessary.
In order, however, that we might explain all these considerations in their particulars, the spiritual power of the Pope must be compared with the persons of judges and secular rulers, with their civil laws, and with their courts and decisions.
As far as persons are concerned, the Pope cannot ordinarily depose temporal rulers, even for just causes, in the same way he deposes bishops, that is, as their usual Judge: nevertheless, he can change kingdoms and take from one and give to another, if it be necessary for the salvation of souls, as we will prove. As far as laws are concerned, the Pope as Pope cannot ordinarily establish a civil law or confirm or modify laws of rulers because he is not a political ruler of the Church: nevertheless, he can do all that, if some civil law is necessary for the salvation of souls while kings are unwilling to establish it; or if there are other harms to souls and kings are unwilling to abolish them.
Therefore, that rule is excellent which the Gloss ("ad cap. Possessor, de reg. Jur. in Sexto, quae talis est"). When Imperial and Pontifical laws are found to be contradictory on the same matter, if the content of the law is a regulation containing danger to souls, the Imperial law is abrogated by the Pontiff....But when the matter of the law is a temporal affair unrelated to a danger to souls, the law of a Pontiff cannot abrogate an imperial law, but both laws must be observed, the one in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the other in the civil forum.
As far as judicial decisions are concerned, the Pope as Pope cannot ordinarily give judicial decisions relating to temporal matters: for Bernard rightly says to Eugenius (in the first book "De Consideratione"): "These terrestrial and lower concerns have their own Judges, the Kings and Rulers of the earth. To what purpose should you invade the preserve of others?" Likewise: "Your power is over crimes not possessions." But, nevertheless, in a case where it is necessary for the salvation of souls, the Pontiff can also pass temporal judgments, when, namely, there is no one who could pass judgment, as when two sovereign Kings are at odds, or when those who can and ought to pass judgment, do not want to make a decision. And Innocent the Third says that the Pontiff exercises temporal jurisdiction only occasionally.
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-21-2022
Chapter 7 - The Opinion of Theologians is Proved by Reasons
This opinion can be proved both by reasons and by examples.
A first reason for holding it is: The civil power is subject to the spiritual power when both are parts of a Christian Republic; therefore, the spiritual head can command temporal rulers and make dispositions of temporal matters in ordering them to a spiritual good: for every superior can command his inferior.
That, however, the political power, not only when Christian, but simply as political, is as such subject to the ecclesiastical power. First, it can be demonstrated from the purposes of both. For a temporal purpose is subordinate to a spiritual, as is manifest; because temporal happiness is not the absolutely ultimate end [of man]; as temporary it must be related to what is unending: this is made clear by Aristotle in Bk I of his Ethics, c. 1, that faculties or powers are subordinated as are purposes.
Secondly, Kings and Pontiffs, clerics and laity, do not form two republics but one, that is, one Church: For we are all one body (Rom. XII and I Cor., XII); but in all bodies, the members are connected and dependent one upon another: but it is not right to assert that spiritual matters are dependent on temporal affairs; therefore, temporal matters depend upon the spiritual and are subject to them.
Thirdly, if a temporal administration impedes a spiritual good, in the opinion of all, the temporal ruler is bound to change that mode of administration, even to the detriment of a temporal good; therefore, this is a sign that the temporal power depends on the spiritual and that the temporal power is subject to the spiritual.
Nor would it be sufficient to reply: that the Ruler is obliged to change an aspect of his administration, not, however, because of a subjection or a subordination to a spiritual power, but only because of the order of charity by which we are obliged to place greater goods ahead of lesser goods; for, not for the sake of the order of charity is one republic held to suffer harm lest another, more noble republic suffer harm. And a private person who is obliged to give all his goods for the preservation of his republic is nevertheless not held to do the same for another, however more worthy. If, then, a temporal republic is obliged to suffer a setback because of a spiritual good, it is a sign that the two are not separate but two parts of one and the same thing, and that one is subordinate to the other.
Nor is it valid to say: A temporal ruler is obliged to suffer a temporal loss for the sake of a spiritual good, not because of subjection to a spiritual republic, but because, otherwise, he would do harm to his subjects, for whom it is evil to lose spiritual goods for the sake of temporal goods. For men of another kingdom, even if they were not its subjects, may suffer notable damage in spiritual concerns on account of the temporal administration of any Christian king; in such an event, such a ruler is obliged to change his way of administering; no other reason can be given for this except that they are members of the same body and subject one to the other.
A second reason. An ecclesiastical republic ought to be a complete one ["perfecta"] and sufficient unto itself to its purpose: of such a kind are well-founded republics; therefore it [an ecclesiastical republic] should have all power necessary to attain its end: but necessary is the power to use and dispose of temporal things, because otherwise, evil rulers could foment heresies and subvert religion; therefore, it has such power.
Similarly, any republic can, because it is a complete thing and self-sufficient, can command another republic not subject to it to change its administration, and even to depose its ruler and install another, when it cannot otherwise defend itself from injustices; there, even more rightly could a spiritual republic command a temporal republic subject to it, and force it to change its manner of administration and depose rulers and substitute others, when, otherwise, it cannot safeguard its spiritual good; and in this way are to be understood the words of St. Bernard in the fourth book of "De Consideratione," and Boniface VIII, in Extrav. Unam Sanctam, where they say that within the power of the Pope are both "swords." For they wish to signify that the Pontiff has per se, both his own spiritual sword and, because the temporal sword is subject to the spiritual, the Pontiff can command the king, or prohibit the use of the temporal sword, when the necessity of the Church requires it.
In this vein are the words of St. Bernard, which Boniface has imitated: "Why do you (he says, addressing the Pope) attempt to usurp the sword which you once ordered to be placed back in the scabbard? That you have denied it is yours does not seem to have paid sufficient attention to the words of the Lord when He says, 'Return your sword to its sheath.' Yours, therefore, it is, and, if not perhaps by your wish and if it is not to be unsheathed by your hand, or otherwise does not belong to you, why should the Lord have responded to the Apostles when they said, 'Look, here are two swords,' by saying, 'That is sufficient,' rather than, 'That is too much.' Both therefore belong to the Church, namely, the spiritual sword and the material, and the one is to be wielded for the Church and the other by the Church. One by the hand of a priest, the other by the hand of a soldier but by the approval of the priest and at the signal of the Emperor." Where it should be noted that when the heretics reprehend Boniface as erroneous, arrogant, tyrranical (thus they speak about him here and there), they should be warned the words of Bernard are the same (in his book "De Consider.", where, nevertheless, he speaks without adulation) as those of Calvin (in "lib. IV Inst. c. 11, paragraph 10); so Bernard speaks, in order that truth itself may seem to speak.
A third reason. It is not permitted to Christians to tolerate an infidel king, or a heretical one, if he strives to draw his subjects to embrace heresy or infidelity; but to judge whether a King is drawing to heresy or not, belongs to the competence of the Pontiff, to whom the care of religion is committed. Therefore, it belongs to the Pontiff to judge whether a king should be deposed or not be deposed.
The proposition above is proved from chapter XVII of Deuteronomy, where the people are forbidden to choose a king who is not one of the brothers, that is a Jew, but one of other brothers not Jewish, lest he draw Jews to idolatry; therefore, Christians, also, are forbidden to choose a king who is non-Christian: for the precept is a moral one and rests on natural imperatives. Again, it is of the same order of danger and harm to choose a non-Christian as not to depose a non-Christian in power if he attempts to turn the people away from their Faith. I add, however, that last condition, on account of those infidel rulers who had dominion over their people before they were converted to the Faith: for if such rulers were not to attempt to turn the faithful away from their faith, they could indeed be deprived of authority, in the opinion of St. Thomas (in 2.2. q. X, ar. 10), but the Church does not always so deprive them, either because it lacks the strength or because it does not judge it expedient. But if the same rulers should attempt to turn the people away from the Faith, in the opinion of all, it can and should deprive them of their authority.
But if Christians formerly did not depose Nero, Diocletian, Julian the Apostate, Valens the Arian, and the like, it was because temporal power was lacking to Christians. For, that they otherwise could have done it rightfully, is clear from the Apostle, in I Corinthians, VI, where he commands that new judges of their temporal cases be instituted by Christians, in order that Christians be not forced to present their cases before a judge who is a persecutor of Christ; as in this way new judges could be installed; so, too, both new princes and kings could have been established, if power to do so had been had.
Furthermore, to tolerate a heretical or infidel king who is trying to draw people to his sect is to expose religion to a most evident danger: "For such as is the ruler of a city, of the same kind are its inhabitants." (Eccl. X, 2), whence the saying, "The world is made after the example of the king." And experience teaches the same: for, because the King Jeroboam was an idolater, the greater part of his kingdom began directly to worship idols, Cf. III Kings; and after the coming of Christ, during the reign of Constantine, the Christian Faith flourished; during the reign of Constantius, Arianism flourished; during the reign of Julian, Ethnicism again flourished; and in England, in our times, during the reign of Henry and, later, of Edward, the whole realm apostatized in a way; during the reign of Mary, the whole realm again returned to the Faith; during the reign of Elizabeth, Calvinism again became dominant, and the true religion went into exile.
But Christians are not obliged, indeed they ought not, in the face of a clear danger to religion, to tolerate an infidel king. For, when the divine right and human right are in conflict, the divine right must be observed to the disregard of the human: it is by divine right, however, to save true Faith and religion, which are one not many; it is by human right, however, that we have this or that King.
Finally, why cannot a Faithful people be freed from the yoke of an infidel King who is drawing others to Infidelity, if a Faithful spouse is free from the obligation to remain with an infidel spouse, when the latter does not want to remain with a Christian spouse without injuring the latter's faith, as Innocent the Third deduces (in the chapter "Gaudeamus", extra de divort.) from the First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians, chapter VII [the "Pauline Privilege" of marriage annulment]. For the right of one spouse over the other is not less than the right of a king over his subjects, but even somewhat greater.
A fourth reason: When kings and princes come to the Church to become Christians, they understand by an express or tacit pact that they subject their scepters to Christ and promise that they will preserve and defend the Faith of Christ, even under the penalty of losing their kingship; therefore, when they are heretics or are opposed to religion, they can be judged by the Church and even deposed from their kingship, nor will there be any injury to them if they are deposed. For one is not fit for the Sacrament of Baptism, who is not prepared to serve Christ and for His sake to lose whatever he has; for the Lord says in Luke, XIV, 26: "If anyone comes to me who does not 'hate' father or mother, spouse, and children, and even his own soul, he cannot be my disciple." Moreover, the Church would err very seriously if it should admit any King who would wish without impunity to foster any sect whatever, and defend heretics, and overturn religion.
A fifth reason: When the Lord said to Peter, "Feed my sheep," all power was given to him which is necessary for a Pastor: but a triple power is needed by a Pastor, one relating to wolves, in order that he may guard against them in every possible way; a second relating to rams, so that when they injure the flock with their horns, he can exclude them and prevent them from any longer going ahead of the flock; a third power over the rest of the sheep, that he may give to each of them suitable fodder; therefore, the Supreme Pontiff has the above threefold power.
Hence, three arguments may be adduced from this consideration; the first is, that the wolves that ravage the Church of God are heretics, as is clear from the passage of Matthew VII, 15: "Beware of false prophets etc." Therefore, if some ruler from having been a lamb or a ram becomes a wolf, that is, from being a Christian he becomes a heretic, the Pastor of the Church can guard against him by excommunicating and by ordering the people not to follow him; and in this way deprive him of dominion over subjects.
A second argument can be: A shepherd can separate and isolate wild rams that are destroying the flock: A ruler, however, is a wild ram when, though Catholic in faith, he is sufficiently evil that he is a great obstacle to religion and the Church, as by selling bishoprics, confiscating churches, and such like activity. Therefore the Pastor of the Church can isolate him or reduce him to the level of a sheep.
A third argument is: A Shepherd can and should feed his sheep in a way suitable to them; therefore, the Pontiff can and ought to command and oblige Christians to observe those things that each of them is obliged to do, that is, to oblige them to serve God in the way that they ought, according to their station in life.
Kings, however, ought to serve God by defending the Church and punishing heretics and schismatics, as Augustine teaches (in epistle 73, ad Leonem Augustum), and Gregory (lib. II, ep. 61, ad Maurit.). Therefore, he can and ought to command Kings to do these things, and if they do not act, to oblige them under the pain of excommunication, and by other suitable means. Read the many observations of Nicholas Sanders (in Lib. II, cap. 4, on the Visible Monarchy) where you will find many of the points we have made.
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-21-2022
Chapter 8 - The Same Points Proved by Examples
Now we come to examples. The first is from the Second Book of Chronicles, chapter 26, where we read that the King Ozias, when he usurped the office of Priests, was ejected from the Temple by the High Priest: and when he was stricken by God with leprosy he was also forced to depart from the city and renounce his kingdom in favor of his son. That he was deprived of his city and the administration of his kingdom, not by his choice but by the sentence of a Priest is clear; for we read (in Leviticus XIII): "Whoever," declares the Law, "is disfigured by leprosy and separated by the decision of a priest must live alone outside the camp." Since, therefore, this was the law in Israel, and at the same time we read in the Second Book of Chronicles, Chapter XXVI, that the king dwelt outside the city in an isolated house, while his son in the city judged the people of the land, we are compelled to say that he was exiled by the decision of the Priest and thereby deprived of his authority to rule. If, therefore, because of bodily leprosy, a priest, formerly, could judge a king and deprive him of a kingdom, why could a priest not do the same because of spiritual leprosy, that is, because of heresy which was prefigured by leprosy, as Augustine teaches (in quest. Evang. lib II, quest. 40), especially since Paul says in I Corinthians, X, that all things happened to the Jews by way of prefigurement.
A second example is found in the Second Book of Chronicles, where, when Athalia tyrranically took over the kingdom and fostered the cult of Baal, the High Priest Joiada called centurions and soldiers and ordered them to kill Athalia, which they did, and crowned Joas king in place of her: that, however, the High Priest did not persuade to but ordered the action is clear from the Fourth Book of Kings, chapter 11, "And the centurions (or captains) did everything that the Priest Jehoiada commanded them." Likewise, from the language of the Second Book of Chronicles, XXIII: "Jehoiada the High Priest went out to the captains and chiefs of the army, and said to them: 'Lead her (Athalia the Queen) beyond the precincts of the Temple and let her be killed outside by a sword.'" That the reason for the deposition and slaying of Athalia was not simply her tyrrany but also because she fostered the cult of Baal, is clear from those words which follow upon the description of her death: "And all the people went to the temple of Baal and tore it down. They smashed its altars and images, and they slew Mattan, the priest of Baal, before the altars." (II Chronicles, 23: 17-18)
The third example is of Blessed Ambrose who, when he was Bishop of Mediolanensis (Milan), was therefore the Pastor and Spiritual Father of the Emperor Theodosius who ordinarily held court at Mediolanensis (Milan); he first excommunicated him because of the execution he had ordered to be done by his soldiers at Thessalonica; then he ordered that he pass a law that sentences issued for execution or the confiscation of goods, could not be ratified until thirty days after the sentences had been announced, in order, precisely, that, if anything had been rashly dictated by anger, it would be revoked within that number of days. Theodoretus writes this (lib. hist. V, chap. 17) but Ambrose could not have excommunicated Theodosius on account of the executions unless he had first known about and judged the case, even though it was criminal and pertained to public justice. He could not have known and judged a case of this kind unless he was a legitimate judge of Theodosius "in foro externo" (in a public tribunal) [as opposed to "in fore interno," the strictly secret forum of Confession].
Moreover, to order the Emperor to institute a law of the state and to prescribe its form-- does this not clearly show that a bishop can sometimes use temporal power even over those who themselves have received power over others? And if any bishop can do that, how much more cannot the Head Bishop?
A fourth example is found in the privilege of Gregory I, which he granted to the monastery of St. Medard, and is found at the end of his letter: "If any king, priest, judge or representative of secular personages should violate decrees of our issuance or any of our precepts, of whatever dignity or venerability he is, let him be deprived of his honor."
A fifth example relates to Gregory the Second who forbade the Emperor, Leo the Image-maker, from receiving the payment of taxes from Italians and thus deprived him of part of his imperial power. The Centuries of Magdeburg, VIII, cap. 10, acknowledge this in the life of Gregory the Second but reprehend him and say that he was a traitor to his own father-land; but they adduce no writer who decries this deed of Gregory, while, on the contrary, we have many who have praised him as holy and justified, namely, Cedrenus, Zonara, in the life of Leo the Isaurian, and all other historians who have written about the events of these times.
A sixth example is of Zachary, who, when requested by leading Franks, deposed Childericus, and, in his place, ordered that Pipin, the father of Charles the Great, be made king. The cause for all this was that, because of the inactivity of Childericus, extreme disaster seemed to be imminent for both religion and the kingdom in Gaul, as is clear from Cedrenus in the life of Leo the Isaurian (Paulo Diacono, lib. VI, cap. 5, de gest. Longobard. et S. Bonafacio Episcopo Muguntino in epist. ad Zachar).
Heretics also acknowledge the fact and find it reprehensible, as the Centuries of Magdeburg, in VIII, cap. 10, where they say that the Pope had boldly exercised power that was quasi divine. But they could not find a critic among the ancient writers: we, however, have a great many who approve, namely, Ado, Sigebert, Rhegino in the Chronicles, but on this topic we have written much in Contra Calvinum, in lib. II, cap. 17.
A seventh example is provided by Leo the Third, who transferred the imperial rule from the Greeks to the Germans because the Greeks could bring no help to the struggling Western Church. From which it developed that, although the imperial dignity, considered absolutely, is not from the Pontiff but from God, by means of the law of nations, as we have shown above from Gelasius, Nicholas, and Innocent the Third, nevertheless, the Emperors who date from the time of Charles the Great, owe their imperial rule to the Pontiff.
The fact that this power is now among the Germans is due to the Pontiff: and although it would not be absolutely necessary that the Pope confirm the Emperor, nor that the Emperor make an oath of fidelity to the Pontiff, nevertheless, from the time of the transfer of the Imperial Rule to the Germans, both are requirements, as is clear from Innocent the Third (cap. Venerabilem, extra de elect.) and from the unique Clementine declaration "de jurejurando," nor is this unjustly required. For he who could transfer the imperial rule to the Germans for the sake of the welfare of the Church, could also establish certain conditions, for the same reason, lest, namely, it should happen that a heretic or schismatic be installed.
The adversaries make a double reply to this example: for some deny that it was rightly done, that the Pontiff transfer the Imperial Rule from the Greeks to the Germans, and among these are the Magdeburgs who say (Cent. VIII, cap. 10, col. 751): "This transfer is a principal one of the miracles of Antichrist." Also Theodore Bibliander (tabula 10 suae Chronol.) says that Leo the Third, by a usurped authority, transferred the Imperium from the Greeks to the Romans. Others, however, that it was done by right but that the author of the transfer was not the Pontiff but the Roman people. Thus, Marsilius of Padua, as Pighius relates (lib. V Hierarch. Eccles., cap. 14).
To these first I reply: That this transfer was rightly and legitimately made is manifestly clear. First, by the agreement of the entire Christian world; for all Christians held Charlemagne and his successors as true Emperors; nor was there, at any time, any Christian king who wished to take precedence over the Emperor, even though some of them preceded him in power and in the age of their kingdom. The Lutherans are the first who, as they had despoiled the people of their Faith and religion, now struggle to bring down the Emperor from his throne. Secondly, (we argue) from the happy results of this transfer: in order that God might show that the transfer was rightly made, He adorned Charles with many victories and made his kingdom most flourishing and most beneficial to the Church. Thirdly, from the acknowledgement of the Greek Emperors, who more than once confessed that the Roman Pontiff could rightly do what he did. For, in the first place, when the Empress Irene heard that Charles had been called Emperor by the Pope, she not only did not decry it but even wished to marry Charles and would have done so, except that some untrustworthy eunuchs blocked it, as Zonares and Cedrenus write in the life of the same Irene.
Then, after the death of Irene, the Emperor Nicephorus, who succeeded her, sent Legates to Charles as the Emperor, as Ado writes in the Chronicles of the year 803, and, a little later, after the death of Nicephorus, Michael who succeeded him likewise sent Delegates to Charles, who openly saluted him as Emperor: as Ado writes in the Chronicles of the year 810. Not only the Greeks but also the Persians sent Legates and gifts to the recently created Emperor Charles: as Rhegino (lib. II) and Otto Frisingensis (lib. V cap. 31) and again (as Blondus writes, lib. V Decadis 2. and Platina, in the life of Alexander III) Emperor Emmanuel of the Greeks, when he heard that the Pontiff Alexander the Third had been reduced to extreme straits by the Emperor Frederick, offered to the same Pontiff help and a massive amount of money if he wished to return the Empire of the West to the Emperors of Constantinople: but the Pontiff replied that he did not want to reunite what his predecessors had, designedly and for the best of reasons, divided. Where, it should be noted that Emmanuel did not want anything else from the Pontiff than the title of Emperor: for he knew that possession itself could not be given by the Pontiff but had to be acquired by arms; he would not have wished to buy a mere title at so great a price if he had believed it to be empty and even false and illegitimate.
It is easy to reply to others who say that the author of the transfer was not the Pontiff but the People of Rome; for, in the first place, the Roman people hardly ever had the power of creating an Emperor; rather, the ancient Emperors, either by hereditary right held the imperium, like Octavius, Tiberius, Caius, or were created by the army, as were created Claudius, Vespasian, and others. And that the ordinary custom was that the Emperor was created by the army, Blessed Jerome testifies in a letter "ad Evagr." Whence derives the canon "Legimus, dist. 93." At the time of Charlemagne, there was no Roman army that could have made him Emperor; for there were in Italy only armies of the Greeks and the Lombards, and all of them were hostile to Charles; nor by hereditary title did Charles have the Imperium, as is clear.
Therefore, if the people of Rome had any authority in choosing an Emperor, they had certainly lost it when the seat of the Empire was transferred to Constantinople: for, subsequently, for about 500 years, that is, from Constantine the Great right up to Charlemagne, the Senate and People of Rome did nothing to create Emperors.
Moreover, all authors who write on this matter, like Zonaras and Cedrinus, on the life of Irene, Paul the Deacon (lib. XXIII. rer. Rom.), Ado (in Chron. anni 800), Albertus Krantzius (in Metropoli, lib. I. cap. 14), Otho Frisingensis (lib. V cap. 31), Marianus Scotus, Hermanus Contractus, Lambertus, Sigibertus, Rhegino, Palmerius, Blondus, and all other chronologists and historians affirm that Leo the Third transferred the Empire from the Greeks to the Franks or the Germans. Innocent the Third teaches the same (cap. Venerabilem, de elect.): "Right and power of this kind came to those from the Apostolic See which transferred the Roman Empire from the Greeks to the Germans, in the person of Charlemagne." And, in the same place, he adds that the German Princes openly recognized it. Charlemagne himself recognized, in a not obscure way, the same thing, when a will written by him, by which he left his sons as heirs of the Empire, he sent to Pope Leo, that he might confirm it by his signature, as Ado records (in Chron. anni 804). Finally, the same is manifest from the Confession of Emmanuel, the Greek Emperor, as was noted above.
An eigth example is of Gregory V, who issued a sanction concerning the election of an Emperor by seven German princes, which is observed up to this day. That this is so, besides Blondus (Decade 2. lib. III), Nauclerus (generat. 34.) Platina (in the life of Gregory V), and many other historians, the Centuries of Magdeburg also (X. cap. 10, col. 546) assert in these words: "Gregory, to adorn his fatherland with a certain outstanding dignity, sanctioned that the right would be in the possession of only Germans of choosing a King who, after receiving the crown from the Roman Pontiff would be called Emperor and Augustus. And Electors have been established: the Archbishops of Cologne, Trier, and Moguntinus, the 'Comes' ('Associate'?) of the Rhine Palatinate, the Duke of Saxony, the March of Brandenburg, and the King of Bohemia." Whether, however, he did it by right, they do not find. But if they want it to be done by right, they are forced to confess that the Pontiff is superior to the Emperor and all rulers, as is manifest: if, indeed, they should like to say that it was not legitimately but tyrranically done, they would injure their patrons and protectors, namely, the Duke of Saxony, the Palatine Comes (Associate), and the Marchio of Brandenburg. For what do they have that is more prized than the right to elect. But they do not have this legitimately if the one who gave it to them could not give it: that the Pontiff, however, gave it is beyond question.
It should be noted here, however, the Onuphrius (in lib. de Comit. Imperat.) has, contrary to the common historical opinion, written that the confirmation of the election of the Emperor was granted not by Gregory the Fifth but by Gregory the Tenth; which, even if it does not detract from the point we are making, I nevertheless think is not true. For Innocent the Third, who held the See seventy years before Gregory the Tenth, (in illo cap. Venerabilem, de elect.) indicates that, long before, the right of choosing an Emperor was granted to certain Princes of Germany: and Henry of Ostia who also flourished long before the time of Gregory the Tenth (in Comm. hujus cap.) says that Innocent speaks of seven Electors, and Pelagius Alvarus, who lived a little after the times of Gregory the Tenth, to such an extent that whatever Gregory the Tenth did became part of his memory; nevertheless, (lib. 1. art 41. de planctu Ecclesiae ["the Lament of the Church]) states that the election of the Emperor, which is now in use, was instituted by Gregory the Fifth, and he there enumerates the seven Electors which we have named above.
A ninth example is of Gregory the Seventh, who deposed the Emperor Henry the Fourth and ordered that another be chosen, as also the Magdeburgians confess (Cent. XI. cap. 10. in vita Gregorii VII) that this was rightly done, and with the approval and applause of all men, as we have shown above in the book, where we exhonorated the Pontiffs from certain calumnies of the Heretics.
A tenth example is of Innocent the Third who likewise deposed Otto the Fourth, as is clear from Blondus (Decade 2. lib. VI).
An eleventh example is of Innocent the Fourth who, at the General Council of Lyons, with the universal consent of the Fathers, deposed Frederick the Second and then left the imperial throne empty for 28 years, as Matthew Palmerius (in Chron.) noted. Still extant is the entire sentence pronounced against Frederick (cap. ad Apostolicae, de sent. et re judic. in 6). The same Innocent the Fourth gave a certain coadjutor to the King of Portugal, who might administer the kingdom, whenever, because of the neglect of the King, both the state and religion suffered harm. This is recorded (cap. Grandi, de suppl. neglig. Prelat, in 6).
A twelfth example is of Clement the Sixth who deposed the Emperor Louis the Fourth who had been excommunicated by John the Twenty Second and Benedict the Twelfth. For the history of this, see Pighius (lib. V. hierarch. Eccles. cap. 14 et 15, in Robertum Arboricensem, tom. 2, theorem 7. de utroque gladio).
The arguments of adversaries have been partly solved in II. lib. de Pontifice and partly they cannot be solved from their statements. See John of Turrecremata (lib. II. Sum. cap. ult. et penult.) and Albert Pighius, lib. V. cap. 15), who solve some trivial and easy arguments.
RE: St. Robert Bellarmine: On Papal Authority - Stone - 04-21-2022
Chapter 9 - Not to fight the Word of God, that one man should be the Ecclesiastical and, at the same time, a political Head
As to the third part of the question, since certain adversaries teach certain things about the temporal power which the supreme Pontiff has.
Is there question of a possession [of temporal power] held by sheer piracy?
Secondly, even if he were to have it [temporal power] by a just title, he could not retain what is in conflict with his spiritual power. So argues Calvin (lib. IV. Inst, cap. 11. 8 et 11). It will be necessary for us to prove both propositions, namely, that such a primacy befits the Pontiff, and that, in reality, he has and possesses it.
Therefore, that it is not repugnant that the Pontiff be at the same time the spiritual head and the temporal head of a certain province is proved first by the examples of Saints who are found to have been Kings and Princes. For, in the law of nature, Melchisedek was a King and a Pontiff, as is clear from Genesis XIV and Heb. VII. Also, formerly, the first-born was both a King and a High Priest, as Blessed Jerome teaches (in quaest. Hebr. in illud Genes. XLIX), "Reuben, my Firstborn." (Gen. XLIX, 3). It is clear, also, that Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob were placed over their own, both in those matters that pertained to religion and in those that pertained to political life.
Then, Moses was both the highest temporal Head and the supreme High-Priest, as is most clear from the Divine Word. For, in Exodus XVIII, it is said: "Moses sat down and judged the people." (Exodus, XVIII, 13). And in Chapter XXXII, he ordered that many of the people be killed for the sin of idolatry, and in Chapter XL, 27, he burned fragrant incense to the Lord, which was the most distinctive duty of the High Priest, as is clear from II Chronicles, chapter 26, and likewise in Leviticus, chapter 8, Moses consecrated Aaron as a priest, consecrated the Tabernacle and the altar, offered sacrifices and holocausts, which only a priest can do. Hence, Philo (lib. III, de vita Mosis) in the final words: "This is the life, this is the ending of Moses the King, the Legislator, the High Priest, the Prophet." And Gregory Nazianzen (in Orat. ad Gregor. Nysenn): "Moses," he says, "the Prince of princes, and Priest of priests, used Aaron as spokesman." Finally, Augustine says of the reign of Moses (q. 68, in Exod): "He sat alone on a judicial height, while the whole people stood around." About his pontificate, moreover, he says (q. 23 in Levit): "There were two High Priests," he says, "Moses and Aaron."
In addition, Heli was both High Priest and political Judge for forty years, as is clear from the First Book of Kings, c. I, and IV. Finally, the Machabees, Judas, Jonathan, Simon, John, and others, up to the time of Herod, were at the same time High Priests and political leaders, as is clear from the Books of Maccabees and from Josephus, in Book XII of the Antiquities and the following.
It is proven by a second reason. First, ecclesiastical and political power are not opposed, but both are good, both from God, both praiseworthy, and one serves the other; therefore, they are not mutually repugnant. Therefore, they can be present in the same one.
Secondly, much more diverse are peace and war than are temporal and spiritual goods: but one and the same King presides over a Senate and an army, over those clad in togas and over those equipped with arms. Therefore, much more probably can one preside over temporal and spiritual matters.
Thirdly, one King can govern kingdoms the most diverse in customary morals, rites, laws and practices: and, for a similar reason, one Bishop can govern very many churches, as is manifest from the ancient Patriarchates (to pass over the Roman) any of which had under him a great many bishops; therefore, one man can rule one episcopacy and one principality. For it is either more difficult to rule an episcopate than a principality, or easier, or equally difficult: if the first, therefore, if one rules two episcopacys, even rules ["well", presumably] two principalities, even more can he rule one principality and one episcopacy; in the third suppostion, where one rules two principalities or two episcopacys, equally, he can rule one episcopacy and one principality.
Fourthly, those who conferred temporal principalities on the Bishop of Rome and on other bishops were devout men; on that account, especially, they were commended by the whole Church, as is clear in the case of Constantine and Charlemagne and his son Louis, who were, therefore, call "Pious" and even praised by adversaries: and, to the contrary, those who wished to confiscate a principality of that kind, like Aiustulphus, King of the Lombards, the Henrys IV and V, Otto IV, Frederick the First and the Second, are cited by all historians as impious and sacriligious.
Concerning Aistulphus, Ado wrote that "Aiustulphus, the King of the Lombards very shamefully smashed the bequest conferred on his predecessors by the gift of Blessed Peter and bestowed on his soldiers the faculties of the Roman Church." And, further on, "Aistulphus, while he was pursuing the hunt, was, by divine justice, suddenly stricken and died." Also, Blessed Bernard (epist. 242. ad Rom.) vehemently rebuked the Romans because they had withdrawn from Pope Eugenius: the reason for their disagreement was, as is clear from Platina and other historians, because they did not want to be subject to the Pontiff in temporal matters, but, as by their ancient custom, they wanted the republic to be governed by Consuls. Concerning Henry the Fourth, see what we indicated above, in Book IV, chapter 13.
Nor were the best rulers only those who thus enriched the Apostolic Church, but also very many of those who had received similar resources and a principality. For Platina wrote that Leo the Fourth was renowned for miracles, all writers call Leo the Ninth a Saint, and Sigebertus and Otto Frisingensis, write that Gregory the Seventh was illustrious for miracles, and also the best of men, writes Lambert Schnaffnaburgensis, and we have said much about the very holy life of Celestine the Fifth and his many miracles, described by Peter ab Aliaco, the Bishop of Camerina. Finally, all writers praise Adrian the First, Leo the Third, Nicholas the First, Innocent the Third, and not a few others, who, nevertheless, as is sufficiently clear, administered a principality along with a pontificate.
Then, lastly, it is proved by experience. For, although it should be preferable, absolutely speaking, that Pontiffs deal with the spiritual and Kings with the temporal; nevertheless, because of the evil of the times, experience cries out that it is not only usefully but even necessarily, and out of the special providence of God, that some temporal rulerships have been given to the Pontiff and other bishops: for, if there had not been Prince Bishops in Germany, none of them would have remained in their sees to this day. As, therefore, for a long time in the Old Testament, there were High Priests without temporal power to rule, and, nevertheless, during later days, religion could not persist and be defended unless High Priests were also Kings, so also we have seen happen to the Church, that, in early times it did not need temporal power to defend its majesty, but now it seems to need it out of necessity.
Now, indeed, that the Supreme Pontiff has, by right, the ruling power he has, can be proven easily by the fact that he has it by the gift of Rulers: to this effect writes Paul the Deacon (de gestis Longobardorum, lib. VI, cap. 26): "Aripertus, the King of the Lombards, restored the donation of the patrimony of Alpius Cotiare, which formerly belonged by right to the Apostolic See, but which for a long time had been confiscated by the Lombards, and directed that this donation be written down in gold letters for Rome." Bede recalls both the same donation and its restitution (in lib. de sex aetatibus); so also writes Ado (in Chronico anni 727): "Moreover, the King Pipin gave over Ravenna and the whole Pentapolis to the Apostles Peter and Paul." And there is extant, in the Decree of Gratian (dist. 63) the constitution of Charles the First, son of Charlemagne, in this form: "I, Louis, the august Emperor of the Romans, establish and concede by this pact of our confirmation to Blessed Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, and through you, to your Vicar the Lord Paschal, the Supreme Pontiff, and to his successors in perpetuity, as you have held, from your predessors right up to now, in your power and possession, the city of Rome with its duchy, suburban and mountainous, maritime, littoral, portside, with all the cities, castles, towns, and villas in the parts of Thusia [Tuscany?].
Likewise, Leo, the Bishop of Ostia (lib. I Chron. Cassinen. cap. 9): "The same renowned King (Pipin), together with his sons, made to Blessed Peter and his Vicar," he said, "the concession relative to the cities and territories of Italy within certain boundaries. From Lunis with the isle of Corsica, thence to Suranum, to Mount Bardo, to Verctum, to Parma, Rhegium, Mantua, and to the mountain of Sicily, together with the entire exarchate of Ravenna, as it had been in antiquity, with the provinces of Venice and Istria: and the entire duchy of Spoleto and Benevento." And, further on: "The same King coming to Italy with the Roman Pontiff, subjected to the Holy See Ravenna and the other twenty cities taken by the already mentioned Aistulphus." The same Leo (lib. III, cap.48): "In the year 1079 of our Lord's Incarnation, the Countess Matilda, fearing the army of the Emperor Henry, devoutly presented the provinces of Ligouria and Thusciam (Tuscany?) to the Pope Gregory, and S. R. E. (devotissime obtulit)." And there are extant at Rome authentic documents of these and similar donations. But even if none of these were extant, the (right of) prescription after 800 years would suffice. For even kingdoms and empires acquired by banditry, finally, after a long time, become legitimate: for otherwise, by what right, did Julius Caesar occupy the Roman Empire? And yet, at the time of Tiberius, Christ says, in Matthew XXII, 21: "Render to Caesar what belongs to Caesar." by what right did the Franks invade Gaul, the Saxons, Britain, the Goths, Spain? And, nevertheless, who in our time would say that the kingdoms established by them are illegitimate?